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Abstract 
 
Preliminary research isolated a set of thirteen candidate principles that military officers 
need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency.  A meta-synthesis of 
eight classical theorists of counterinsurgency sought support for and consensus on these 
principles and discovered considerable consensus on all of them.  Therefore, this set could be 
considered a “classical” model of counterinsurgency for use in counterinsurgency campaign 
planning.  
 The contemporary global political environment is very different from that the classical 
theorists faced. Therefore, additional research attempted to understand the changes in the 
environment and in the nature of insurgency to determine the changes necessary to update the 
classical model.  The most important changes in the environment included the end of the Cold 
War and of superpower rivalry, the increase in the number and influence of important non-state 
actors, urbanization, and globalization of media and communications technologies.   
Corresponding changes in the nature of insurgency included the changed objectives of insurgent 
groups; the globalization of local national struggles; the formation of global terrorist groups that 
can be perceived as insurgencies; the advent of networked, rather than hierarchical, insurgent 
organizations; and increased emphasis on the use of media to generate support for insurgent 
causes and to spread fear. 
Nevertheless, analysis found the classical principles to be remarkably durable.  While the 
tactics and techniques needed to put each principle into action might be very different from those 
of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles remain valid, and are still useful for campaign planning. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Justification 
 Nation-building is an activity that has been in the American news often since the 
intervention in Somalia in 1992, and it has engendered a good deal of debate over the 
appropriateness of U.S. involvement in nation-building efforts and over what means should be 
employed.  Much debate centers on the commitment of military resources to the often-difficult 
and dangerous situations where opportunities for nation-building are found.  Conspicuous 
failures, such as the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, depicted in the book, 
Blackhawk Down (Bowden, 1999), and the 2001 movie of the same name, have convinced many 
Americans that we should not intervene in failed states because the prospects for success are too 
small or because these activities are inappropriate uses of military capability (Von Hippel, 2000).  
On the other hand, many persons and organizations have criticized the U.S. for failure to 
intervene in Rwanda and for permitting the genocide there to continue (U.S. Committee for 
Refugees, 2000).  Bonner (1994) reports praise for French military peacekeepers that did 
intervene there. 
What Is Nation-building? 
 Before beginning a lengthy discussion of nation-building, it is appropriate to seek a 
consensus on a definition of the term as it is used in professional and scholarly literature.  Some 
have objected to the term, “nation-building” because it improperly uses the term “nation”—
which refers to people and culture—when it really means “state”—the capacity of the 
government to govern.  Fukuyama (2004a) put it this way: “What we are really talking about is 
state-building—that is, creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police 
forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the 
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like.” (para. 4).  While state-building is the more accurate term, nation-building is far more 
common in scholarly and professional literature and on American editorial pages.  It is the one 
used by political leaders in speeches designed to garner support for policy, and so it is the one I 
will use.  That said, however, for our purposes, the terms are synonymous. 
 Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse (2007) state, “Nation-building, as it is commonly 
referred to in the United States, involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to 
promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging 
from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (p. xvii).  Dobbins et al believe 
there is great potential for achieving success in nation-building efforts provided the purposes for 
which the intervention is undertaken are matched by the resources committed to it.  This is the 
definition I will use, because Ambassador Dobbins is among the most highly respected thinkers 
on nation-building, and because it does not require democratization, which is much more 
difficult than the creation of a stable state.  
 Payne (2005), who differs with Dobbins and his colleagues in their view on the efficacy 
of nation-building, describes it as “the idea of invading and occupying a land afflicted by 
dictatorship or civil war and turning it into a democracy” (para. 2). Von Hippel (2000) writes, 
“Nation building, which really means state building, has over the years signified an effort to 
construct a government that may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable.”  She 
continues, “Today, nation building normally implies the attempt to create democratic and secure 
states” (p. 96).  She explains that military intervention precedes the beginning of nation-building 
efforts, and that a military presence is integral throughout the effort.  Only military organizations 
have the capability to establish security, repress spoilers, protect relief and development workers 
and supplies, and ultimately, to permit the formation of a legitimate state, capable of maintaining 
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order and encouraging further development.  The consensus among these scholars is that the 
military is a key player—or perhaps the key player—in the nation-building intervention. 
Where Are We Going? 
 At issue in this study is the role of the U.S. military in nation-building activities.  I will 
argue that humanitarian concerns and national interest can justify nation-building, and that a 
military presence is required, due to the weakness of the local government, to provide an 
atmosphere of security in which the remainder of the nation-building effort can move forward.  I 
will introduce the various roles the military might play in nation-building—roles that vary with 
the situation, but vary primarily with the degree of security available.  We will examine the 
various roles apportioned to the military, observe the reasons why the military is not as good at 
nation-building as it might be, and discuss how the performance of the military can be improved.  
Finally, we will select the activity characterized by the most violent situations faced by the 
military in nation-building—counterinsurgency warfare—and seek ways in which military 
officers can become better at counterinsurgency, where “better” is defined as achieving U.S. 
policy objectives—which, in counterinsurgency, by definition, is supporting the local national 
government to establish a stable state—with as little violence and human suffering as possible. 
 We will omit any discussion of policy—that is, whether or not it is appropriate for a 
nation to use its military to assist a state, or coerce groups within a state, to work toward a 
peaceful future, in general or in specific cases—because the military in the United States is a tool 
of policy and not a policymaking institution.  Rather we will treat the decision to intervene as 
made, and focus only on the ways in which the military can affect or facilitate policy objectives 
with as little violence and as little cost in human life and suffering as possible. 
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 This study will explore the military’s possible roles in nation-building; specifically, it 
will seek to determine the principles military officers engaged in counterinsurgency operations 
need to understand. 
Why Nation-build? 
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify three “opportunities” for nation-building as “the 
prevention of civil war in currently peaceful environments; the shortening of conflicts in 
currently war-torn environments; and the reduction in the risk of the resumption of conflict in 
post-conflict situations” (p. 2).  This demonstrates that the need for nation-building is found in 
states in conflict—those involved in civil war or those with sizable insurgencies; states emerging 
from conflict; and states too weak to exercise the authority characteristic of legitimate 
governments, and in which violence might break out at any time.  All of these can be called 
failed states, and these are the places that require international assistance for nation-building. 
 Nation-building can be justified on humanitarian grounds.  The Human Security Report 
(Human Security Centre, 2005) observed that since 1992, the number of wars in the world has 
declined by half, and the number of persons killed, wounded, or displaced by conflict has 
declined by a greater proportion.  The same document, after a detailed study of the conditions 
which lead to stability and peace between states and also within states, concluded that an upsurge 
in international activism, led primarily by the UN, which has been freed from the stasis caused 
by the Cold War, has played a critical role in reducing political violence around the world.  This 
activism includes activities such as conflict management, conflict prevention, post-conflict 
peace-building, preventive diplomacy, and peacemaking.  For example, peacemaking efforts 
(those that seek to stop on-going conflicts) have increased from four in 1990 to 15 in 2002 
(Human Security Centre, 2005).  The same report argues that international interventions are 
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more widely supported, that post-conflict peacekeeping operations are more common, and that 
the international community is more likely to use force to deter groups or states from 
undermining peace agreements or to use economic coercion to encourage compliance.  UN 
action is evidence of an international consensus that intervention for the purpose, usually with an 
effective military component, is considered desirable if it results in a decrease in violence, and 
ultimately in an increase in human welfare. 
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that post-conflict relapses into violence make up about 
half of civil wars around the world, and conclude that improved interventions in post-conflict 
situations are the most cost-effective way of reducing violence and the resulting human 
suffering.  Dobbins et al (2007) argued that international military interventions are often the only 
means to prevent post-conflict society from slipping back into violence.  Kaysen and Rathjens 
(2003) argued for the formation of a volunteer UN military, in part, because this would increase 
the willingness of member nations to act in dangerous situations.  Only the military can stop 
fighting and enforce order.  For example, Bonner (1994) asserts the French army saved the lives 
of thousands of people by halting the genocide in Rwanda during its intervention there.  Von 
Hippel (2000) explains that military inventions in failed states stem, in part, from popular 
reaction to media coverage of human suffering which prompts democratic governments to 
intervene.  Once order is restored, relief and development activities resume, and ideally, a 
government is formed which permits the transition of security functions to local authorities, and 
therefore, the disengagement of foreign soldiers. 
 Nation-building, or more specifically, U.S. participation in nation-building, may also be 
justified by U.S. national interests.  Von Hippel (2000) argues the U.S. declined to intervene in 
Rwanda in the spring and summer of 1994, largely due to the negative popular reaction to the 
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deaths of U.S. soldiers in Somalia in October, 1993.  However, the U.S. chose to intervene in 
Haiti in September, 1994, because it perceived its interests were involved in the latter case.   The 
Bush administration justifies the nation-building efforts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
denying a haven to global terrorist groups and bettering the poor conditions of instability and 
poverty thought to breed terrorists.  The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) names 
terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, the top threat to U.S. national security for the next 
several years.  Defense Secretary Gates thinks nation-building so essential to U.S. security 
interests that he has called for the development of “soft power” in the form a cadre of experts 
capable of managing reconstruction and stabilization projects in failed states (Matthews, 2008).  
Dobbins thinks nation-building so important that he is afraid that the U.S. experience in Iraq, and 
the difficulties encountered there, will convince the U.S. public and Congress that Americans 
should not engage in nation-building (as cited in Hegland, 2007). 
How Prevalent Is Nation-building? 
 The United States is no stranger to nation-building.  Boot (2002) makes the case that the 
U.S. military has a great deal of experience in small wars and in nation-building.  Experience in 
the Philippines, in Central America, and throughout the Caribbean has provided considerable 
precedent for the use of American power to promote stability in failing states.  Dobbins et al 
(2007) have observed that the U.S. has participated in nation-building seven times since 1991—
in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.  Consequently, the U.S. has 
the most experience of any Western nation in nation-building activities.  Moreover, the pace of 
nation-building has increased dramatically, from a new U.S. intervention once every 10 years 
during the Cold War to one every two years since 1992 (Fukuyama, 2004a).  The pace of UN 
activities has increased even more, from a new intervention every four years to two per year 
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(Dobbins et al, 2007).  The missions are also becoming more complex and ambitious, which 
means that interventions take longer and are more expensive (Dobbins et al, 2007; Human 
Security Centre, 2005).  
 Despite the common perception that nation-building often fails, the Human Security 
Centre (2005) attributes the global decline in violence in failed states to the intervention of the 
international community in the form of nation-building efforts.  The RAND Corporation 
determined that the UN enjoys substantial success in two-thirds of its nation-building missions, 
and that the U.S., which takes on more difficult missions, still succeeded in 50% of its efforts 
(Dobbins et al, 2007).  The reconstruction of Germany and Japan following World War II is 
often cited as a clear example of nation-building success (Dobbins et al., 2003).  All of this 
indicates that there is a substantial hope for success.  
 Of course, nation-building also has its critics; Payne (2006) studied 51 attempts to nation-
build by the U.S. or Great Britain since 1850.  He found exactly 14 successes for the 
unimpressive success rate of 27%.  However, Payne’s definition of nation-building requires 
intervening in a failed state and “turning it into a democracy” (p.599).  Thus “successful” nation-
building needs to confirm that military intervention led to “a democracy that lasted at least 
several decades” (p. 603), which is a considerably higher hurdle than “transforming a society 
emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 
xvii).  Also, Payne contends that even in the 14 cases that were “successes,” there is often not 
sufficient evidence that the military intervention actually helped the democratic process.  
What Are the Military’s Roles in Nation-building? 
 The military’s roles in nation-building vary with time and place, and specifically with the 
relative security of the nation-building situation.  In general, the less secure the local situation, 
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the more difficult it is for non-military actors, critical to nation-building efforts, to work.  Severe 
difficulty would result in the failure of nation-building efforts, the likely resumption of violence 
and an increase in suffering.  Therefore, the worse the security situation, the more important the 
military becomes as a part of nation-building. 
  While a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of U.S. military doctrine that 
relates to nation-building—which the military calls “stability operations” (Dobbins et al, 
2007)—and counterinsurgency is contained in the next chapter, an overview is helpful here.  The 
most recent version of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (2008), the capstone document for doctrine 
concerning Army operations, conceives of potential operational environments as 1) stable peace, 
which provides the best opportunity for sustained human development; 2) unstable peace, in 
which conflict could break out; 3) insurgency, in which disaffected groups within a state are 
currently fighting the government; and 4) general war, in which states violently contend for 
advantage against one another.  The Army’s broad categories of activities in these environments 
include peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, 
and major combat operations.  Only peace operations and irregular warfare require substantial 
stability operations, or nation-building; these are the only ones of interest here. 
 Two types of peace operations require substantial military commitment.  According to 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 (1999), in peacekeeping, soldiers monitor a voluntary accord 
between groups, and there is rarely violence that requires a military response.  The long-standing 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) are peacekeepers who monitor the 1979 accords 
between Israel and Egypt.  On the other hand, peace enforcement will “compel compliance” with 
accords affecting groups that might not wish to cease fighting.  FM 3-0 (2008) explains that 
peace enforcement might require violent military action that varies in intensity.  An example is 
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the enforcement of the air exclusion zone protecting Kurdish refugees in 1991 as part of 
Operation Provide Comfort and many activities in the Balkans. 
 Small groups of specially-trained experts perform the U.S. military tasks associated with 
most forms of irregular warfare. Usually, these experts provide expertise, training, and advice to 
local national governments and their militaries, and there is no need to develop capacity to do 
these things.  Only counterinsurgency requires the mass commitment of U.S. soldiers, who must 
be trained appropriately to conduct the difficult military activities—and many activities that are 
not quite “military”—associated with counterinsurgency efforts. 
How Is Counterinsurgency Related to Nation-building? 
 Counterinsurgency is related to nation-building in that counterinsurgency is the hardest 
military role in the most violent and difficult nation-building environments.  In fact, 
counterinsurgency is a microcosm of nation-building, with all its inherent difficulties combined 
with the problems caused by a very poor security environment.  Due to the lack of security, 
many of the developmental tasks that are better performed by the local national government with 
assistance from other agencies, international organizations, or civil society organizations, must 
be performed by soldiers.  This point cannot be overstated: in counterinsurgency environments 
soldiers must do more than fight insurgents and guard facilities.  They must also do a host of 
other activities designed to persuade citizens, some of whom are insurgents or sympathizers, to 
support the government (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005).  Ideally, both nation-building and its 
most difficult subset, counterinsurgency, should be interagency and multinational efforts.  If they 
are not, because the other organizations lack the security they require to work, the 
counterinsurgency effort, which may be all the nation-building going, must still be multi-
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disciplinary, and soldiers must have the skills to do the key tasks associated with it until the 
security situation improves sufficiently for other organizations to relieve soldiers of these tasks. 
 Counterinsurgency is important because success in the counterinsurgency effort makes 
possible many of the other nation-building activities that build a sustained peace and make 
possible sustainable human development.  Successful counterinsurgency is a successful 
competition for the loyalty of the population; it implies the government is perceived as 
legitimate, and that it delivers security and other important services to the people.  Furthermore, 
successful counterinsurgency is conducted in a way that minimizes violence and the human 
suffering associated with it.  Simply put, the more proficient the counterinsurgent, the more 
quickly the government can govern, the more quickly peace is restored, and the fewer people 
who are killed, wounded, or displaced.  That is why it is important to study counterinsurgency 
warfare. 
What Is Counterinsurgency? 
 To describe counterinsurgency, we must first understand insurgency.  FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, defines an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of 
a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (p. 1-1).  Therefore, 
counterinsurgency is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions 
taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (FM 3-24, p. 1-1).  Some notable examples of 
counterinsurgency are U.S.-led multinational attempts to aid the government of Iraq to defeat 
insurgent groups there; the NATO-led activities against a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan; and 
the British colonial government’s struggle against Communist guerrillas in Malaya.  Notable 
insurgencies include the Chinese Communists’ struggle against the Nationalist government in the 
1920s-30s and their subsequent struggle against the Japanese occupiers in the 1930s-40s; the 
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Sandinistas’ defeat of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua; Castro’s overthrow of the Batista regime 
in Cuba; and arguably, the American colonies’ struggle for independence against Great Britain 
begun in 1775.  In addition, Lacy (2003) and Kilcullen (2004), among others, have argued that 
the phenomenon of Al Qaeda is a “global insurgency” that might best be addressed through 
counterinsurgency techniques. 
 Other terms used by scholars, practitioners, and journalists to describe political and 
military events associated with the attempt to change a government, secede from a state, or throw 
off an occupier (and the attempts to prevent these) include revolution, revolutionary war, 
rebellion, civil war, guerilla war, irregular war, people’s war, mutiny, insurrection, asymmetric 
war, partisan war, small war, revolt, uprising, and others.  Which one is most appropriate 
depends upon the time and place, the era, the tactics used, and the perspective of the writer.   
Why Do Americans Do Nation-building and Counterinsurgency So Badly? 
 Dobbins et al (2007) explain several critical reasons why Americans have gotten a slow 
start at nation-building. The first is that the pace of nation-building has increased dramatically, 
from one new intervention per decade during the Cold War to one new intervention every two 
years since 1989.  Moreover, these interventions have pursued more ambitious goals, and 
therefore become more lengthy and expensive, possibly because the U.S. was freed from the 
constraint of superpower competition.  But early difficulties, especially in Somalia and the 
former Yugoslavia, have made the American people and the Congress suspicious of the long 
term commitment of soldiers abroad.  Consequently, the development of doctrine during the 
Clinton administration began slowly, and the Defense and State Departments did not develop the 
capability to carry out these missions.  No special training was available, no guidelines were 
published, and this sort of service was not considered career-enhancing (Dobbins et al, 2007).  
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The Bush administration was against the use of U.S. soldiers for nation-building before the 
events of 9-11 changed the president’s mind.  The difficulties encountered in Iraq, however, are 
forcing both State and Defense to begin efforts to develop capacity for nation-building. 
 This study also begs the more focused question: Why does the military do nation-
building badly? The primary reason is that for many years, policymakers, citizens, and military 
officers believed that nation-building was a distraction from the military’s primary mission.  
George W. Bush, as a presidential candidate in 2000, said, "I don't think our troops ought to be 
used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war" 
(quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, para. 1).  His criticism was directed against the perceived misuse 
of American soldiers by the Clinton administration in interventions around the world. 
 Weigley (1973), in a very influential work, concluded that the American style of waging 
war attempted, through firepower and attrition, to utterly destroy the military of an opposing 
state.  In this view, fighting is an alternative to negotiation rather than part of the bargaining 
process, despite Clausewitz’s influential dictum that “war is politics by other means.”  The short 
title of Weigley’s book, The American Way of War has become shorthand for this attitude in 
discussions of strategic military operations.    Weigley’s thesis, though not undisputed, is widely 
accepted and frequently cited in policy debates concerning the use of the military instrument of 
national power.  Cassidy (2004) referred to this attitude as the “big war paradigm” and described 
it as “an obstacle to learning how to fight guerillas” (p. 42).  
 The American tradition of civilian control of the military reinforces Weigley’s American 
way of war because it increases the separation between political and military spheres 
(Echevarria, 2004). This has the very laudable effect of preventing the military from taking too 
much power in our society, and has the additional laudable effect of limiting the interference of 
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political leaders in ongoing military operations, yet it removes the subtlety from the use of the 
military instrument of national power as a diplomatic tool, and reduces it to a bludgeon whose 
sole purpose is to beat down recalcitrant adversaries. 
 Evans (1987) thought the trauma of the military experience in Vietnam inhibited the 
discussion of “low intensity conflict” (LIC) among American military officers and other 
members of the national security intelligentsia.  This inhibited the military’s willingness to 
discuss, and therefore to learn from, the experience in Vietnam.  Furthermore, Evans thought 
military officers disliked the ambiguity of the political nature of counterinsurgency operations, 
and the resulting constant need to consult with civilian authorities and experts.  This had the 
effect of diluting military authority and increasing civilian interference in “military” affairs. 
Things are changing, however.  Officers have realized the need to overcome qualms 
about the political nature of LIC environments; in other words, their preference for victory, given 
the commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, has trumped their desire for autonomy 
within conflict situations.  In fact, Marine General Pace, chairman of the joint chiefs, has 
observed that "Our civilian agencies are under-resourced to meet the requirements of the 21st 
century” (quoted in Hegland, 2007), and Defense Secretary Gates has called for the development 
of “soft power” in other agencies of the U.S. government (Matthews, 2008), because these men 
realize that soldiers alone lack the skill set required for success in nation-building and 
counterinsurgency environments.  Finally, according to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
the absence of powerful enemies means that, in the first decade of the 21st century, terrorists, 
particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction, are the most credible and dangerous 
threats to U.S. security.  Officers understand that capturing or killing terrorists, and removing 
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their havens in failed states, which may be done through nation-building, constitute the military’s 
most important mission in 2008. 
 The final reason we do it badly, despite our growing realization that it is important, is that 
nation-building and counterinsurgency are hard.  Fukuyama (2004a) said “we must remember 
that nation-building is inherently difficult” (Failure to Anticipate section, para. 1).  President 
Bush, in 2003, even before the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq, said, “Rebuilding Iraq will require 
a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own…” (quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, 
para. 2).  Hegland quoted Dobbins, who she referred to as the “maestro” of nation-building, as 
saying he wrote several important Rand studies on nation-building, in part, so that "nobody could 
ever again go up to Congress and say we could do this on the cheap” (quoted in Hegland, para. 
4).  The Army field manual for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (2006) and Nagl (2006) quote an 
unnamed Special Forces officer in Iraq, who said “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s 
warfare—it is the graduate level of war,” which requires a fundamentally different approach than 
massing the effects of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy military forces. 
 However, for reasons that we have already seen, the need for nation-building remains.  
Dobbins is so convinced of its importance that he worries the American public will learn the 
wrong lesson from our experience in Iraq, and oppose nation-building efforts in the future.  He 
said, "The Pentagon and the administration have reflected on their experience in Iraq and 
concluded that we need to do better next time, while most of the public and Congress have 
reflected and concluded that we need to not do this the next time" (quoted in Hegland, 2007, 
para. 13). 
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Is There Hope? 
 The short answer is yes.  The State Department, the Defense Department, the uniformed 
military, other government agencies, scholars and policymakers now have observed a gap exists 
between what events on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown we need to know and 
what we actually know.   
 Military professionals and scholars are closing this gap.  They are reading the old 
counterinsurgency classics by authors such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara, and Galula.  They are 
writing about counterinsurgency.  Military Review published a special issue in October, 2006, 
where all the articles related to counterinsurgency.  A perusal of the website of the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) will unearth dozens of articles relating to counterinsurgency 
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although many of the articles are about how to do tactical 
tasks better—doing things right—there is still an expanding body of literature that attempts to 
determine and do the right things. 
 All the thought about counterinsurgency is leading to a paradigm shift overtaking the 
Army.  Soldiers are beginning to understand that insurgency is not defeated by force alone, but is 
defeated through a combination of combat operations, effective public information, governance 
capacity-building and economic development (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005).  The new 
paradigm decreases the emphasis on violent action and increases that on all the other activities 
required in counterinsurgency.  The publication of the new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24 
(2006), which downplays the role of combat operations as a part of the counterinsurgency effort, 
is an acknowledgement that fighting alone is insufficient, and the subsequent elevation of its 
principal author, General David Petraeus, to the command of all troops in Iraq, shows that 
change is taking place. 
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There has been an explosion of interest in counterinsurgency with many more 
publications from soldiers, diplomats, journalists, and policy wonks.  Even the public is 
interested, as evidenced by the reprint of classic books on counterinsurgency, such as the 
Marines’ Small Wars Manual (2005) (three separate reprints are available at Amazon.com), 
originally published in 1940; Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare (2006), written in 1964; the 
University of Chicago Press printing of FM 3-24 (2007); and the proliferation of books on Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the global war on terror. 
 This study of counterinsurgency is to advance this process of learning.  More effective 
counterinsurgency prefers to persuade people to support their government, and fights selectively 
and only when necessary.  Effective counterinsurgency also reduces the level of violence, 
achieves policy objectives faster, begins sustainable development sooner, costs less money, kills 
fewer local nationals, and results in fewer military casualties. 
Why Is This Study Significant? 
 My argument in nutshell is this: Nation-building saves human lives, decreases human 
suffering, and increases human welfare.  It increases the security under which people live, and 
makes possible sustainable human development.  The military has a key role in nation-building 
because it provides security for the remainder of the effort, because it alone can coerce 
recalcitrant groups to lay down their arms, and because it can enforce peace.  A powerful 
insurgency poses the greatest threat to nation-building efforts; it makes the environment violent 
and leads to the loss of human lives and an increase of displaced persons.  Military organizations 
must know how to engage and defeat insurgency in order to return the society to peace.  
Moreover, during the conduct of counterinsurgency, many of the capacity-building, 
development, and relief tasks normally associated with nation-building are conducted by soldiers 
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in order to relieve suffering and persuade the population to support the government over the 
insurgent, ending the conflict.  Therefore, effective counterinsurgency saves lives. 
What Are the Research Questions? 
 In the course of my inquiry I found it necessary to explain the nature of 
counterinsurgency, and its relationship to nation-building and to human well-being; to examine 
the roles that military forces play in enhancing human well-being in difficult and violent 
environments; and to examine the quality of the military’s performance as counterinsurgents.  
My own experience in Iraq suggested there was room for improvement in the military’s 
performance, and my research has uncovered substantial literature that shares this perception.  
Therefore, a gap exists between what the average officer knows about counterinsurgency and 
what he or she needs to know.  Thus, I sought to answer the question, “Why do Americans do 
nation-building and counterinsurgency so badly?” which of course, begs the question, “How can 
we do it better?” 
 Therefore, the research question which drives this inquiry is simply this: “What 
principles do military officers need to understand to conduct counterinsurgency effectively and 
humanely?” 
What Are the Research Objectives? 
The further identification of specific objectives may help to clarify and articulate the 
expectations of research results.  In this case, the literature and available data limit the inquiry to 
a qualitative methodology.  Nevertheless, preliminary research suggests a rigorous and 
systematic qualitative examination of the most influential literature—that we might describe as 
“classic” literature—on  insurgency and counterinsurgency will independently identify a set of 
principles upon which considerable consensus exists.  This sort of effort is not unprecedented; 
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indeed other lists of principles exist.  For example, Galula (1964) published several lists, 
including, among other things, the prerequisites for successful insurgency, some “laws and 
principles for counterinsurgency warfare” (p. 71), and a proposed strategy containing a step-by-
step procedure for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign.  Another notable example is FM 3-
24 which contains a list of “historical principles” (p. 1-20-1-24) another of “contemporary 
imperatives” (p. 1-24-1-26), and still another of “paradoxes” (p. 1-26- 1-28).  Still an empty 
niche in the literature exists that a systematic examination of classical works will fill by 
producing independently a list of principles sufficiently agreed upon to be fairly described as a 
classic theory of counterinsurgency.  At a minimum, this systematic examination will illuminate 
the strength of the consensus surrounding each identified principle and will also highlight any 
“caveats” or debates for further examination, either as part of this study or in subsequent 
investigations.  A set of principles each showing strong consensus suggests a degree of validity 
that is current as of the time that the classical literature was published.   
Since the heyday of classic counterinsurgency thought was in the 1960s in the U.S. 
(Evans, 1987; Kilcullen, 2006a), some inquiry into the changes in the global political 
environment and in the nature of insurgency will be necessary to determine the changes 
necessary to counterinsurgency theory.  Preliminary research suggests that several authors agree 
that urbanization; globalization; the development of transportation and communication 
infrastructures; the growth of transnational organizations; and changes in the organizations, 
motivations, and likely objectives of insurgent groups require a reexamination of 
counterinsurgency principles (Hoffman, 2007; Metz & Millen, 2004; Metz, 2007; Kilcullen, 
2005; Cobbold, 2006).  Using the set of principles—which we might term “classic” theory—that 
emerge from the systematic examination of the classic literature as foundation for further 
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inquiry, this study will determine some of the changes necessary to the classical theory that are 
appropriate for facing 21st century insurgency.  A review of literature suggests there is not yet 
consensus on these issues, so there is opportunity for new theoretical insights. 
The modified framework that emerges from this second examination needs to be 
compared with the literature emerging from “contemporary experience” (FM 3-24, 2006), which 
will provide a test of any new theoretical implications that arise from previous analyses, and may 
also gauge the understanding of theory in current practice.  It will also provide one additional 
opportunity for theoretical syntheses. 
 Therefore, the objectives of this study are: 
1) Identify principles of effective and humane counterinsurgency theory inherent in the 
“classic” works. 
2) Determine the strength of the consensus that exists on each of the identified principles 
and identify “caveats” or disagreements for further examination. 
3) Identify and describe changes in the classic principles required by changes in the 
contemporary environment and in the nature of insurgency. 
4) Test modified principles against literature emerging from “contemporary experience” 
to determine additional changes required to a list of counterinsurgency principles. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Diversity of Literature 
 The diversity of literature concerning counterinsurgency is great.  Soldiers, diplomats, 
policymakers, and scholars are debating the theory and practice of counterinsurgency.  Since key 
elements of a total counterinsurgency effort are not “military” in their essence, development 
workers are also contributing to the discussion.  Journalists are observing events on the ground in 
failed states.  They provide accounts of the activities of insurgents and counterinsurgents in 
action, and some of these observations have implications for the theory and practice of 
counterinsurgency.  Their accounts are the basis of historical case studies and illuminate 
contemporary practice, which FM 3-24 (2006) describes as the ways to study counterinsurgency.  
The editorial pages also contain a lot of information about counterinsurgency strategy and policy. 
 As I have studied the phenomena surrounding counterinsurgency, I have made it a point 
to separate the literature into several categories to improve my ability to evaluate the quality of a 
particular source.  These are: 1) “Classical literature” which is usually a book and which appears 
on reading lists or bibliographies that are published by key organizations or in professional 
journals.  The presence of these works on reading lists indicates that they have credibility among 
scholars and practitioners.  2) Professional literature, which is usually from a periodical and 
written by a scholar or practitioner—a soldier, diplomat, policymaker, or development worker.  
These are usually peer-reviewed journals, either professional military journals or journals dealing 
with international affairs, national security policy and the like.  Occasionally, I have included as 
professional literature the opinion of an author accepted elsewhere in the professional literature.  
For example, the testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker before Congress I have 
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considered professional literature.  3) Doctrinal literature from the military or another U.S. 
government agency.  These are authoritative because they affect individual and organizational 
behavior abroad, because they undergo rigorous review and concurrence procedures, and 
because they are usually works of scholarship in their own right.  4) Qualitative methodology.  
As the design of this study suggested itself, I was obliged to seek a methodology appropriate to 
the research question and available data, and to understand the capabilities and limitations of this 
method. 5) Newspaper accounts, which I have limited to background information and to the 
occasional documentation of a particular fact.  6) Editorials in major media.  Editorialists are 
usually informed people in a general sense, but may or may not be informed about the particulars 
of counterinsurgency practice.  I am reluctant to rely upon an editorial for matters of a theoretical 
or practical nature, but occasionally I have read something in an editorial which I followed up by 
checking the writer’s facts. 
 The first four categories are credible in an academic sense, and I have pulled extensively 
from literature of these natures.  The latter two categories are not scholarship, and I have relied 
upon them little.  I have cited newspaper accounts to document several particular facts, such as 
the role of the French army in restoring order to Rwanda (Bonner, 1994).  I have not cited any 
editorials, but recognize that editorials do shape the policy debate.  Most policy issues are not the 
concern of this study, however. 
 Much of the literature on counterinsurgency is published in military journals.  
Parameters and Military Review were particularly helpful in studying counterinsurgency, and 
many other journals for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have published on this topic as well.  
Military Review published a special issue on counterinsurgency in October, 2006, which is an 
excellent place to start a study, and each of these articles contains references.  Parameters, a 
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journal of the Army War College, has a cumulative index located at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/a-index.htm and which links to full-text PDFs of 
most of the articles. The Army War College also hosts the Strategic Studies Institute which 
publishes on a variety of national security topics.  The Army War College, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the National Defense University, the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Center of 
Excellence, and the Army Command and General Staff College all have excellent libraries with 
many electronic resources that are available to the public.  Many of these institutions publish 
reading lists on various defense-related topics, including counterinsurgency. 
 Most military journals and manuals are indexed by Google, so a simple search will 
uncover specific articles or PDF versions of many manuals.  Footnote-chasing through Google is 
simple and usually returns a full-text peer-reviewed article from a military journal as a PDF file 
or one that can be “captured” as a PDF.  A search for a specific article will often uncover 
something from the same author or on a closely related topic that is helpful as well. 
 The problem with military manuals is that they are indexed by number and not by title, so 
the researcher has to know which one he or she wants to see.  Global Security provides a 2002 
index to Army manuals at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/, and 
the firm makes some manuals available for reading online.  Some of these are obsolete manuals 
that the military has not published in digital form.  Once a researcher knows which manual he or 
she wants, it can usually be located through Google. 
 The reading lists described in Chapter 3 are all excellent sources.  Additionally, the Small 
Wars Journal website publishes an annotated reading list and houses a “reference library.”  The 
latter contains links to resources that are available in the public domain.  The Army’s 
Professional Writing Collection draws from a variety of professional journals that impact on 
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issues relating to the Army.  Its homepage provides links to a number of research organizations, 
and can be located at http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting.  The Australian Army publishes 
a “Senior Officers Professional Digest” which pulls from a variety of professional journals on 
topics of interest to senior officers.  The June 2008 issue can be found at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/SOPD_61.pdf.  Finally, journals such as Foreign 
Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, and The Washington Quarterly contain scholarship on nation-building 
and counterinsurgency.  These journals make some articles available to the public.  Others are 
available for purchase or may be obtained through LSU’s electronic library resources.  For 
example, these three journals are indexed in Academic Search Complete, and full-text articles 
are available for download to scholars who have appropriate privileges. 
The Knowledge Gap and the Evolution of American Military Thought  
The joint military community in the United States has engaged in a conversation about 
military operations, the changing nature of its missions, and the effect of military action on the 
total security environment of the post-Cold War world.  The Army, for example, during the Cold 
War, prepared primarily to confront the Soviets on the plains of Europe or to confront the armies 
of other nation-states on an unambiguous battlefield.  This core mission took priority over other 
commitments, and affected the organization, equipping, and funding of the Army.  This mission 
discouraged the use of the Army for other missions because of the imperative need for the Army 
to be available for this one (Echeverria, 2004; Cassidy, 2004; Nagl, 2002; Evans, 1987).  Also it 
convinced several generations of military officers that fighting major wars was their vocation, 
and that other things were not.  With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Army both became 
available for use elsewhere and for other purposes, and the new security environment required it 
to rethink its role. 
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 In 1993, the Army deliberately expanded its thinking beyond operations as a part of 
general war, and began discussing military “operations other than war” (OOTW).  There was 
considerable debate over the semantics of the term; it separated the environment in which 
military operations would occur into two categories—war and other than war (Fastabend, 1997).  
Some objected to the term because the situations encountered in the real world did not fit neatly 
into one category or the other.  Some thought it diluted the Army’s warrior ethos and distracted 
from its core warfighting mission, while others thought it did not go far enough to describe new 
activities the Army needed to learn. In the latter’s perspective, “OOTW was brought into the 
house of doctrine, but then perniciously quarantined in a back closet with its own unique 
principles and special considerations, reinforcing the perception of OOTW as being completely 
‘other than’ what the [Army does]” (Fastabend, 1997). 
 In the late 1990s, the Army debated the merits of the OOTW terminology, and the 
implications of the changing world, and drafted a new version of its keystone Field Manual (FM) 
3-0, Operations.  Published as doctrine in 2001, FM 3-0 (2001) clarified the OOTW category 
somewhat.  Now military operations were divided into offensive, defensive, stability, and 
support operations.  The latter two were considered operations other than war.  Stability 
operations—which  Dobbins et al (2007) described as the Defense Department’s term for nation-
building—“promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and 
information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime 
developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis” (FM 3-0, 2001, 
p. 1-15).  Support operations “employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, 
as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering” (FM 3-0, 2001, p.1-16).  Stability 
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operations may or may not require violent action to achieve policy goals, while support 
operations usually will not. 
 In addition, given the military experience of the post-9-11 world, the distinction between 
war and “other than war” inherent in the term, OOTW, has given way to a vision of the military 
conducting operations that are both war—fighting, shooting, maneuvering—and other than 
war—humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping—in close proximity to each other in both space and 
time, in what Marine Commandant Charles Krulak, referred to as “the three block war” (quoted 
in FM 3-06, 2006).  The entire quote is instructive:  
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced 
refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two 
warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be 
fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day…all within three city 
blocks. It will be what we call the “three block war.” (p. 1 -7)  
 
Thus the term, OOTW, has given way to “full spectrum operations,” defined in the again-
revised FM 3-0 (2008) as when “forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil 
support operations simultaneously… to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative… They employ 
synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a 
thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment” (p. 3-1).  “Lethal” 
action, of course, refers to attempts to kill, capture, or coerce adversaries or destroy their 
equipment or supplies.  “Non-lethal” action is exactly that—actions that do not kill anyone, but 
seek to gain advantage in other ways, such as those which affect popular perceptions of U.S. 
policy, support local national authorities, provide humanitarian assistance, or persuade 
adversaries to discontinue hostilities. 
 The military also attempted to categorize conflict by its intensity in order to aid doctrinal 
understanding of missions and roles that it might be called upon to play.  The first “spectrum of 
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conflict” categorized conflict into high, medium, and low intensity (Fastabend, 1997).  The latest 
incarnation of the spectrum of conflict describes potential operational environments as 1) stable 
peace, which provides the best opportunity for sustained human development; 2) unstable peace, 
in which conflict could break out; 3) insurgency, in which disaffected groups within a state are 
currently fighting the government; and 4) general war, in which states violently contend for 
advantage against one another (FM 3-0, 2008).   
 Broad categories of military activities, termed “operational themes,” describe the 
“character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 2-3).   
Each operational theme corresponds broadly with a range of environments described by the 
spectrum of conflict.   FM 3-0 (2008) offers a graphic of the spectrum of conflict overlaid with 
corresponding operational themes (p. 2-5).  The graphic is reproduced as Figure 2-1. 
Coping with the last environment, general war, almost exclusively through major combat 
operations, has been the military’s self-perceived raison d’etre for most of American history 
(Weigley, 1973).  It is very good at it; there is a huge body of doctrinal, scholarly, and 
professional literature, and in this environment, there is not yet a need for nation-building, which 
cannot be effective during hostilities.  Therefore, it is not object of this study. 
At the other end of the spectrum, stable peace and its associated activities, peacetime 
military engagement, offer no great military challenges, and the military’s role in whatever 
developmental activities may be ongoing is relatively small. 
 Limited interventions are, by definition, limited in scope, that is, in time, space, and 
resources (FM 3-0, 2008).  Typically, they involve skills very similar to those used in major 
combat operations.  Examples include missile strikes against terrorist training camps following 
the attack on the USS Cole, or air combat with Libyan MiGs over the Gulf of Sidra in the 1980s.  
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The military is very good at these, and their definition precludes nation-building.  Once nation-
building begins, the operation is no longer limited. 
 
Figure 2-1. Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes (FM 3-0, 2008). 
 
 However, the environments described by the center of the spectrum are characteristic of 
the societies which need, and provide the opportunities for, nation-building.  The military 
operations associated with these environments—peace operations and irregular warfare—are 
those that require greater understanding from military officers. 
 Figure 2-2 below, taken from FM 3-0 (2008, p. 2-4), illustrates the types of operations 
that the military may be required to conduct under each operational theme.  Peace operations and 
irregular warfare are the categories that contain the military activities that are found in nation-
building efforts.   
 Of the component operations of peace operations (see above), only two—peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement—normally require prolonged commitment of military forces.  The others 
 28
 
Figure 2-2. Types of Operations Required Under Operational Themes. 
 
are defined in FM 3-0 (2008) as being predominantly diplomatic or economic in scope.  In fact, 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace Operations (1999) includes chapters only on peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. 
 Peacekeeping “consists of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major 
parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement” (FM 3-0, 
2008, p. 2-8), and does not normally require peacekeepers to engage in violent action.  For 
example, in 1991, I participated in the longstanding Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 
mission that monitors the 1979 peace accord between Israel and Egypt.   
 Peace enforcement, on the other hand, “involves the application of military force, or the 
threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with 
resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 2-9).  
Peace enforcement might require violent action, and if of sufficient duration or intensity, require 
limited intervention, irregular warfare, or even major combat operations to enforce the peace. 
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 Of the component operations of irregular warfare, foreign internal defense, support to 
insurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare are conducted typically by small 
groups of specially trained military personnel.  There is no need for a large effort to develop 
capacity within this small cadre.  Only counterinsurgency requires a significant portion of the 
military, mostly Army and Marines, to execute, and it is the one type of operation that requires a 
major effort to learn new principles to govern strategy and operational art. 
The American Way of War 
Weigley (1973), in a very influential work, concluded the American style of waging war 
attempted, through firepower and attrition, to utterly destroy the military of an opposing state.  In 
this view, fighting is an alternative to negotiation rather than part of the bargaining process, 
despite Clausewitz’s influential dictum that “war is politics by other means.”  The short title of 
Weigley’s book, The American Way of War has become shorthand for this attitude in discussions 
of strategic military operations.  Weigley’s thesis, though not undisputed, is widely accepted and 
frequently cited in policy debates concerning the use of the military instrument of national 
power.  Cassidy (2004) referred to this attitude as the “big war paradigm” and described it as “an 
obstacle to learning how to fight guerillas” (p. 41).  
 Echeverria (2004) examined this attitude and likened it to European attitudes like that of 
von Moltke, who believed that political leaders should determine who should be fought and why, 
but that political leaders should then leave the fighting up to professional military officers, who 
presumably know best how to go about it.   
 The problem with this view, and with American subscription to it, is that it leads to a 
separation between the political ends of warfare and the military means used to pursue them.  
Military officers thus equate winning wars with winning battles, rather than with the 
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achievement of policy aims that prompted military action (Echeverria, 2004). Therefore, both 
military officers—responsible only for defeating the enemy’s military—and political leaders—
responsible only for determining who needed to be defeated and why—have had trouble 
grappling intellectually and practically with the hard work of tying the two loose ends together 
and turning military victory into strategic political success (Echeverria, 2004).  In other words, 
‘”we spanked ‘em, now what?” 
 Boot (2002) argued that Weigley’s view was insufficient to explain the American way of 
war.  Boot looked to history and argued that the US military had a significant “small war” 
tradition.  He wrote that American involvement in conflicts such as that with the Barbary pirates, 
various Indian wars, the Philippines insurrection; and interventions, such as those in Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua constitute significant military experience, and that an 
understanding of an American way of war must include an understanding of limited war.  
Cassidy (2004) made a similar observation, arguing that we can look to our own history for 
lessons on fighting small wars.  In 1940, the Marine Corps, after its experiences in Central 
America, thought small warfare, counterinsurgency, and nation-building—or “pacification” as it 
was known then—was a significant part of its mission, and published the Small Wars Manual 
(1940) to capture the lessons learned.  The manual has experienced a resurgence of popularity, 
and a reprint can be purchased in book stores in 2008.   
 The American tradition of civilian control of the military reinforces Weigley’s American 
way of war because it increases the separation between political and military spheres 
(Echeverria, 2004). This has the very laudable effect of preventing the military from taking too 
much power in our society, and has the additional laudable effect of limiting the interference of 
political leaders in ongoing military operations, yet it removes the subtlety from the use of the 
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military instrument of national power as a diplomatic tool, and reduces it to a bludgeon whose 
sole purpose is to beat down recalcitrant adversaries. 
 The Powell Doctrine, associated with the First Gulf War of 1991, states that wars should 
be fought only for vital national objectives, should use overwhelming force, and must have clear 
political objectives and popular support (Echeverria, 2004).  This doctrine serves to restrict 
policymakers’ use of force in “small wars” and reinforces the military’s belief that it is only for 
big wars that involve “vital” interests.  (A similar formulation is associated with former Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who preceded Powell, and is sometimes referred to as the 
Weinberger Doctrine.)  This is in direct contention with Boot’s thesis—that our military 
prowess, technologically and organizationally, allows us to use the military instrument to achieve 
limited ends without great cost in casualties or expense (Boot, 2002).   
 Evans (1987) thought the trauma of the military experience in Vietnam inhibited the 
discussion of “low intensity conflict” (LIC) among American military officers and other 
members of the national security intelligentsia.  He thought that the failure of U.S. policy and the 
pre-eminent role of the military in executing it—the loss of the war—created an organizational 
denial similar to the psychological state of denial induced in individuals by a traumatic event.  
This inhibited the military’s willingness to discuss, and therefore to learn from, the experience in 
Vietnam.  In fact, this state also affected policymakers, diplomats, and scholars, none of whom 
wanted to be perceived as advocating the commitment of the nation to another such experience.  
Research on low intensity conflict declined greatly throughout the 1960s, and was very sparse 
until the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq revived an interest in counterinsurgency.   
 Evans (1987) speculated that military leaders avoided building competence in, or 
capability for, low intensity conflict environments for fear that such competence might tempt 
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policymakers to commit the military to these environments, which are detrimental to the 
military’s perceived core mission.   
 In addition to the effect of the Vietnam experience, Evans (1987) argued the military’s 
lack of interest in low intensity conflict is due to several factors: 1) conventional officers’ 
suspicion of the elite units that would likely dominate LIC environments; 2) the low technology 
nature of LIC that would inhibit procurement of more technical systems needed for more intense 
conflict; 3) the political nature of LIC, in which the constant consultation with political, 
economic, and other experts dilutes military authority and increases civilian “interference” in 
“military” affairs; and 4) the belief that other missions are more important than LIC. 
 Things are changing, however.  These arguments are mitigated somewhat by 
contemporary operating environments.  Current commitments are too great for elite units to 
handle, and they require all officers to develop competence for dealing with them.  Technology 
is moving onto the LIC/counterinsurgency battlefield.  Night vision devices; networked 
command, control, and communication (C3) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) systems; precision munitions; unmanned aerial vehicles; robots; jammers; sensors; and a 
host of other technologies are serving daily on the battlefield.  Furthermore, the need for larger 
systems has decreased given that currently there are no “peer competitors” to threaten the U.S. 
and to require their procurement.   
 Officers have realized the need to overcome qualms about the political nature of irregular 
warfare environments given the commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.  Marine 
General Charles Krulak’s observations about the “three block war” and the “strategic corporal” 
(1999) have highlighted the need for the development of political awareness and subtlety in the 
execution of military duties down to very junior leaders.  The sentiment is very similar to that 
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expressed by his father, Marine General Victor Krulak, in 1966 in reference to Marine operations 
in Vietnam: “You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all” 
(quoted in Nagl, 2002, USMC and the Combined Action Platoon Section, Para. 1). 
Officers also have realized the importance of interagency partners to the overall effort.  
Marine General Peter Pace, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has observed that "Our 
civilian agencies are under-resourced to meet the requirements of the 21st century” (quoted in 
Hegland, 2007) and Defense Secretary Gates has called for the development of “soft power” in 
other agencies of the U.S. government (Matthews, 2008), because these men realize that soldiers 
alone lack the skill set required for success in nation-building and counterinsurgency 
environments.  Finally, the absence of powerful enemies means that, in the first decade of the 
21st century, terrorists, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction, are the most 
credible and dangerous threats to U.S. security (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006).  Officers 
understand that capturing or killing terrorists, and removing their havens in failed states, which 
may be done through nation-building, constitute the military’s most important mission in 2008. 
 Research and discussion can accelerate this trend and ensure that it reaches a greater 
variety of officers and soldiers.  There is still a critical need because of the importance and 
inherent difficulty of these missions.  Fukuyama (2004a) said “we must remember that nation-
building is inherently difficult.”  Bush, in 2003, even before the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq, 
said, “Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our 
own…” (quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, p. 1).  Dobbins said, "The Pentagon and the administration 
have reflected on their experience in Iraq and concluded that we need to do better next time… " 
(quoted in Hegland, 2007).  Despite its importance, American officers still understand nation-
building and counterinsurgency poorly.  Fukuyama (2004b) has said, “We need to focus a great 
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deal more thought, attention, and research on this area” (p. 17).  Payne (2006) has said, “There is 
no theory on which it is based; it has no proven technique or methodology; and no experts know 
how to do it” (p. 609).  Carson (2003) has said, “…many military personnel do not understand 
the critical role the military plays in this mission” (p. iii). 
Evolution of a Theory 
Small Warriors, Partisans, and Revolutionaries 
 Guerrilla war, small war, partisan war or whatever title writers have given to this class of 
war is not new in human history.  It has been practiced probably since before history was 
recorded. Whenever one side of a conflict was observably weaker than the other, people have 
resorted to guerrilla war to continue fighting when a single decisive battle would be lost.  
Classical theorists of war in the West, known primarily for their writings relative to conventional 
war, have nevertheless observed the phenomenon and commented upon it.   Clausewitz 
(1832/1984) thought the guerrillas or partisans were an adjunct to conventional forces that were 
particularly prevalent when a nation was resisting an invader.  Guerrilla forces would harass the 
invader, nibbling at his flanks, lines of communication, supplies, and ambushing small groups of 
his soldiers.  This causes the invader great difficulty, increases the cost of his war, and diverts 
resources from the major fighting when the regular armies meet.  Guerrillas were not to confront 
the invader in a direct way; to do so would mean their destruction and the end of their 
effectiveness to their cause.  They were instead to be “nebulous and elusive” (quoted in 
Kalyanaraman, 2003, p. 173), offering the invader no target, but sapping his will to go on.  In 
this way, the partisans contributed to the exhaustion of the invaders and added to his defeat by 
the nation’s regular forces. 
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 Jomini also thought of guerrilla warfare in terms of resistance to an invader.  He believed 
a popular uprising caused great difficulty to the invader when it was formed around a nucleus of 
trained regular solders.  He thought guerrillas were not capable of decisively defeating an 
invader without regulars, and that popular rising without the support of regulars would ultimately 
be suppressed.  However, well led and supported guerrillas could control the countryside around 
an invader’s forces, so that he controls only the ground he is standing on.  The guerrillas who 
know every facet of the ground can move around the invader, striking him where he is weakest 
and fading away before he can respond (Kalyanaraman, 2003). 
 Marx and Engels also believed guerrillas were adjunct to regular forces.  Marx observed 
that guerrillas may enjoy some success when they are in small groups, but these are incapable of 
the decisive defeat of regular forces, whether these are the forces of an invader or of the regime.  
He thought that once guerrillas concentrated into larger formations, they could be found and 
defeated.  Engels thought the regular tactics of his day adequate to cope with guerrilla bands 
large enough to be a threat to regular armies.  A large regular army was simply too powerful to 
face in battle; only a popular uprising involving substantial participation by masses of the people 
offers any hope of slowing a powerful army.  Even then, the guerrillas are very likely to lose 
(Kalyanaraman, 2003). 
 The authors above did not focus on guerrilla war; Clausewitz and Jomini are widely-
respected and often-read military thinkers, but their writings focused on regular warfare founded 
in the European experience of warfare between nation-states.  Marx and Engels were not military 
thinkers at all, but were political theorists and observers of history.  They observed that the 
popular uprisings throughout Europe in the mid-1800s were defeated by the forces of the regime, 
and that 19th century European warfare was dominated by regular armies. 
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Imperial Wars: Callwell 
 The increasing pace of colonialism and imperialism in the late 1800s led to a great many 
conflicts between European nation-states and non-European entities of various types.  This 
focused European attention on the phenomenon and tactics of a different sort of warfare.  
Callwell (1906), a British officer with experience in these “small wars,” sought to classify and 
study the experience of colonial powers in fighting small wars, and he is among the first Western 
theorists to specialize in the theory of small wars.  His method was a study of historical cases to 
determine the characteristics of small wars, and the methods that work or do not.  I was unable to 
determine when he wrote the first edition of his conclusions and recommendations, but he 
published a second edition in 1899 and a third in 1906. 
 His definition of small war was very broad: “Practically it may be said to include all 
campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises 
the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises 
campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where 
organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field” 
(Callwell, 1906, p. 21).   
 He argued that small wars came in three varieties: 1) campaigns of conquest or 
annexation; 2) campaigns for the
 
suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement 
of conquered or annexed territory; and 3) campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge 
a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy (p. 25).  In the first, Callwell observed that the 
more organized the resistance offered by a foreign king or potentate, the more rapidly it could be 
defeated.  By offering battle to superior European forces, the local national armies—irregular to 
the European eye—were usually quickly crushed, the annexation affected, and resistance 
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ended—unless the defeated peoples resorted to guerilla warfare following the defeat of their 
states.  In this case, the struggle became characteristic of the second type of small war.  This type 
of small war is very analogous to the current conflict in Iraq.  U.S.-led multinational forces 
accomplished the initial defeat of the regime speedily, but large segments of the population have 
resorted to guerrilla warfare, and have proven difficult to subdue or co-opt. 
 The second type was almost always characterized by guerilla action on the part of 
segments of the local national population.  They might rebel for any number of reasons, and their 
guerilla tactics of ambush, rapid attacks against dispersed targets, assassination, or brigandage 
were difficult for the colonial power or local national regime, usually allied to a colonial power, 
to suppress, simply because the guerillas were hard to find and come to grips with.  As Callwell 
observed, “the crushing of a populace in arms and the stamping out of widespread disaffection 
by military methods… are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, and are always 
most trying to the troops” (p. 26).  Most of the remainder of Callwell’s work is an examination of 
the considerations and tactics required to successfully prosecute counter-guerilla warfare. 
 The third style of warfare is termed by the U.S. Army today as “limited intervention.” 
Callwell observed that it, like all other forms of warfare, is undertaken in pursuit of a political 
objective.  Depending upon the objective, a limited amount of force may be sufficient to 
accomplish it, and occupation of the enemy’s territory may not be required.  In this case, the 
colonial power need not engage guerrillas.  If the political objective requires the overthrow of the 
local national government, and popular resistance forms, then once again, the war becomes one 
of the second type. 
 Therefore, we turn again to Callwell’s observations on guerilla war because his 
conclusions in many regards are still pertinent, and fit in with the literature that follows.  He 
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observed that war against irregulars was very different than conventional European wars of his 
day.  The latter had rules, generally well-known, that governed the behavior of armies in the field 
both with regard to strategy, operational art, and tactics and with regard to what constituted 
lawful behavior of the combatants.  Irregular war, however, had no rules, but was driven by the 
specifics of each case and the diversity of conditions faced.  Determining the right strategy and 
tactics against a particular native enemy required historical and cultural perspective.  The 
examples in Callwell’s book helped give the former, and the latter required regular military 
leaders to gather some cultural intelligence on their adversaries’ key leaders, economic and 
political ways of life, and on factors such as religion or cultural attitudes that might motivate the 
local nationals to fight.  He insisted that officers study “the habits, the customs, and the mode of 
action on the battlefield of the enemy” (p. 33).  For example, Callwell observed that Boers and 
Zulus were very different enemies although located very close together in terms of global 
geography.   
 Callwell insisted that small wars need a “well defined objective” (p. 378) so that soldiers 
know when they are winning—or losing.  He admitted military objectives may be hard to define 
when there are no power centers or centers of population.  
 Callwell observed that terrain is very important in choosing how to fight.  Terrain drives 
operational and tactical decisions much like wind speed and direction drove the decisions of old 
sailing ship captains.  The advantages sought from terrain have not changed.  In general, the 
adversary on the highest ground or the one with cover and concealment has the advantage. 
Operationally, remote and inaccessible terrain gives irregulars a place to hide, and causes 
regulars great difficulty.  Also, the differences between desert, mountains, and jungles are critical 
to campaign planning.  The terrain dictates where soldiers on both sides can move.   
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 Today, with burgeoning populations, rapid urbanization, improved mapping, satellite 
imagery, reconnaissance aircraft, and helicopter transportation, remote areas are much less 
remote.  Nevertheless, modern insurgents can still hide in remote areas, although they are less 
effective when removed from the population.  They can hide in semi-remote areas—those that 
are out of the way, but not really hard to get to, and that are seldom under the observation of 
security forces.  Finally, insurgents can hide among small town populations where security 
forces seldom go or in urban populations where the number of people prevents close scrutiny and 
also prohibits the use of very destructive weaponry that is available to regular armies.  This 
“human terrain” often provides the 21st century guerrilla with the ability to remain undetected. 
 The terrain may also dictate the economic conditions of the populace from which the 
guerrillas are drawn.  One land lends itself to farming, another to hunting, and still another to 
herding.  The campaign plan may be to attack the economic life of the guerrillas in order to 
convince them that fighting is not worthwhile; to force them to defend their food stores, thus 
forcing them to give battle; or destroy their capacity to make war by destroying or removing food 
stocks.   
 Callwell noted that in small war campaigns, regulars often lack reliable information about 
the terrain and about the enemy.  Nevertheless, these sorts of intelligence are as essential for 
small wars as they are for conventional war.  A lack of intelligence about the terrain, due to the 
fact that regular troops are often foreign and due to the fact that in Callwell’s day most of the 
world was unmapped, led to all sorts of tactical and logistical problems.  Commanders did not 
know how best to move forces, what obstacles they might encounter, or where they could find 
water or other key resources.  The lack of knowledge of the terrain caused great navigational 
problems, and feeling lost caused commanders to doubt themselves.  Finally, the tactical 
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advantage to the guerrillas who are at home on the terrain, who understood how to live there and 
could move rapidly and accurately around regular forces, was frustrating to regular soldiers.  In 
many campaigns their primary struggle was against the terrain and not the guerrilla enemy. 
 Intelligence about the enemy was important primarily because the tactical problem of 
regulars fighting irregulars is finding the irregulars and forcing them to give battle.  A key 
tactical principle for guerrillas is to refuse battle unless the time and place is carefully chosen to 
be of advantage to them.  Then the guerillas will run away before the regulars can mass against 
them and destroy them. 
 Regulars seldom know the strength and disposition of their guerilla enemy, and in remote 
areas or areas with a population sympathetic to the guerilla cause, regulars have the greatest 
difficulty obtaining this information.  Yet their movements are obvious to the population, and 
since people talk, and since the social networks in underdeveloped regions depend upon word of 
mouth, good intelligence on the regulars will reach the ears of the guerrillas—either because of 
the people’s sympathy to them or simply because a regular army’s movements are good gossip. 
 Also the regular commander may not know how supportive of the guerrillas a population 
is, and so cannot judge how far a people will go to “put forth their entire strength” (p. 49).  
Obviously, a small group of brigands despised by the local population are easier to find and 
destroy than a popular guerrilla leader with a large band made up of the neighbors and family 
members of the local populace. 
 The most controversial element to Callwell’s counter-guerrilla warfare to today’s 
counterinsurgency theorist is his advocacy of the burning of crops, confiscation of livestock, and 
similar actions against an insurgent population.  The issue is relevant, however, because it strikes 
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at the heart of the debate between the coercion and the “hearts and minds” schools of thought in 
counterinsurgency. 
 He thought one method of fighting guerrillas was to confiscate livestock; burn crops, 
buildings, or food stores; or attack other economic activities.  This style of warfare occurs when 
the regulars can find no other power centers to attack.  The possible effects of this destruction are 
to persuade the enemy that fighting is not to his advantage; to deprive him of wealth and critical 
resources; or to force him to defend his herds or possessions, thus bringing him to battle.  
Callwell quotes a Lord Wolseley as advising that, when there is no capital city, “your first object 
should be the capture of whatever [the guerrillas] prize most, and the destruction or deprivation 
of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion,” and that the enemy “can be 
touched through his pocket” (p. 40).  Perhaps a modern example of this is the air war against the 
Serbs.  In this instance, military aircraft destroyed electric relays from power plants to Serbian 
cities.  The people were left without electricity, and Serbian government ceased its aggression. 
 However, Callwell also observed that the destruction of crops and stored food is harsher 
than stealing cattle, possibly because the hardship it forces on the locals is greater or perhaps 
because many traditional cultures of that time understood that the victor always carries away the 
spoils (cattle, etc.), but wanton destruction breeds enmity.  Often the government of the regulars 
ultimately would like to “acquire the friendship of the people which its armies are chastising” (p. 
41), and so too much destruction is not “expedient.”  He further observed that the regulars’ 
“purpose is to ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing, and 
not the exasperation of the enemy, is the end to keep in view” (p. 42).  He also admitted that 
much of these tactics “may shock the humanitarian” (p. 40). 
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 The issue is still relevant.  Is it morally permissible to cause the suffering of civilians 
because they are the same population from which the insurgents are drawn?  Is it expedient to do 
it?  How can the counterinsurgent tell the difference between a guerrilla fighter who has no 
uniform, a guerrilla supporter who does not fight, but who provides support to fighters, and an 
innocent person who lives there?  Is it necessary to break the will of these people to resist?  Does 
their proximity to or relationship with a guerrilla band imply that they support it? 
 Callwell also laid out a prescription for defeating guerrillas that was used successfully 
against the Boers.  The essential steps were: 
 1) Partition the area to contain guerrillas within a single partition or detect them when 
they cross into another, depriving them of mobility and surprise. 
 2) Clear our resources that might serve as supplies for guerrillas.  
 3) Establish outposts which are minimally manned; the garrisons should be just large 
enough to resist assault from a guerrilla band, but no larger in order to free troops for other 
operations. 
 4) Establish larger bases where supplies can be stored, troops rested or trained, and 
animals reconditioned. 
 5) Establish “flying columns” that are as small as possible to enhance mobility and to 
saturate the operational area.  These are to find the guerrillas and destroy them.  Mobility was 
essential; in Callwell’s day this implied mounted men in most places.  Mounted men could drive 
in confiscated livestock, and catch up to fleeing guerrillas. 
 6) Freedom of movement is given to low echelons (command is decentralized) so that 
low ranking leaders can exploit intelligence quickly. 
 7) Intelligence is vital.  Scouts and informants are critical to finding the enemy. 
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 8) Counter-intelligence is also critical.  A “secret service” and alert police force are 
critical to defeating guerrillas. 
Class Struggle: Lenin  
 Vladimir Lenin, as a Communist revolutionary, thought that the revolution to speed the 
historical process of the conversion of capitalist economies into Marxist ones would be led by 
wage-earning workers in an urban setting.  Nevertheless, the Communist Party in Russia before 
the 1917 Revolution debated the merits of guerrilla warfare being waged with or without Party 
leadership in various areas inside Russia.  Lenin weighed into the debate with a pamphlet entitled 
Guerrilla Warfare (1906/1965).  He did not dwell extensively on the strategy or tactics of a 
guerrilla struggle, but focused on the totality of the Marxist struggle through any of its various 
means, and not merely through “guerrilla” war.  The value of Lenin is that he highlights the 
political nature of the struggle, and explains other tactics of the struggle that insurgents may use 
to further their aims.  Also, the urban nature of Lenin’s view of the Marxist struggle may help to 
understand the tactics of modern guerrillas which function increasingly in an urban environment. 
 Lenin believed that, as the struggle continued to develop through various economic and 
social conditions, different forms of struggle emerge and become the primary means of struggle 
for a time before being displaced by another.  For Lenin, “the struggle” referred to all means 
employed to hasten the conversion of a capitalist economy to a Marxist one, but Lenin’s ideas 
can be extended to struggles on behalf of other causes.  In fact, the term “struggle” is a 
particularly useful one, in that it highlights the essentially political nature of an attempt to 
radically alter a society, whereas words such as “war,” ”conflict,” or the like place an emphasis 
on the violent aspects of such an attempt. 
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 For Lenin, Marxism demanded the Party’s selection or suppression of a form of struggle 
to be judged on whether or not it facilitated the total struggle.  Any form of struggle which 
advanced the cause was valid and should be encouraged.  Any that did not, for whatever reason, 
should be condemned as inexpedient.  Various forms of struggle include the general strike, the 
mass political strike, street barricade fighting, political demonstrations, peasant revolts, armed 
uprising, peaceful parliamentary struggle, partial military revolts, partial peasant revolts, 
guerrilla war, and civil war.  He thought people would intensify the struggle to the point of 
armed uprising, guerrilla war, or civil war when the causes of poverty, hunger, or unemployment 
become so great that people felt they had little to lose by fighting. 
 Lenin believed that when enough individuals were dissatisfied to the point of armed 
uprising, that guerrilla warfare resulted.  He wrote, “Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of 
struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising” (p. 
217).   He answered the criticism that guerrilla war caused disorganization within the Party by 
arguing that it was Party weakness that was unable to take the inevitable guerrilla war under its 
control.  Powerful economic and political causes bred guerrillas, and the Party cannot eliminate 
these, rather, it must take control of the guerrilla struggle and organize it in service to the Marxist 
struggle.  Lenin stressed the need for the organization of the Party to give voice, direction, and 
organization to the people’s struggle.  Like other theorists, he knew the revolutionary 
organization was critical to direct the successful insurgency. 
A Sense of Self: Lawrence and the Arab Revolt 
 T. E. Lawrence was a British officer, and a leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I. As such, he played the role of an insurgent fighting with Arabs 
against their Ottoman overlords.  He wrote several works that have become classics of 
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counterinsurgency warfare.  The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1991 (the most common of several 
versions was originally published in 1926)) is his memoir of his service and details the actions he 
and his comrades took as they fought their way across Arabia.  Twenty-seven Articles (1917) is 
his advice to soldiers designated to be advisors, particularly to Arabs.  Much of this article is still 
pertinent 90 years later, and should be required reading for American officers and non-
commissioned officers who are assigned as advisors.  The real meat of his view on insurgency 
and therefore, the material most useful for the study of counterinsurgency is his article entitled 
Evolution of a Revolt (1989), originally printed in 1920.  All quotations are from this work. 
 Lawrence, unlike most of his British contemporaries, recognized the potential strength of 
Arab irregulars in the particular context of the Arabian desert during WWI.  Most serving British 
officers of the time thought nomadic Arab tribesmen incapable of defending or attacking 
prepared positions, and wanted to use European advisors to train Arab regulars in the same 
manner as European soldiers.  While Lawrence recognized the Arab weakness in positional 
warfare, he thought in the specific time and place in which he found himself that the Arabs could 
contribute mightily to the defeat of the Turks, and ultimately gain their independence. 
 Lawrence objected to the European obsession (his term) with the “the dictum of Foch that 
the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy’s army, his center of power, and destroy it in 
battle” (p. 3).  Such a confrontation would certainly result in an Arab defeat.  Perhaps after a 
long training period under British tutelage, Arab regulars might displace the Turks, but at a cost 
in casualties the Arabs were unwilling to pay.  Rather Lawrence observed that the value of Arab 
irregulars was in their “depth” or their ability to move freely and rapidly about the desert and to 
be in unexpected places.  This mobility, which Lawrence likened to mobility of ships on the 
ocean, allowed a small number of Arab irregulars to tie up huge numbers of Turk regulars in 
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Hejaz region of Arabia. In essence, the Arabs forced the Turks into perpetual defense throughout 
the Hejaz. 
 Lawrence’s thought, while not revolutionary, still required him to step out of the cultural 
and institutional mindset of the British officer.  He recognized that Arab nomads had no 
organized forces to present a target the Turks could destroy.  Moreover, he recognized that 
driving the Turks from the city of Medina was unnecessary, even counterproductive.  Such an 
action would have required military capacity the Arabs did not possess, personnel and resources 
the British were unable to spare, and which would be unwelcome in territory the Muslim Arabs 
viewed as holy.  Moreover, the Turks were not a threat to anything important sitting primarily in 
Medina, or along the railroad that fed their garrison there.  Since the Arabs controlled the other 
99% of the Hejaz, the Turks could do no harm where they were.  Moreover, if driven out, they 
would join the main army opposing the British in Sinai, and if taken prisoner, they would require 
feeding and guards in Egypt.  The Arab cause was best served by avoiding direct conflict—and 
the attendant casualties—required to drive the Turks out, and by not accepting British help that 
would be difficult to get rid of later.  The British cause was also best served by encouraging the 
Turks to stay.  As Lawrence put it:  
If [the Turk] showed a disposition to evacuate too soon, as a step to concentrating in the 
small area which his numbers could dominate effectively, then we would have to try and 
restore his confidence, not harshly, but by reducing our enterprises against him.  Our 
ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and 
discomfort to him (p.12). 
 
 Lawrence also understood the military objective of the Arabs was not to kill Turks, but 
simply to control all of Arabia without Turkish rule.  The Arabs’ objective was not military at 
all, but political in its nature.  The Arabs were fighting for a cause—for freedom, which each 
man would prefer to live to enjoy.  Thus, by avoiding confrontation, the Arabs denied the Turks 
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a target, went about their business, and waited the Turks out while the wider war took its toll on 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 Lawrence considered the problem of command from both strategic and tactical 
viewpoints and found in each the same “elements, one algebraical, one biological, and a third 
psychological” (p. 7).  Considering the first, he concluded that to control the geographic area of 
Arabia, the Turks would need so many posts, manned by so many men each, such that 600,000 
men would be required to suppress the Arab revolt or “the combined ill wills of the local Arab 
people” (p. 8).  The Turks had only 100,000 men available. 
 The biological element was the “breaking point” (p. 8), which was the point at which 
men in combat or units in combat break and quit fighting.  Arab irregulars were not disciplined 
into units; rather they were individuals, where each casualty deprived a family of a son, brother, 
husband, or father.  The irregulars could not endure the casualties that a regular unit would, and 
the irregular commander had to recognize that fact.   
Moreover, this element could be considered in reference to materials as well as men.  In 
the context of this struggle, the Turks were more vulnerable through their materials, which were 
more scarce than their men.  Ultimately, the Arabs never intentionally engaged the Turks, but 
rather attacked the railways which fed the Turk garrisons.  The Arabs contained the Turks by the 
threat of the “vast unknown desert” (p. 10) out of which the Arabs would materialize at some 
unexpected place and attack.  The populace aided this style of fighting by providing “perfect 
intelligence” so that the Arab irregulars could “plan in completely certainty” (p. 10). 
 The psychological element was perhaps the most important.  The conduct of the revolt 
required irregular commanders to lead and motivate individual soldiers without the assistance of 
institutional coercion or unit cohesion.  It was essential for them to understand the “mood” of the 
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men, and to cultivate an image of victory in their minds.  Face to face leadership and propaganda 
were both essential to this activity, with propaganda having the capability to expand a leader’s 
influence greatly.  Lawrence identified five audiences for propaganda—the Arab irregulars, the 
Turk soldiers opposing them, the Arab nation supporting the revolt, the Turk nation supporting 
their soldiers, and the neutrals looking on.  He identified the printing press as “the greatest 
weapon in the armory of the modern commander” (p. 11).  This realization anticipates a great 
deal of modern thought about the value of information operations in a counterinsurgency 
struggle. 
 Lawrence understood the primary importance of the psychological realm, and that the 
people were the center of gravity for the success of the revolt.  He wrote “We had won a 
province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or 
absence of the enemy was a secondary matter” (p. 12).  He also asserted that a successful revolt 
required a friendly population in the sense that the populace would not betray rebel movements 
to their enemies. 
 He also understood the value of cultural awareness to a multinational effort.  He knew 
that not “a single Arab would have remained with the Sherif if he introduced British troops into 
the Hejaz” (p. 3).  This appreciation for the cultural sensitivities of potential allies is important to 
the modern counterinsurgent today.  It helps in the cooperation with allies, and with the wooing 
of the populace.  It helps to mitigate the home field advantage of the insurgent. 
Advent of People’s War: Mao Zedong 
 Mao Zedong, as a Communist revolutionary, wrote two very influential works discussing 
how and why to go about fighting a protracted guerilla war.  His works became manuals for 
revolutionaries seeking to overthrow governments in the post-WWII period.  Vo Nguyen Giap, 
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who commanded North Vietnamese forces during U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, was a student 
of Mao, and so Mao became very influential among American students of insurgency.  Because 
he was so influential among revolutionaries, good counterinsurgents also read his work to better 
understand guerrilla movements and organizations.  Mao’s influence was so great that Metz 
(1995) criticized then-current counterinsurgency doctrine for applying only to a “Maoist 
People’s War;” and others (Hoffman, 2007; Kalyanaraman, 2003; Kilcullen, 2005) refer to the 
Maoist “model” or “conceptualization” when discussing a popular rural insurgency. 
 Mao wrote both works, On Guerrilla War (1937/1961) and On Protracted War 
(1938/1967), during the late 1930s when the Japanese had occupied key parts of China, and both 
Chinese Communists and Nationalists were seeking to expel them.  Large portions of the latter 
explain why a strategy of protracted war was the only viable course for a large and populous, but 
militarily weak China.  He argued that if the Chinese regular armies were to mass in several 
places in China, and permitted the Japanese to do likewise, that the result of these several battles 
would be the destruction of the Chinese armies, which were the centerpiece of Chinese national 
strength.  Mao thought it much more advantageous to admit that Chinese forces lacked the 
capacity to oppose the Japanese in what he termed “positional” warfare, a set-piece battle the 
Chinese were certain to lose.  He argued that China had no alternative but to engage in protracted 
war—a series of small engagements dispersed throughout China—that avoided decisive battles, 
but bled off the strength of the Japanese until the relative strengths of the contending armies were 
reversed.  A process of years of small intermittent contacts, with time and place always chosen 
by Chinese guerrillas, would weaken the Japanese. Simultaneously, the experience of guerrilla 
warfare would train and strengthen Chinese forces until they could shift to the offensive in 
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conventional war and expel the exhausted Japanese.  Mao likened guerrilla attacks to the biting 
of “innumerable gnats” that would ultimately exhaust the “giant” of Japan (1937, p. 54). 
 Mao thought all warfare was political in its essence.  There was a reason that men, 
organizations, or states resorted to armed struggle, and that reason was political.  This cause 
provided the motivation for individuals to fight.  In the Chinese context, the cause was to expel 
the Japanese from China, and this cause was so important that Communists discontinued their 
struggle against the Nationalists until the Japanese were defeated.  Mao envisioned guerrilla 
warfare as the organization of “vast” numbers of peasants to bleed the strength from the Japanese 
invaders.  Political goals had to reflect the “aspirations of the people” to elicit sympathy, 
cooperation, and assistance; without a clearly defined political goal, guerrilla warfare efforts 
would fail.  Guerrillas and the population supporting them need a “precise conception of the 
political goal of the struggle” (1937, p. 88).  An indefinite political goal, poor leadership, and 
failure to work with the people bring guerrilla failure. 
 Mao believed that the people were essential to the struggle, which was protracted and 
characterized by guerrilla operations.  The people provided the recruits and support that 
sustained the guerrilla army.  The people’s silence or passive non-cooperation with foreign 
soldiers hid the guerrillas, and the people reported their observations of Japanese movements to 
guerrilla leaders. 
 Mao’s conviction that the people were the essence of the struggle cannot be overstated.  
This theme pervades his writing, and has produced several often-quoted expressions.  In 
discussing the relationship that should exist between the people and the guerrillas, Mao wrote, 
“The former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish who inhabit it” (1937, p. 93) and “the 
fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people” (1937, p. 73).  Furthermore, he 
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argued guerilla warfare “derives from the masses” and “it can neither exist nor flourish if it 
separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation” (1937, p. 44). 
 According to Mao, the Chinese guerrilla was on the progressive side of history.  He 
thought that Communist guerrillas would be victorious because counter-revolutionary guerrillas 
oppress the masses and lack a base in the people; therefore, they are easy to destroy.  Since 
revolutionary guerrillas fight in the interest of the people, they have a broad base in the people, 
and can count on the people to support them with supplies and information.  Moreover, the 
people who support the guerrillas will not share information with their enemies, allowing the 
guerrillas to avoid contact on unfavorable terms.  In effect, the people allow the guerillas to hide 
among them. 
 Mao understood the value of propaganda and political education to motivating guerrilla 
soldiers and the population from which they are drawn.  Propaganda was necessary to unite the 
“class groups” of the masses to conduct guerrilla war, and guerrilla success depended upon 
leaders working with the people to bring about “internal unification.”  Finally, he believed in the 
power of persuasion; he wrote, “The people must be inspired to co-operate voluntarily. We must 
not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual” (1937, p. 82).  Only volunteers are acceptable 
guerrillas; “vicious people,” criminals and those of low character were not acceptable. 
  Guerrilla strategy depended upon “alertness, mobility and attack;” it sought to “avoid the 
solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. 
When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he 
stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws” (1937, p. 46).  The guerrilla 
“attacks the enemy in every quarter” (1937, p. 50), and attempts “to exterminate small forces of 
the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to 
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establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the 
enemy to disperse his strength” (1937, p. 53).  The goal was to dissipate the enemy’s strength, 
exhaust him, render the region ungovernable, and force his withdrawal.  To be most effective, 
guerrilla activity was coordinated as closely as possible with the activities of the regular Chinese 
army. 
 Guerrillas depended upon mobility and dispersion to survive and carry on the struggle to 
a successful conclusion.  When the enemy was over-extended in defense, guerrillas harassed and 
demoralized him; when guerrillas were encircled, found themselves on ground which did not 
favor them, or were short of supplies with which to fight, they dispersed and withdrew.  They 
also disperse to promote mass movements over a wide area.  Mobility was key; Mao wrote, “the 
guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind” (1937, p. 102). 
 Despite the pain guerrillas cause his enemy, Mao thought that guerrillas were incapable 
of winning a decisive victory—tactically or strategically.  The guerrilla was an important adjunct 
to the surviving “orthodox” Chinese forces, and guerrillas could, over time, develop into 
“orthodox” forces capable ultimately of defeating the Japanese after the protracted struggle had 
weakened them. 
Mao believed in the need to organize the people to conduct guerrilla warfare.  He quoted 
Lenin’s work entitled Guerrilla Warfare, “Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the 
unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism” (quoted in Mao, 1937, p. 46).  The 
Party used propaganda and leadership to organize people into guerrilla squads that could be 
assembled into larger units.  The Party taught the people of an area to arm and to organize into 
two groups: one for combat and another for self-defense.  The combat group was smaller and 
composed of persons willing and able to fight full time.  They were generally to remain near 
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their homes, in the terrain that they knew well, and they were to be led by local officers to 
facilitate cooperation with local people.  The self-defense group was made up essentially of the 
whole population.  The people performed “local sentry duties, securing information of the 
enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda” (1937, p. 80). 
Mao recognized that protracted guerilla warfare had an international dimension.  He 
knew that international material aid and sympathy against Japan would be invaluable, and he 
knew propaganda directed against enemy soldiers and against the Japanese home population 
could enhance and accelerate the demoralization of the Japanese war effort. Mao thought the 
oligarchic nature of the Japanese regime would lead to the disaffection of the Japanese public, 
with catastrophic effect on their ability to conduct the war.  This is a very important insight.  
Today, insurgents specifically target the home population of states engaged in counterinsurgency 
in order to undermine their will and force the withdrawal of foreign soldiers.  With global 
communications available today, these efforts have tremendous potential to succeed, and 
therefore, foreign counterinsurgents must take measures to mitigate and respond to this threat 
(Claessen, 2007). 
Mao was emphatic about the need for guerrilla soldiers and political cadres to treat the 
people well.  He thought a large part of Japan’s problem in China was due to their “peculiar 
barbarity” (1938, p. 14) in their treatment of the Chinese people, and their tendency to engage in 
“naked plunder” (1938, p. 23).  These actions created an environment of absolute hostility 
among the peasants that Japanese operated among, so they found themselves surrounded by a 
hostile people.  The people’s hostility greatly facilitated the ability of the Chinese resistance to 
organize the people and operate with impunity among them.  This is also a key point for modern 
counterinsurgents.  Mao knew that foreigners already suffered a disadvantage because they were 
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not like the local people in culture, speech, or mannerisms.  It is important the counterinsurgent 
not to add to that disadvantage by mistreating or humiliating the people. 
 Mao was also emphatic that guerrillas must treat the people well in order to gain 
and maintain their support.  He promulgated his famous “three rules and eight remarks” to 
enforce his desire that guerrillas treat the people with respect.  These were: 
Three rules: 
 
All actions are subject to command. 
Do not steal from the people. 
Be neither selfish nor unjust. 
 
Remarks: 
 
Replace the door when you leave the house. 
Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 
Be courteous. 
Be honest in your transactions. 
Return what you borrow. 
Replace what you break. 
Do not bathe in the presence of women. 
Do not without authority search those you arrest. 
 
Finally, Mao is credited with providing a model of guerrilla warfare that has become a 
commonly-used taxonomy for describing the present nature of the struggle and the level of 
organizational development of the insurgent organization (Kalyanaraman, 2003).  While Mao’s 
formulation of the model in On Protracted War was very contextual to the Chinese experience in 
the 1930s, Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap used the model successfully against the U.S. in 
the 1960s-70s, and made it popular among scholars and practitioners of irregular warfare.  
According to Kalyanaraman (2003), the first stage consists of preparation to organize the people 
politically, engage in propaganda, and create bases.  Violence during this phase is limited to 
selective terror, assassinations, sabotage, and small guerrilla actions.  The second stage is 
characterized by an increase in the intensity of guerrilla operations and the political expansion of 
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the movement from its initial base areas into adjacent areas to enlarge the “liberated zones.”  
Once the guerrilla movement has gained sufficient strength to approach parity with government 
forces (and its foreign supporters), has formed regular formations capable of offensive actions 
against the regime, and has established itself as the de facto government in significant areas of 
the national territory, it shifts to the third phase of insurgency, characterized by “mobile war" in 
which it attacks and destroys the enemy state. 
Tying the Loose Ends: Galula 
 David Galula was a French officer who served in World War II, and also gained 
experience in irregular warfare in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria.  His book, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, originally written in 1964, has become a 
textbook for the conduct of counterinsurgency war.  It is required reading for mid-career U.S. 
Army officers in service schools, and Nagl, in his foreword to a 2006 reprint, described Galula’s 
work as having “primacy of place in the canon of irregular warfare.”  My assessment is that his 
book is the single most concise, comprehensive and useful study of counterinsurgency.  It 
explains the nature of insurgency, explores strategic issues, and also suggests tactics that are 
effective in the majority of cases.  It is well worth reading in its entirety.  
 Galula understood that all warfare seeks political goals, but that the conduct of what he 
termed “revolutionary war” was particularly political in its nature.  Contrary to conventional war 
in the Western tradition where politics take a backseat during the conflict and emerge again at 
the conclusion of hostilities, the operations designed to secure the objective in insurgency—the 
people—were “essentially of a political nature” (p. 9).  He argued that every military move had 
“to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa” (p. 9). 
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 In order to succeed, Galula argued, the insurgent needed the ideological power of a cause 
that would motivate people to participate in the one-sided, asymmetric struggle against the 
government, which wields all the power of the national state.  The cause was necessary to attract 
the critical mass of active participants, and create an environment filled with passive supporters 
who would not betray the movements of guerrillas and political cadres.  He knew that the cause 
must attract the sympathy of a substantial portion of the populace; an insurgency with a narrow 
base among the people will likely fail.  At the beginning of the conflict, the cause was the only 
real asset of the insurgency, whereas the government had the army, police, civil administration, 
and all the instruments of power.   
 He also observed that the cause was often a negative statement, “Since it is easier to unite 
‘against’ than ‘for,’ particularly when the components are so varied, the general cause will most 
probably be a negative one, something like ‘throw the rascals out’” (p. 24)  So the word 
“grievance” can also describe the reason people are fighting the government.   
 Galula, like Mao, understood that “revolutionary war” was asymmetric in its nature.  He 
pointed out the advantages of the government were many:  
Endowed with the normal foreign and domestic perquisites of an established 
government,[the counterinsurgent] has virtually everything—diplomatic recognition; 
legitimate power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; control of the 
administration and police; financial resources; industrial and agricultural resources at 
home or ready access to them abroad; transport and communications facilities; use and 
control of the information and propaganda media; command of the armed forces and the 
possibility of increasing their size (p. 6-7). 
 
Yet, the government’s great advantage in assets was balanced by the great responsibility it had to 
maintain order in the face of an insurgency.  Against this, the insurgent had the attraction of his 
cause; the strategic initiative, in that, he could potentially operate and organize for a long time 
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before the government became aware of his activities; and the fact that disorder is much easier to 
produce than order.   
 Galula knew that the people were the center of gravity in “revolutionary warfare.”  He 
wrote that effective government requires the “tacit or explicit agreement of the population” (p. 
8), while the insurgency requires the “complicity of the population [which] is the key to guerrilla 
warfare… and it has been expressed in the formula of the fish swimming in the water” (p. 50). 
He explicitly stated that the people were the “objective,” that the side which successfully 
controlled the population would win the conflict.  He knew that without the support of the 
people, the insurgents could conduct “commando-style operations” using the same tactics as 
guerrillas, but could not fight “true guerrilla war,” and that without the people, guerrillas cannot 
be distinguished from bandits (p. 19).    
 Furthermore, the people provide intelligence—both ways.  They provide intelligence to 
the side they favor and deny it to the other, to the side which protects them, or to the side which 
can threaten them most effectively.  Galula conceived of the population as made up of a minority 
of active supporters of the insurgents, a minority of loyalists, and a great mass of people who are 
essentially neutral, and who decide who they will support based on which side is likely to win. 
He wrote, “Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has 
to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe” (p. 72). 
 The most succinct statement of the importance of winning the support of the population, 
which is much more important than merely killing guerrillas, is: 
A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political 
organization. If one is destroyed, it will be locally re-created by the other; if both are 
destroyed, they will both be re-created by a new fusion of insurgents from the outside… 
A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, 
isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population 
(emphasis added) (p. 77). 
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 Propaganda is a tool used to gain influence over the population.  The insurgent has an 
advantage in that he can lie and misinform, and he is judged by what he says rather than by what 
he does.  On the other hand, the government has responsibilities to the population.  Its actions 
speak louder than its words, and if the government lies, it will likely be found out, and is 
discredited for good.  So for the government, propaganda is a secondary weapon; it can be used 
to inform, but not to mislead the people.  Nevertheless, propaganda was critical to the 
counterinsurgency effort.   
 Either antagonist must be able to control the population in order to win.  The insurgent 
will sell its cause to enlist support, it may threaten people who are not supportive, or it may kill 
those that it believes cooperates with the government.  The government can use a variety of tools 
to increase its control over the population of a contested area.  Galula advocated taking a census 
so that officials understand who belongs in the local area, and can plan interactions with the 
population that are appropriate for the level of security.  In gathering the census, soldiers and 
other officials meet with and inform the people and engage in face-to-face propaganda to solicit 
support.  The government will also impose restrictions on movement—no one can leave his 
home for more than 24 hours without a travel pass, and no one can entertain out-of-town visitors 
without a visitor’s pass.  The system of passes not only controls the movement of persons, but 
provides an “alibi” for the people to refuse to help the guerrillas.  The government might also 
order the people to do some work in their community, with pay, because it makes the people 
work with the government, and the “order” also provides an alibi.   
 The tactical principles that govern “revolutionary war” are the familiar guerrilla tactics 
espoused by other authors.  Mobility is critical to both sides.  Galula adds that guerrillas can 
avoid effective efforts in a single jurisdiction by moving into an adjacent one, and back as 
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necessary.  Galula also recognized that dispersal was essential for the survival of guerrilla forces.  
The insurgents will mass for an attack, and then disperse to avoid the counterstroke.  In this way, 
the insurgent often gains the tactical initiative.  The government cannot refuse battle because it 
must protect the population, which means that most engagements are fought on the guerrilla’s 
terms.  The guerrilla, on the other hand, will always refuse battle accept on his terms because he 
often has nothing to defend.  If the population of an area is supportive of the guerrilla, the 
government cannot find him and bring him to battle.  If the population supports the government, 
it may be possible to catch him and force him to fight. 
 Galula agreed with Mao that insurgency required protracted conflict.  In fact, this is how 
Galula distinguished between insurgency and coup d’état.  In essence, the guerrilla must pursue a 
strategy of protracted conflict because he lacks the strength to oppose the state, and because the 
state is not so weak as to be vulnerable to a coup.  In fact, the insurgent may be at work for a 
long time before the government becomes aware of his presence.  In this sense, the insurgent has 
the strategic initiative; he can be at work without the government knowing it is under attack. 
 Galula thought that guerrillas were unlikely to succeed against a moderately strong state. 
The insurgent army would have to grow into one that is capable of defeating the national army in 
order to win the conflict militarily. 
 Secure bases and “liberated zones” are important to guerrilla success.  The insurgent 
provides administration in liberated zones, providing the order that the government could not, 
and demonstrating his superiority to the government.  Late stage insurgencies have regular 
military bases with a functioning government providing services.  For example, Mooney (2007) 
describes the manner in which Hezbollah provides social services in southern Lebanon.  Also, 
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secure bases are required to raise, train, and equip the insurgent regular armies that will destroy 
the national army. 
 Effective organizations are required to control and direct the population.  The insurgency 
usually will begin with the formation of a party that initiates the struggle by organizing 
supporters and teaching the population the aims of the struggle.  Since the first violent guerrilla 
actions are designed to sow disorder, a loose, decentralized organization can be effective, but as 
the insurgency grows, the organization must increase in complexity and take on more 
complicated tasks. 
 The importance of having an organization that would, in turn, organize and direct the 
activities of the people could not be overstressed.  Galula wrote: 
Objectively, there is no difference between ordinary, everyday bandit activity in almost 
every country and the first guerrilla actions. What makes it possible for the guerrillas to 
survive and to expand? The complicity of the population. This is the key to guerrilla 
warfare, indeed to the insurgency, and it has been expressed in the formula of the fish 
swimming in the water. The complicity of the population is not to be confused with the 
sympathy of the population; the former is active, the latter inactive, and the popularity of 
the insurgent’s cause is insufficient by itself to transform sympathy into complicity. The 
participation of the population in the conflict is obtained, above all, by a political 
organization (the party) living among the population (emphasis added), backed by force 
(the guerrilla gangs), which eliminates the open enemies, intimidates the potential ones, 
and relies on those among the population who actively support the insurgents. Persuasion 
brings a minority of supporters—they are indispensable—but force rallies the rest. There 
is, of course, a practical if not ethical limit to the use of force; the basic rule is never to 
antagonize at any one time more people than can be handled. (p. 49-50). 
 
He added, “In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the 
population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots” (p. 79).  Trinquier 
(1964), another French counterinsurgency expert, agreed with Galula about the importance of the 
people, and directed that the counterinsurgent create similar organizations to oppose insurgent 
organizations and to control and direct the people’s resistance to insurgency.  Ultimately, both 
the government and the insurgency also want to create local self-defense organizations—militias, 
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concerned citizens’ groups, neighborhood watches, etc—loyal to its side, that can defend the 
homes of its members and assist the mobile units of the fighting armies. 
  The government had an additional organizational problem; it must coordinate the 
activities of military, police, administrators, social workers, etc.  Effective counterinsurgency 
requires that it creates the organization necessary to coordinate the activities of all government 
organs within an area. 
 Galula documented two “patterns” that insurgent movements might take.  The first, 
which he termed the “orthodox pattern,” he associated with insurgent movements led by national 
communist parties.  It is broken down more than Mao’s model, but is very similar. 
 Step 1. Create the party.  Ideally the party is disciplined, strong, well-organized, both in 
its open and clandestine organizations. 
 Step 2. Create the united front.  The party initiates or joins other opposition organizations 
in a united front.  It will abandon its allies as it becomes necessary and as movement grows 
strong.  The united front takes subversive action to forestall the regime’s reaction to the growing 
insurgency. The party shepherds its allies toward the  party’s agenda, and prepares the populace 
for accepting party leadership 
 Step 3. Initiate guerrilla war.  The party begins guerrilla war when conditions are “ripe” 
(p. 49).  Operations may be characterized by classical guerrilla tactics—small raids, ambushes, 
hit and run attacks, etc. They may also include acts of terror, such as assassinations, bombings 
against non-military targets, and the like. 
 Step 4. Movement warfare. The party creates regular military formations in order to 
destroy the government’s army.  Insurgent units attack and overwhelm isolated regular units with 
brief contacts, but do not attack entrenched regular units in prepared positions.  They do not 
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abandon guerrilla war, but move guerrilla operations into contested areas.  Now, the insurgents 
have a multi-tier organization: regulars, guerrillas; and militias that defend the “liberated zones.” 
 Step 5. Annihilation campaign.  When the insurgent gains military, political and 
psychological dominance his activities will increase and overwhelm the state. 
Galula posited some counterinsurgency responses to the orthodox pattern.  In the “cold” 
struggle, while the insurgent is operating in Steps 1-2, many insurgent activities are legal and 
low profile.  The government may not be aware of embryonic insurgent organizations, or legal 
insurgent organizations may be mistaken for peaceful political opposition groups.  When the 
government becomes aware of the insurgent’s unlawful intentions, they can: 1) Act against 
insurgent leaders; 2) Act to decrease conditions causing popular dissatisfaction and redress 
grievances, co-opting the insurgent’s cause; 3) Infiltrate the movement and lessen its 
effectiveness; or 4) Reinforce its political machine so that it is less assailable.   
The first of these works for totalitarian regimes, who need not worry about the legal 
niceties; if cause has little appeal; if the government already has accepted legal powers 
permitting action; or if the government can prevent publicity.  The second is a great solution to 
eminent insurgency because it takes real action toward solving the country’s problems.  The third 
might or might not work depending upon the effectiveness of the insurgent leaders and upon the 
ability of the agents to disrupt insurgent activity.  The last may take the form of developing 
capacity to repress the people, or it may consist of developing the capacity of the government to 
deliver services, provide security, and promote confidence. 
 During the “hot” struggle, when the insurgent is operating in Steps 3-5, he is easier to 
attack with the various organs of the state, and more repressive legal measures become palatable 
to the government, the legal non-insurgent opposition, and the population, and therefore, easier 
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to approve.  Conventional forces have difficulty coming to grips with guerrillas who refuse to 
stand and fight, because the regulars often lack the intelligence needed to find and fix the 
guerrillas.  This intelligence must come from the populace.  Destroying guerrillas is not decisive 
because they can be replaced faster than they are caught or killed, unless there are simultaneous 
activities designed to control and influence the population to support the government.  The 
population’s support will supply the intelligence needed to bring guerrilla bands to battle and 
destroy them, and to identify and remove members of the insurgent’s political organization 
located among the people. 
 The other pattern, Galula termed the “bourgeois- nationalist pattern.”  The advantage of 
this pattern is that it did not rely upon years of grass roots organizational effort.  If successful, it 
could leap from Step 1 to Step 3 in a short time, but its use of terror had the potential to backfire 
and alienate the people.  This pattern differed from the orthodox pattern only in Step 1-2; Steps 
3-5 were identical.  The first two steps were:  
Step 1. Engage in blind terror.  The purpose of terror was to gain publicity, and perhaps 
attract supporters.  Operations are completed as spectacularly as possible to attract the most 
attention.  The regime could respond with press censorship to lessen the effects of insurgent 
operations. 
Step 2. Engage in selective terror.  The purpose here is to isolate the counterinsurgent 
from the masses, to involve the population in the struggle, and to gain at least passive complicity 
from the populace.  Selective terror involved killing low-ranking government officials, 
policemen and teachers—those close to the population—to make terror effective in local 
communities.  The insurgents collect money from the population; some refusing to pay are 
executed, those who do pay are now complicit with insurgents. 
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Galula provided a way to assess the strength of a regime, and its capacity to resist 
insurgency. The characteristics of the regime to be assessed in determining its strength, and 
therefore, in determining the need for capacity-building efforts to head off insurgency included: 
 1) Absence of problems- without problems the insurgents have no cause. 
 2) National consensus- willingness of the people to accept and back the regime. 
 3) Resoluteness of counterinsurgent leadership. 
 4) Counterinsurgent leaders’ knowledge of counterinsurgency. 
 5) The machine for the control of the population (political structure, administrative 
bureaucracy, police and armed forces). 
 6) Geography.  
 Galula observed that a regime need not be popular to be strong; many totalitarian states 
are quite strong because they have efficient, perhaps brutal, state machinery capable of sowing 
“terror and mutual suspicion” (p. 27).  This iron control rules out the launching of insurgency.  
Against such a state, terror was still possible, because it could be executed by a single individual, 
but one person or a small group is unlikely to overthrow a state.  Finally, an external crisis may 
provide the opportunity for insurgency to begin. 
 In summing up his discussion of the prerequisites for successful insurgency, Galula 
writes: “(1) a cause, (2) a police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgent camp, (3) a 
not-too-hostile geographic environment, and (4) outside support in the middle and later stages of 
an insurgency—these are the conditions for a successful insurgency” (p. 42). 
 Galula posited some “laws and principles” of counterinsurgency—tenets that must be 
obeyed in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency effort.  They are:  
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First law: Support of population is as necessary for counterinsurgent as for insurgent.  
The government can “clean” an area, but cannot prevent the return of insurgents to that area once 
the mass of soldiers are withdrawn for use elsewhere.  Only the people of the area can keep it 
clean, therefore the government must organize the people to resist the return of insurgents. 
Second Law: Support is gained through an active minority.  In any insurgency, an active 
minority supports the government and another minority supports the insurgency.  The neutral 
majority can be influenced, and must be influenced in order for one side to gain victory.  In 
counterinsurgency, the government will need to identify local leaders that are loyal and organize 
them against the insurgent minority. Galula went so far as to say, “Every operation, whether in 
the military field or in the political, social, economic, and psychological fields, must be geared to 
that end” (p. 77).  Effective propaganda shows that the government is superior to the insurgent 
alternative. 
Third Law: Support of population is conditional. The government must demonstrate that 
it has “the will, the means, and the ability to win.” (p. 78).  Loyalist local leaders cannot emerge 
and the neutral majority will not rally to the government’s cause until they feel somewhat secure 
from insurgent threat.  
Fourth Law: Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.  Fighting an 
insurgency is very expensive; the government will need to assemble and concentrate a great deal 
of resources and many personnel.  This implies the need to concentrate forces in prioritized 
areas, clean them, organize them, and move to other areas.   
Galula also laid out a cookie-cutter operational plan for the defeat of insurgency in a 
selected area (p. 80):  
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 1) Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed 
insurgents. 
 2) Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength; 
install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 
 3) Establish contact with the population, and control its movements in order to cut off its 
links with the guerrillas. 
 4) Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. 
 5) Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 
 6) Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 
incompetents; give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 
 7) Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 
 8) Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.   
When a village or neighborhood is cleared, small groups of solders can live there to 
prevent the insurgent from returning until village self-defense can fend for itself with little help.  
The turning point is when leaders emerge among the loyalists; once they are committed, they do 
not want the insurgent to return.  Once basic security is assured and population is separated from 
the insurgent, the government can use its interagency capabilities to provide services and gain 
popular support. 
In closing, one of the key points Galula has for military officers engaged in 
counterinsurgency is that “the objective [in revolutionary war] is the population, military and 
political actions cannot be separated, and military action—essential though it is—cannot be the 
main form of action” (p. 84).  This is important because a military officer, trained his whole 
professional life to seek out and destroy his enemies, finds it easy to forget that the objective is 
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the people.  When he stomps about the countryside searching for a few guerrillas that he will 
have a hard time catching, he is likely alienating the population that he needs to succeed.  He 
forgets that the destruction of a few guerrillas is of little gain.  If he antagonizes the people, they 
are easily replaced or augmented.  It is not unusual for a clumsily-executed military operation to 
create more guerrillas than it destroys.  An American infantry lieutenant and Iraq war veteran of 
my acquaintance (who I will not identify) recently told me that “we made more insurgents than 
we killed or captured.”  When I asked why, he said “because we behaved too aggressively in 
sector, and pissed the people off.” 
State of the Art: Guidance from Multinational Corps- Iraq (MNC-I) 
 Students and practitioners of counterinsurgency can find a concise (three pages), up-to-
date statement of the principles that govern the U.S. military’s interaction with the Iraq 
population in the guidance statement of the Multinational Corps- Iraq (MNC-I) to subordinate 
military units.  MNC-I is the headquarters for U.S. and multinational forces in Iraq.  The priority 
of military efforts (“our focus”) is to protect the Iraqi populace; this “is the clearest, most visible 
demonstration of excellence in the practice of counterinsurgency” (p. 1).  Furthermore, MNC- 
wants to reduce the level of violence, creating time for the government of Iraq to become more 
capable and secure, creating the opportunity for national reconciliation, and facilitating the 
“delicate tasks” of capacity-building and gaining the confidence of the people. 
 The statement instructs military leaders to think about, talk about, and operate on the 
bases of ten principles: 
1) Secure the people where they sleep. Counterinsurgents must secure the people in their 
homes with their families.  Once they are secured, they cannot be abandoned or the insurgent 
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will return, and terrorize those who have supported the government.  Units must control areas 
that are clear, and should prioritize effort to secure most important areas first. 
2) Give the people justice and honor.  Foreign hands that bring security must also give 
justice and honor or the people will view multinational soldiers as oppressors and occupiers. 
3) Integrate civilian and military efforts. Also, soldiers must get out of armored vehicles 
and walk; it is impossible to influence and control people when soldiers are isolated from them. 
4) Intelligence is developed at low level.  Patrols of all types observe things that combine 
to form intelligence, and a steady U.S. presence may lead to unsolicited tips.  It is the low-level 
intelligence that is most actionable. 
5) Every unit advises Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) partners.  Building the capacity of Iraqi 
forces is U.S. soldiers’ ticket home.  The ISF will eventually carry the load; they must be trained 
and ready as soon as possible.  Also, multinational units must be aware that Iraqis will emulate 
them—for better or worse. 
6) Include ISF in multinational operations.  Foreign troops do not have a “feel” for the 
environment, and local troops lack the firepower and supporting arms available to U.S. units.  
The combination of the two is more powerful than either alone. 
7) Attack the network behind the improvised explosive device (IED).  Forces must use all 
assets—unmanned aerial vehicles, rapid reaction forces, helicopters— to pursue IED-setters.  
Units need to be proactive, innovative and follow-up to defeat insurgent networks. 
8) Be first with the truth, and know that actions are louder than words.  Units must 
communicate with local audiences frequently and honestly. 
 69
9) Make people choose, but convince them to choose to support the government.  All 
activities should be oriented toward getting people to choose the government.  Once they, 
choose, counterinsurgents must protect them from insurgent reprisal. 
10) Influence local leaders who can sway blocks of people to support the government. 
Challenge of the 21st Century 
Know the Enemy, Understand the Social Environment 
 Lewis (1990) describes the reasons why many Muslims resent the West in general and 
the U.S.—the leader of the West—in particular.  Lewis points out that Islam is not a monolithic 
creed and that Muslims are not of the same mind, nevertheless, some observations apply in 
general.  Muslims remember a time when Islam was a dominant force and the community of 
Muslims was the world’s leading civilization.  The last several hundred years of Western 
dominance is humiliating to them, and frustrating to them because God is supposed to favor 
them.  Moreover, they cannot shut us out; Western media pervades the world and threatens to 
change who they are.  Also, they deeply resent the friendship the U.S. shows to Israel.  In the 
Arab mind, Israel has stolen their lands and dislocated their people.  Al Qaeda and similar groups 
wish to expel Western influence from Muslim lands.  Lewis believed, in 1990, that the West 
should refuse to over-react to minor provocations and let the Muslim world come to terms with 
modernity without too much interference. 
 Freidman (1999) described the pressure that modernization and globalization puts on all 
societies.  This pressure is most acute on traditional societies that have not had the opportunity to 
modernize at a pace that provides for more gradual change.  These societies desire to participate 
in the bounty of the modern world, but are concerned about the changes modernity will require 
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of them.  Their conflict produces frustration and anger that may be directed against Western 
models of modernity (Lewis, 1990). 
 Huntington (1993) described the “clash of civilizations” that he thought brewing along 
the frontiers of Islam.  The very different ways in which Western and Islamic peoples view the 
world will lead to cultural conflict that is different from the ideological or economic conflict of 
the recent past.  Religious differences and differences of values will force Western and Islamic 
“civilizations” (and perhaps that of the Chinese) into conflict.  The matter is made more acute by 
the fact that modern communication and transportation systems are making the world smaller. 
Modernity is uprooting people from longstanding local identities, and non-Western peoples are 
demonstrating the will and the capability to resist Western cultural dominance.   
 In working with foreign cultures, it is critical that soldiers, diplomats, relief and 
development workers understand key features of the host culture.  This reduces 
misunderstanding and provides insights that can make capacity-building efforts much more 
effective.  It is hard to over-state the value of this understanding; as McFarland (2005) argued, 
“engagement with local populaces has become so crucial that mission success is often 
significantly affected by soldiers’ ability to interact with local individuals and communities” (p. 
62). 
Patai’s The Arab Mind (2002) attempts to explain features of the Arab belief system and 
behavior that might mystify a Western observer.  Patai appears on reading lists for soldiers, but 
he is not without critics, especially since Patai himself was an Israeli.  De Atkine (2004), who 
has assigned the book as an instructor, and has written a foreword to a 2002 reprint of Patai’s 
work, published a short summary of this criticism, and answered it somewhat.  In another article, 
De Atkine (1999) explains characteristics of Arab culture that Westerners perceive as inefficient, 
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but an understanding of which should improve the performance of advisors and soldiers assigned 
to assist Arab allies.  This article was required reading for my mid-career Army officer’s course 
at the Command and General Staff College.  Connable (2004) attempted to explain Iraqi cultural 
facets to a military audience by figuratively describing Marines as being from Mars while Iraqis 
are from Venus.  
 Renzi (2006) argued the need for “ethnographic intelligence” in understanding the 
cultures and needs of people in the host nation.  Particularly, he thought the most pressing need 
was to understand the social networks of the populace so that insurgents could be separated from 
the people in the least violent way.  He qualified the term, “intelligence,” suggesting that 
“information” was equally descriptive, but that he retained the use of “intelligence” to highlight 
the “military utility” of the information gathered (and perhaps to sell a gentler notion to 
pragmatic Army officers).  In context, this “utility” is not confined to combat operations, but is 
useful for getting along with the people of an area and for helping them meet their needs. 
Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, and Smith (2006) described the Army’s attempt to better 
understand cultural differences and local issues at very low level.  They described the formation 
of Human Terrain System (HTS) teams made up of area experts, linguists, and social scientists, 
particularly anthologists, that conduct research and fieldwork to better understand the "cultural 
intricacies" (p. 8) of the local people.  The intent is to understand grievances and motivations that 
increase the people’s support for the government and decrease violence by mapping the “’human 
terrain’—social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among 
whom a force is operating” (p. 9), and enhance military units’ ability to “understand and respect 
the culture” (p. 11).  The program was widely criticized by anthropologists as “enabling the kill 
chain” (Vine, 2007) and violating professional ethics by subverting the principle of informed 
 72
consent.  How can anyone “consent” to be interviewed or studied when the researcher arrives 
with an armed band of soldiers?  Weinberger (2007) reported on the disapproval of the executive 
board of the American Anthropology Association for HTS for a variety of professional ethics 
reasons, including “informed consent.”  The collision of professional ethics and 
counterinsurgency effectiveness is unfortunate; The New York Times (Rohde, 2007) reported a 
brigade commander in Afghanistan as saying that combat operations in the brigade’s area had 
decreased by 60% since the arrival of the human terrain team assigned to his brigade.  The 
Christian Science Monitor (Peterson, 2007), probably reporting on the same HTS team, 
described the anthropologist as perceiving progress not only in understanding the people, but 
also in the evolution of the soldiers’ attitudes toward the people as moving “away from firepower 
to a smarter counterinsurgency” (An Anthropologist at Work Section, Para. 4).  The main 
beneficiaries of a decrease in violence are the local populace. 
 Cobbold (2006) thinks that 21st century warfare will often be characterized by asymmetry 
simply because no entity can compete effectively against the U.S. or another Western military.  
He argued that the 21st century environment is also characterized by the global media capable of 
instantaneous transmission of images around the world.  This ability makes the media message 
extremely influential and affects the manner of decisions made by democratic governments.  
Furthermore, he thought countries will attempt to shape the world through coalitions, but these 
will be coalitions of the willing, because international organizations are plagued by the 
unwillingness of member states to bear shares of the burden. 
 Krulak (1999) describes the need for the “three block war” fought by “strategic 
corporals,” those low level leaders whose actions will have strategic consequences for good or 
ill.  The actions of junior leaders and individual soldiers have a large effect on the perceptions of 
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local people and, via global media, the perceptions of a world audience. Moreover, the line 
between combatant and non-combatant will be increasingly blurred, and adversaries will resort 
to asymmetric warfare to achieve their aims. 
 Claessen (2007) explains how insurgents “attack” the public will of democratic 
populations to force the withdrawal of their armies from areas of conflict.  Using the global 
media, insurgents craft messages that counterinsurgency efforts are ineffective and repressive, 
and that insurgents are fighting for a good cause.  By persuading the populace of the foreign 
counterinsurgent that the struggle is inappropriate and unworthy of the cost, the insurgent 
effectively defeats the foreign counterinsurgent and removes his support from the local national 
government.  This has the interesting effect that democratic governments prefer to keep 
counterinsurgency efforts low key, so that the war is conducted out of mind of the home 
population.  Lynn (2005) acknowledges that popular support in the U.S. is the “center of gravity” 
of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts abroad, and so the defeat of U.S. popular will results in the 
failure to achieve policy objectives. 
Urbanization 
 The world’s population numbered 2.52 billion in 1950 and had increased to 6.46 billion 
in 2005.  Moreover, the percentage of the population living in urban centers has increased from 
29.0 percent to 48.7 percent during the same period (UN, 2006).  The huge increase in urban 
populations has had many effects on facets of modern life, including the practice of insurgency.   
 The first wave of modern urban insurgency took place in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly in 
Latin America and Europe.  Most of these movements were branded “terrorist” due to the nature 
of their operations, which included robbery, assassination, kidnapping, and bombings 
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(Kalyanaraman, 2003). Some movements, like the Baader-Meinhoff, never had wide popular 
appeal, while others, such as the Provisional IRA managed to attract a corps of supporters. 
The “urban guerrilla” derived several advantages from operations in urban areas.  
Niezing (1974) observed that urban society was vulnerable to disruption by political violence, 
which could cause great inconvenience and considerable expense to the government.  The 
government might also over-react to insurgent violence and act in repressive ways that prove 
counter-productive.  Indeed, sometimes insurgents acted deliberately in an attempt to provoke 
repression (Mack, 1974).  Kalyanaraman (2003) pointed out that the mass of people provide 
good cover for insurgents in the same way that inhospitable terrain hides the rural insurgent.  
However, urban insurgents can remain in contact with the people which they hope will support 
their cause.  Kalyanaraman also observed that leaders of revolutionary political movements of 
this time were likely to be city-bred and educated, and had difficulty relating to the peasantry.  
Finally, an urban setting provided better access to the media that insurgents need to spread their 
message and draw attention to their cause.  Wiberg (1974) even speculated that some urban 
insurgencies may be products of the media, instead of manipulators of the media.   
Perhaps the most important theoretical implication for urban insurgency is that the 
support of the people is not as critical as it was for a Maoist model people’s war.  The urban 
guerrilla can support himself by robbery and ransom, and need not rely on the people’s support 
for food or other supplies (Marighella, 1969).  Moreover, the clandestine nature of the urban 
guerrilla is difficult to reconcile with the need to mobilize the masses for victory (Kalyanaraman, 
2003).  Perhaps this is a reason that few urban guerrillas can claim any real success (Wiberg, 
1974) unless they are accompanied by a legal political wing that can publicly represent the same 
interests and constituencies.   
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 The legacy of urban guerrillas for 21st century practice is that insurgents can hide more 
easily among urban masses than in remote hinterlands, and still have access to the local and 
global networks which support them.  Additionally, the practice of insurgency requires the 
manipulation of media to garner support, spread terror, and influence the political decisions of 
their adversaries (Kilcullen, 2005; Metz and Millen, 2004).  Like the 1970s urban guerrilla, 21st 
century insurgents can disrupt society and coerce governments without a great deal of local 
popular support.  This implies that counterinsurgency designed to separate the insurgents from 
the people are less effective than when facing a popular movement like that described by Mao. 
Global Insurgency, Most Serious Threat 
 The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) states that global terrorists groups 
constitute the most serious threat to U.S. security for the next several years.  The possibility of 
these groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction makes them even more dangerous.  This 
assessment of the threat they cause has provoked some discussion as to the best ways to counter 
this threat. 
 Kilcullen (2005) and Lacy (2003) have argued that groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates 
are better perceived as a global insurgency than as a permutation of traditional terrorists.  The 
implication of this argument is that theory developed for fighting al Qaeda and similar groups 
would be better based in, and developed from, counterinsurgency theory than from counter-terror 
theory. 
 Lacy (2003) pointed out that insurgencies arise out of discontent, when grievances are not 
or cannot be addressed within an existing political system.  He observed that popular discontent 
permits the mobilization of people and resources with which to fight an established order.  He 
believed that this described al Qaeda and its affiliates, with their effectiveness enhanced by 
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global communication and transportation technologies that allow them to mobilize globally 
rather than merely within a single nation.  Lacy argued that existing low intensity conflict theory 
as embodied in then-current Air Force doctrine (he wrote before the publication of FM 3-24) was 
helpful to understanding how to combat this phenomenon.  The theory taught that insurgency 
was a contest for “legitimacy” between the established order and those who were unhappy with 
it.  The side which gained legitimacy in the eyes of the people won.  Moreover, the legitimacy of 
a nation where attacks were taking place was not the only issue, but that the legitimacy of the 
U.S. as a global leader was also at issue.  Finally, Lacy observed that popular perceptions had 
more to do with legitimacy than the actual actions of the actors involved, hinting that operations 
to manage perceptions are crucial to the effort on both sides.  Lacy observed that the 
“multifaceted” approach demanded by counterinsurgency theory was the best way to enhance the 
legitimacy of the current order. 
 Kilcullen (2005) reviews the apparent strategy of Islamist groups and concludes that there 
is a “jihadist” movement, but that it consists of “a loosely aligned confederation of independent 
networks and movements, not a single organization” (p. 602).  He argues that it is best 
understood, however, as an insurgency—“a popular movement that seeks to change the status 
quo through violence and subversion” (p. 604).  Terror is merely a tactic that they employ along 
with propaganda, subversion, and open warfare. 
 The terrorist “paradigm” considers terrorists to be “unrepresentative aberrant individuals” 
with whom we will not negotiate so as not to encourage further terror (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 605).  
The insurgency paradigm recognizes that insurgents are representative of popular grievances 
which we might legitimately seek to redress through negotiation and compromise.  These 
insurgents’ methods are unacceptable, but their grievances may be legitimate.  This implies a 
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“whole-of-government” approach for addressing the conflict rather than merely a military or law 
enforcement approach. 
 Metz (1995) anticipated the changes in insurgency that threatened the sufficiency of then-
current 1990s counterinsurgency theory.  He observed that counterinsurgency doctrine in the 
U.S. was designed to address a Maoist people’s war, but that the nature of insurgency groups and 
the causes that motivate them were changing.  Insurgency was becoming ethnically or 
religiously-based, and likely to advocate some form of succession or separatism.  The problem 
for the local national government, if it was perceived as oppressing a particular sect or ethnic 
group, was that its (lack of) legitimacy was defined in ethnic terms.  Since ethnicity is something 
that cannot be changed, it was difficult for the government to gain legitimacy among the 
meaningful segment of the population.  Religions, of course, are similar in that people are 
unwilling to change.  The implications for U.S. policy were that we could intervene in 
circumstances where there was little hope of resolution at any reasonable cost.  Furthermore, the 
larger the U.S. commitment, the greater the psychological assurance to the local national 
government that it need not undertake appropriate reform, which exacerbates the problem and 
might prolong the conflict.  Metz argues that the U.S. should be selective about where it chooses 
to intervene, should act as part of a coalition, and should seek indirect support options, rather 
than the commitment of U.S. forces. 
 Hoffman (2007) weighed into this debate by criticizing the “classicists’” influence in the 
new counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24).  He thought the manual was a good start to 
understanding counterinsurgency, but that the classical writers were addressing mid-20th century 
insurgency and not the new variations of globalized insurgency characteristic of the 21st century.  
He details the changes he perceives in insurgency practice that should require changes in 
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counterinsurgency practice as well.  He advocates the revision of counterinsurgency theory into 
“neo-classical counterinsurgency” to account for these changes.   
 However, the problem with the enlargement of counterinsurgency theory to account for 
global insurgency is that it may obscure the practices needed to address local insurgencies in Iraq 
or Afghanistan.  Those “classical” principles need to be understood at all ranks—private through 
general—in order to cope with large scale intervention within a nation.  The more nebulous 
global insurgency networks will never be grappled with using significant military force (unless 
the insurgents choose it, such as al Qaeda in Iraq—and then counterinsurgency theory is not 
really helpful, because the “hearts and minds” of men who go to a country to fight Americans 
cannot be won), and so the average soldier need not understand the nuances of the global effort.  
This suggests that two counterinsurgency models might be more appropriate for two types of 
insurgency than one large model capable of handling both. 
 The seeds of synthesis (that the U.S. actually needs two models) may already exist.  Metz 
and Millen (2004) argue that insurgencies may be classified into two types—national and 
liberation.  They argue that existing doctrine focuses on national insurgencies, and that liberation 
insurgencies may require a different strategy.  National insurgencies are ones in which “the 
primary antagonists are the insurgents and a national government which has at least some degree 
of legitimacy and support” (p. 2).  Each side seeks to win over neutral persons in a contest for 
legitimacy.  On the other hand, liberation insurgencies “pit insurgents against a ruling group that 
is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, 
or culture” (p. 2).  The insurgents attempt to “liberate” their nation from alien occupation. 
 Metz and Millen (2004) also suggest two broad categories of counterinsurgency—victory 
and containment.  In the former, the U.S. would assist a government, judged to be at least 
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somewhat legitimate, to defeat the national insurgency it faces.  In the latter, the U.S. might 
attempt to contain the effects of a national insurgency against a government judged to be less 
legitimate, that is, where the insurgents have legitimate grievances the government is unwilling 
to redress.  For liberation insurgencies, Metz and Millen believe a strategy of victory is a “very 
long shot” (p. vii) and that a strategy of containment would be more logical.  Along these lines, 
the global insurgency of jihadist groups is a liberation insurgency in the sense that the jihadis 
have successively portrayed themselves as liberators to important segments of the Islamic world.  
Given their dispersion and global support networks, they cannot be defeated in any relevant 
sense.  Therefore, a strategy of containing the effects of jihadists’ campaigns may be the best one 
to pursue. 
Current Debates and Contemporary Practice 
 One debate is between the “hearts and minds” and the coercion schools of thought.  The 
former is represented by most of the classic authors discussed above and embodied in current 
U.S. doctrine.  Kahl (2007) in the course of reviewing FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006) gives 
a quick summation of the coercion school of thought.  The coercion school holds that 
counterinsurgents should use coercion to force the population to abandon any support for the 
insurgency.  The school believes that the regime should increase the cost of supporting the 
insurgency by reprisals and collective punishments.  The problem with this approach is two-fold.  
It ignores morality and violates Western values (Kahl, 2007) and surrenders the global 
struggle—a contest over ideals—to terror by adopting it.  This also ignores the need to maintain 
domestic support for the counterinsurgency effort and ignores the value of the support of the rest 
of the world.  Also, this approach, despite the clear success of repression in some cases, may not 
accomplish the objective.  In many other cases, brutal repression has achieved only a temporary 
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effect, and in others it has strengthened popular resentment against the regime and therefore, 
strengthened the insurgency.  Lynn (2005) observed that unrestrained or indiscriminate violence 
leads to the “three R’s—resentment, resistance, and revenge” (p.27).  Kahl (2007) notes that 
some authors have observed that counterinsurgency theory effective against nationalists and 
communists in the last century may not be effective against religiously motivated guerrillas 
whose hearts and minds cannot be won. 
 Another debate stems around the need for additional counterinsurgency theory.  
Strickland (2005) argued that classical theory, appropriately applied to today’s situation, tells 
counterinsurgents what they need to know to be successful.  The insurgencies currently facing 
the U.S. are not, in their essence, different from the insurgencies of the 20th century.  His 
argument appears contextual to Iraq or Afghanistan, however, and may not consider the global 
insurgency suggested by Lacy (2003), Kilcullen (2005) or Metz and Millen (2004).  Others agree 
that there were valuable lessons to be learned from the past.  Sepp (2005), for example, thought it 
possible to extract a list of “best practices” from a study of historical cases.  He generated a list 
of “successful operational practices” which included assurance of human rights for the populace, 
effective law enforcement, population control measures, and participatory political processes, 
among other things. Coffey (2006) and Andrade and Willbanks (2006) argued that the Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, which 
integrated security and development efforts within a single political unit, such as a hamlet or 
village, provided a model for a similar program adapted for Iraq. 
Many others recognize the value of the old classics without suggesting that theoretical 
development should stop.  Marston (2007) provided a review and summary of the work of 
Gwynn (1934), Kitson (1971), Galula (1964), and Thompson (1966) as a vehicle to 
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understanding and applying classic lessons to a changing environment.  Tomes (2004) provided a 
summary and synthesis of Galula, Trinquier (1964), and Kitson (1971), highlighting common 
themes.  He believed “rereading” the classics did not provide all the answers, but that reading 
them showed that some problems, and therefore some solutions, might not be original to the 
present.  Still others think the contemporary environment requires a systematic re-examination of 
theory to determine what changes are necessary.  Metz (1995) argued that U.S counterinsurgency 
doctrine (as of 1995) was based on a model of a Maoist People’s War, but that not all 
insurgencies fit the model.  Therefore, he argued, some doctrinal assumptions might be obsolete. 
Metz and Millen (2004) took this re-examination seriously, producing theoretical progress by 
distinguishing between “national” insurgencies and “liberation” insurgencies 
Aylwin-Foster (2005), a British brigadier, offered the Army a friendly, but explicit and 
comprehensive critique designed to help improve U.S. government and Army counterinsurgency 
practices from early in the Iraq insurgency.  A brief summary of his ideas, in his own words, 
reads like this: 
My overriding impression was of an Army imbued with an unparalleled sense of 
patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination, with plenty of talent, and in no 
way lacking in humanity or compassion. Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a 
stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that 
duty required all issues to be confronted head-on. (p. 3). 
 
The pre-disposition to offensive operations was such that it led to the neglect of hearts and minds 
activities and efforts to build legitimacy, and often created unnecessary conflict with the Iraqi 
people.   Aylwin-Foster even quoted an unnamed Army colonel as saying in 2004, “If I were 
treated like this, I’d be a terrorist!” (p. 3). 
 Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005) explained the multi-disciplinary activities of the 1st 
Cavalry Division during its tenure in Baghdad in 2004-2005.  It organized activities along 
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several “lines of operations” (LOOs), including combat operations, train and employ security 
forces, essential services, promote governance, and economic pluralism, all performed primarily 
by soldiers.  These activities had the expressed aim of enhancing the legitimacy of local 
institutions, and producing the following: “A secure and stable environment for Iraqis, 
maintained by indigenous police and security forces under the direction of a legitimate national 
government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism” (p. 7). 
Some Tentative Syntheses 
 A reading of several classic works of counterinsurgency suggests tentative agreement on 
some principles that is worthy of further investigation.  These are: 
1) Insurgency is political in its nature; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or 
grievance); and a long-term solution is political, not military, in its essence.   
2) The people are the center of gravity.  The side that can command the people’s 
allegiance will win.  This idea has several corollaries: 
  a. The government must be able to provide security.  If it cannot, it cannot be 
perceived as legitimate, and cannot command the people’s allegiance. 
  b. People can be persuaded.  Respectful treatment, redress of grievances, and 
provision of services from the government will decrease perceived grievances and reduce 
support for insurgency.   
  c. Propaganda is important in persuasion.  It affects popular perceptions of both 
insurgent and counterinsurgent. 
  d. People and resources need to be controlled to separate the insurgents from the 
people who support them. 
3) There are fundamentals to guerrilla operations. 
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  a. A secure base is essential to a growing insurgent movement. 
  b. External support is critical to having sufficient resources to be successful. 
  c. Tactical mobility and dispersal are essential for insurgent survival.   
4) There are also fundamentals to counterinsurgency. 
  a. The government must understand the limits of its authority and behave in 
accordance with the law.  It must be perceived as fair and as providing equitably for all citizens. 
  b. Interagency, multi-disciplinary, multi-faceted operations are necessary to win.  
There is no long-term military solution to any significant insurgency. 
We have seen that Lawrence, Mao, and Galula explicitly state most of these ideas.  
Gwynn (1934) and Guevara (1963) have similar views.  More recent practice and scholarship 
suggest that these essentials are still important.  This study will ascertain which other classic 
theorists say the same, the extent to which current scholarship agrees, and then determine what 
additions to theory are required to address the changing nature of 21st century insurgency.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Introduction 
To address the question, “What principles do military officers need to understand to 
conduct counterinsurgency effectively and humanely?” it is necessary to seek an appropriate 
method for inquiry.  The selected methodology needs to be sufficiently rigorous to claim 
validity, but also sufficiently flexible to cope with the data that exist. 
The diversity of scenarios addressed by insurgency and counterinsurgency is great, 
varying with the geographical location, the time in which the struggle occurs, the intensity of the 
struggle, the technology available, the cultural features of the combatants, and a host of other 
issues.  Moreover, the theoretical literature is either the work of practitioners going about their 
business or scholarship that is a study of these practitioners’ activities in pursuit of their goals. 
 Therefore, the broad study of counterinsurgency is not amenable to quantitative analysis, 
and the literature reflects this.  Only a few studies have made use of even the simplest 
quantitative analysis.  Merom (2003) used opinion polling data to explain why democracies lose 
small wars.  Scholars (Dix, 1983; Davies, 1962; Wickham-Crowley, 1987) have used statistics to 
describe socio-economic conditions inside a country facing a revolutionary struggle, compare 
cases, understand where revolutionary movements are likely to occur, and determine their 
prospects for success.  These studies are useful in understanding why men are fighting—their 
cause or grievance.  The cause motivating insurgents will emerge as a key principle in this study, 
but the detailed investigation of causes is not my topic. 
 More often, the study of counterinsurgency uses a qualitative methodology because of the 
large number of variables that affect the outcomes of these struggles. FM 3-24 (2006), the 
 85
Army’s and Marine Corps’ new counterinsurgency manual, endorses case study methodology, 
stating “principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations… must be grounded in 
historical studies, [and] informed by contemporary experience” (quoted in the Foreword).  A 
search through Academic Search Complete using the keyword, “counterinsurgency,” located 255 
articles, many of which were historical case studies or studies of the “contemporary experience.”  
Among the classics, Callwell (1906) illustrated his points by reference to specific cases; Galula 
(1964) interpolated theory from a study of cases, whether those in his own experience or those he 
studied; and West (1985) examined the experience of a Marine squad posted in a Vietnamese 
village with such detail that he reconstructed dialog among the participants based on extensive 
interviews.  Nagl (2002), a widely read study—nine of the 255 articles discussed above were 
reviews of this book—compared the capacity of the British Army to learn and adapt in order to 
defeat insurgency in Malaya with the inability of the U.S. Army to do the same in Vietnam. 
  Some studies examined the work of one theorist in detail.  Clark (1988), for example, 
examined the work of Guevara.  Others compared the work of two theorists.  Anderson (1970), 
for example, compared Mao and Lawrence, concluding that the “similarities far outnumber the 
differences” (p. i) despite “the very different environment and times in which each of our 
leaders, Mao and Lawrence, practiced their strategy and tactics” (p. 13).  Marston (2007) 
provided a review and summary of the work of Gwynn (1939), Kitson (1971), Galula (1964), 
and Thompson (1966) as a vehicle to understanding and applying classic lessons to a changing 
environment.  Tomes (2004) provided a summary and synthesis of Galula, Trinquier, and Kitson, 
highlighting the common themes.  These works provide some precedent for this study, but I 
could locate no study that attempts comparisons as ambitious or as systematic as this study. 
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Meta-Synthesis 
 A variety of qualitative approaches exist, but the objective of this study requires a 
synthesis of theoretical literature.  Finfgeld (2003) defines a metasynthesis as “a complete study 
that involves rigorously examining and interpreting the findings (versus the raw data) of a 
number of qualitative research studies” (p. 894).   
 Meta-synthesis produces broader perspectives than individual studies (McCormick, 
Rodney, and Varcoe; 2003).  It is valuable because practitioners and policymakers want 
synthesis to guide policy and practice (Dixon-Woods, Booth and Sutton, 2007).  Finlayson and 
Dixon (2008) agreed, noting that practitioners and policymakers desire “useable findings rather 
than endless interpretations of the same or similar subjects” (p. 65).  McCormick et al (2003) 
noted that qualitative meta-analysis provides a “foundation for praxis” (p. 933). 
 Finfgeld (2003) found the results of meta-synthesis are “theory building, theory 
explication, and substantive descriptions of phenomena” (p. 893), and Finlayson and Dixon 
(2008) described the aims of meta-synthesis as theory building, theory development, and higher 
level abstraction.  Estabrooks, Field, and Morse (1994) encouraged researchers to move past 
“one shot” research studies and to continue the “incremental business of accumulating 
knowledge” (p. 510). 
I want to compare the findings of several key counterinsurgency theorists on a list of 
principles that represent the understanding required for effective counterinsurgency practice.  
This is a theory-building activity that moves past individual case studies, and is designed to 
inform practice.  Meta-synthesis appears to offer an appropriate methodology. 
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Problems with Meta-Synthesis 
Despite its potential usefulness, daunting methodological problems exist in synthesis 
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2007).  McCormick et al (2003) report that qualitative meta-analysis 
techniques “are relatively new and poorly developed” (p. 934), and that “there is a sense that 
qualitative meta-analysis has not yet achieved legitimacy with qualitative researchers” (p. 935).  
Finlayson and Dixon (2008) add that qualitative meta-synthesis is “time consuming and is laced 
with an array of unresolved philosophical, methodological and terminological controversies” (p. 
60). 
 Since no firm guidelines for meta-synthesis exist, a wide variety of methodologies have 
been used to complete meta-synthesis projects (Finfgeld, 2003).  There is even considerable 
debate that guidelines are necessary.  Some researchers argue that guidelines restrict creativity 
and limit the accumulation of some types of knowledge.  Others argue that some standards are 
necessary to ensure sufficient rigor for any given research to claim validity (Whittemore, Chase 
& Mandle, 2001).  Dixon-Woods, Shaw, Agarwal, and Smith (2004) argued there is no 
consensus on the characteristics that define quality research, and no consensus on the need for 
criteria for quality.  Sandelowski, Docherty, and Emden (1997) stated one reason for the lack of 
firm criteria for the selection of research reports for inclusion in meta-synthesis is the belief that 
valuable data may be lost if unnecessary restrictions exclude some research. For this reason, it is 
critical that researchers disclose the criteria they have used to select studies for meta-synthesis.  
Finfgeld (2003) also states there is no consensus on which data sources are best for meta-
synthesis.   
Despite these difficulties, Dixon-Woods et al (2007) report that the number of papers 
reporting synthesis of qualitative research is increasing, and that the rapid increase in the 
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development and criticism of qualitative methods is increasing the rigor of this research.  
McCormick et al (2003) observe that published accounts of qualitative findings have proliferated 
in the health sciences.  Moreover, the synthesis of qualitative research is moving from nursing 
into other disciplines (Dixon-Woods et al, 2007).   
A wide variety of synthesis methods are in use and under development to enable 
qualitative meta-synthesis (Finlayson & Dixon, 2008).  These range from interpretive approaches 
to integrative techniques with strict research strategies similar to those of quantitative meta-
analysis.  Finlayson and Dixon (2008) conceive of the range of methodologies as a continuum 
rather than a set of discrete techniques. They believe that the purpose of the study drives the 
selection of synthesis method.  The proper framing of the research question provides focus and 
determines preliminary search criteria. 
Overview of Method 
While the details of the method will continue to unfold below, an overview at this point 
may be helpful in discussion of reliability and validity, population and sample, development of 
the instrument, and data management. 
My expectation was that the answer to the research question would consist of a list of 
principles or concepts that specify key understanding that counterinsurgents need to be effective 
and humane.  An initial inquiry suggested that there exists some tentative consensus upon these 
principles among “classical” authors in the counterinsurgency literature. I believed that further 
systematic inquiry could uncover a set of these principles. 
 The inquiry consisted of a three stage process.  In Stage 1, I conducted a meta-synthesis 
of classical counterinsurgency literature.  I developed criteria for evaluating works of 
counterinsurgency theory to determine which are “classics.”  I used a coding sheet developed 
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during preliminary research to organize quotes from each work.  I selected from among the 
quotes of a single theorist those that best represent his position on each topic.  These were 
inserted in a comparison matrix alongside the quotes of other theorists on the same topic.  Then I 
searched for similarities and contradictions for explicit treatment in the findings. 
 As the classic works were somewhat dated, in Stage 2, I examined additional influential 
and scholarly works, particularly in periodical literature, in order to determine what additional 
concepts needed to be considered.   For example, urbanization has had an effect on the usually 
rural character of past irregular war.   What additional considerations must counterinsurgents 
take into account when dealing with an insurgency that is based in major urban centers?  What 
theoretical changes does urbanization require?  Additionally, the globalization of media and the 
growth of the internet have made insurgency possible on a global scale.  Kilcullen (2005) and 
Lacy (2003), among others, have argued that Al Qaeda is best perceived and addressed as a 
global insurgency.  What changes to theory does this require?  Stage 2 exposed several 
modifications to the principles found in Stage 1. 
 In Stage 3, I coded recent periodical literature into the modified list of principles obtained 
in Stages 1 and 2.  This tested the validity of theoretical syntheses gained in Stages 1 and 2 
against recent experience and scholarship, and provided one additional opportunity for synthesis. 
Reliability and Validity 
 In qualitative research, reliability and validity are difficult because of the inherent 
subjectivity of the subject matter, and the focus on the “uniqueness of human situations and the 
importance of experience” (Harper, 2005, p. 46).  Whittemore et al (2001) examined the debate 
surrounding the need for standards for validity and reliability in qualitative research.  There is no 
agreement that standards are necessary, and certainly no agreement on what they should be, so 
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Whittemore et al (2001) reviewed ten different sets of validity criteria.  There is a great deal of 
variation in the words used to signify criteria, but many are analogous to reliability and validity 
concepts found in quantitative and experimental research.  Reliability refers to the stability of 
findings and validity refers to the truthfulness of findings (Whittemore et al, 2001). 
Several concepts appear useful to this investigation.  Whittemore et al (2001) cite Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) as translating “internal validity to credibility, external validity to transferability, 
reliability to dependability, and objectivity to confirmability” (Whittemore et al, 2001, p. 523).  
Lincoln and Guba also identified credibility as among the most important considerations for 
qualitative research.   
 The research design proposed here addressed these criteria well.  Credibility was 
addressed by the strict procedure by which I had chosen the “classics” and by the use of 
quotations from each theorist, thus allowing him to speak for himself.  Transferability was 
addressed by the synthetic nature of the analysis.  Several classical theorists agreeing on a 
principle suggests the results are transferable.  Dependability was also suggested by the design; 
the dispersal of the theorists in time—1899 to 1972—and additional synthesis sought in current 
periodical literature in Stage 3 of the study suggested the results are dependable over time.  
Finally, the clear explanation of the path I followed as I moved through the research provides 
confirmability, or what other authors have referred to as auditability (Sandelowski, 1986). 
 The single largest threat to the credibility of this study was the possible existence of 
significant biases that I hold.  The use of research teams is known to increase the integrity of 
qualitative results (Finfgeld, 2003), in part, by reducing the bias associated with any individual 
researcher.  Because no funds are available to hire additional researchers/raters, and the large 
quantity of the data precludes use of volunteer raters, no other rater was available to develop 
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coding instruments or to code results separately. This study addressed rater reliability issues only 
by the submission of the coding instrument to a subject matter expert in counterinsurgency prior 
to coding and the submission of completed raw coding sheets to the same expert for confirmation 
that the coding was reasonable.  This expert, Mr. Stephen Henthorne, agreed that the coding 
sheet provided a fair, but not exhaustive, list of candidate principles, and that the completed 
coding was a fair representation of the theorists’ work. 
Additional techniques for reducing bias associated with the researcher and enhancing 
credibility include the use of supporting evidence in the form of “raw data,” particularly 
quotations.  Finfgeld (2003) found that quotes are very useful evidence in publication because 
they allow readers to grapple with the original evidence and remove a layer of researcher 
interpretation.  My design was heavily dependent upon quotations, which also offered a 
mechanism to limit the influence of my biases on findings. 
Triangulation—the “approach of using several referents in a study to converge on the 
truth” (Harper, 2005, p. 48)—is also useful to building credibility.  A degree of triangulation 
exists in Stage 3 of the design where current periodical literature was compared to the results of 
synthesis from Stages 1 and 2. 
Preliminary Research and Researcher Perspective 
 Finfgeld (2003) observed that in the “investigations conducted since 1994, it appears that 
most researchers had done preliminary studies in their metasynthesis areas of interest. Thus, in 
many cases, the researchers’ own incremental work appears to have guided their topic 
selections” (p. 898).  While I have no published work on this topic, the preparation of this 
dissertation is not the first encounter I have had with the theory and practice of 
counterinsurgency warfare.  Moreover, the often subjective nature of qualitative inquiry suggests 
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reliability is improved and possible biases illuminated by an understanding of the researcher’s 
perspective and background.  Therefore, I offer a brief explanation of my experience and 
perspective. 
 While still in high school, I read a number of histories, memoirs, and fictional accounts of 
the U.S. experience in Vietnam.  Perhaps my interest was due to my father’s service there, and 
perhaps, as I grew older, my plans to serve as a military officer increased my interest.  I studied 
topics relating to counterinsurgency, revolution, and Marxism as part of an undergraduate degree 
in international affairs at Georgetown University from 1985-1989.  American counterinsurgency 
efforts in El Salvador were ongoing during this period, and the Reagan Administration was 
caught illegally assisting Contra rebels against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. 
 While at Georgetown, I participated in ROTC, and upon graduation was commissioned as 
an Army officer.  I was assigned as a light infantryman, which meant that I walked a lot in 
preparation for deployment to places where foot-mobile infantry would be important to any war 
effort.  At that time, this implied employment in primarily rural areas (today foot-mobile infantry 
is considered key to controlling urban areas as well).  It also meant I was well trained in the 
small unit tactics that would characterize counter-guerrilla fighting in rural areas.  Accordingly, I 
studied works on small unit actions and counterinsurgency, primarily in Vietnam and Malaya. 
 The recent resurgence of my interest in counterinsurgency and the motivation for this 
inquiry is due to my experience in American counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq in 2004-2005.  I 
was posted as the Louisiana National Guard’s 256 Brigade’s civil-military operations (CMO) 
officer (a brigade is composed of about 3800 soldiers).  CMO officers are responsible for many 
Army interactions with the local populace and the local national government, and for programs 
which are not concerned primarily with providing security to the populace.  CMO officers have 
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no command authority; rather they are members of a commander’s staff, and advise him on civil-
military matters. 
 My location in the hierarchy of military units was such that I was able to speak often to 
Iraqis on the street, an opportunity that was rare for my counterparts at higher headquarters, and 
also able to participate in policy discussions at the embassy, which was not possible for my 
counterparts at lower levels. 
 My observations convinced me that the Army could conduct more effective and more 
humane counterinsurgency if we could understand this environment and the special 
considerations it requires, and then use this understanding to inform training and future 
operations.  The purpose of effective counterinsurgency is not to kill more guerrillas, but to 
shape the environment so that the local national government can govern justly and legitimately.  
Effective counterinsurgency makes this possible, decreases resistance to the government, 
persuades people that their interests lie with the government, and decreases violence.  Effective 
counterinsurgency is a moral activity. 
 After Dr. Burnett, then committee chair, agreed that counterinsurgency warfare was an 
appropriate topic for Human Resource Education, I began a more systematic examination of 
counterinsurgency theory.  The purpose of this activity was to understand the nature of the data, 
determine feasible research questions and begin development of an instrument for coding data in 
subsequent investigation. 
Instrument Development 
 In preliminary research, before any design for this inquiry had suggested itself, I read the 
work of Callwell (1906), Mao (1937/1965), and Galula (1964).  I began to see similarities in 
their thought.  I constructed a preliminary instrument, essentially an outline, using Mao’s On 
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Guerrilla Warfare as a base, addressing topics in the same order that Mao did.  Mao was selected 
because I was familiar with the work of Mao through my professional experience, and because 
he is very influential in the development of theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency (Metz, 
1995; Hoffman, 2007).  Hammes (2004) thought Mao the intellectual father of a form of modern 
protracted asymmetric war, which Hammes termed “fourth-generation war,” and which he 
defined as war “which uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to 
convince the enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable 
or too costly for the perceived benefit” (p. 2).  Fourth-generation warfare began with Mao’s 
efforts in China against the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the Nationalists again.  Hammes 
believes the U.S. will not need to fight conventional war in the near future because no nation or 
non-state actor can oppose America in this way.  Rather, opponents’ relative military weakness 
forces them to adopt asymmetric war, and they choose this arena because history suggests 
asymmetric war can succeed.  Hammes argues that the U.S. has lost this form of war three 
times—in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia—and that it is the form of war waged by U.S. 
opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan.  O’Neill, in the foreword to Taber (1965/2002), credits Mao 
with providing a blueprint and the “main inspiration and impetus” (p. vii) for the successful 
prosecution of revolutionary war in China, in Vietnam against both French and Americans, and 
in other places around the world.  Since the Vietnamese general Giap was a student of Mao 
(Kalyanraman, 2003), the best of his American adversaries also became students. Mao’s 
influence is significant, and so I thought Mao a reasonable place to start. 
I began outlining the work of other theorists using this preliminary instrument.  The 
purpose of this activity was to organize my notes across theorists so that their thoughts on each 
topic suggested by Mao appeared in the same order for each theorist in my notes.  After 
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constructing several of these outlines, I observed some tentative syntheses, and refined my 
preliminary instrument, grouping ideas by their relationship to each other rather than in the order 
Mao addressed them.  I used this secondary instrument to pool the ideas of several theorists as 
part of the literature review, and again I refined my instrument to better capture the ideas 
expressed.  At this point, I developed the method outlined above to systematically pursue the 
investigation, and increase the rigor of the study.   
 The third revision instrument is, of course, still heavily dependent upon my judgment, 
and therefore potentially subject to my biases.  In order to improve the reliability of the 
instrument and limit the effect of my bias, the instrument was submitted to a subject matter 
expert on counterinsurgency appointed to my committee for this purpose.  This committee 
member, Mr. Stephen Henthorne, reviewed and assisted me to refine the instrument and 
confirmed my coding of the data.   
Population  
 Stage 1 required a means to identify “classic” theorists from among the many authors 
who have published on insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerrilla war, or irregular war.  I defined 
a population of works by combining the reading lists of several military organizations and one 
soldier-scholar, who wrote a rigorous and influential book based on research into the 
counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya and Vietnam, and who is widely read among military 
officers today.  Details are found below. 
 In order to be considered “classical,” a theorist must meet the following criteria: 
1. he must have significant influence in the study and practice of counterinsurgency 
(influence criterion),  
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2. his work(s) must focus on the strategic or operational level of the struggle (level 
criterion), and  
3. he must be a practitioner of insurgency or counterinsurgency, who wrote during or 
after his experience (a theorist who wrote before his experience is regarded as a 
“scholar” and is deferred from Stage 1) (practitioner criterion).  
The first criterion required a method for gauging the theorist’s influence.  I have 
identified four authoritative “reading lists.”  The first is published by the Commander of the 
Army’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) which provides the headquarters for the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College, the mid-career service school for officers.  The staff 
college is regionally accredited to confer the degree of Master of Military Art and Science 
(MMAS), and is an important influence on doctrine.  The second is a compilation of two lists 
from the U.S. Marine Corps.  One is entitled “Supplemental Reading for Majors and Lieutenant 
Colonels Deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan” and the other is “Counterinsurgency Reading List: 
For Marines deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.”  Each is divided into sections; I have selected 
the sections in which the word “counterinsurgency” appears and then pooled the lists.  The third 
is compiled by Nagl (2006), who is author of a recent influential book (Nagl, 2002) that appears 
in other lists.  His list is published under the title Learning Counterinsurgency: An Annotated 
Bibliography (2006).  The fourth is the section of the annotated bibliography contained in FM 3-
24 Counterinsurgency (2006) labeled “The Classics.”  FM 3-24 is a manual jointly published as 
Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency.  A theorist appearing on three of the 
four lists had sufficient influence to be considered “classical.”  
The second criterion required an examination of the work in question.  If a work is 
focused on tactical tasks—that is to say, it is about doing things right, whatever those things 
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are—it was not the subject of this study.  Rather this study examined works with strategic or 
operational implications—doing the right things—and that is specific enough to provide 
candidate principles.   Hammes (2004) distinguished concisely between tactical, operational, and 
strategic.  He wrote:  
U.S. military discussion divides war into strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  The 
strategic level sets the goals, allocation of resources, and overall timeline for the conflict.  
The operational level develops the campaigns that tie a series of battles together to 
achieve the strategic goals.  The tactical level covers the battles themselves; the 
techniques, procedures, and tactics for fighting (p. 215). 
  
The third criterion required an examination of the theorist’s biography.  A practitioner 
must have participated in a significant insurgency or counterinsurgency effort, and have written 
about his experience during or after the struggle.  His theoretical work must be informed by 
previous experience for inclusion in Stage 1.  The sample selected for Stage 1 met all three 
criteria. 
 Pooling the reading lists produces a population of 87 total works.  Several authors appear 
multiple times: Lawrence appears in the list three times; Fall, Metz, O’Neill, West, Krepinevich, 
and Maass all appear twice.  Of the 87 works, nine have multiple authors: eight have two, and 
one has three.  In addition, three have institutional authors including the U.S Army, the U.S. 
Marine Corps, and the Russian General Staff. 
Sample 
 Applying the influence criterion to the compiled list, I obtained a sample of eight 
theorists with the requisite influence to be classics.  Callwell (1906), Galula (1964), Kitson 
(1971), Lawrence (The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926/1991)) appeared on all four lists.  The 
remainder, Thompson (1966), Trinquier (1964), West (1972/1985), and the Marine Corps’ Small 
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Wars Manual (1940), appeared on three lists.  All eight met the level and practitioner criteria as 
well. 
 Multiple works by Lawrence were included in the population.  The Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom appeared on all four component lists, Twenty-seven Articles (1917) appeared on two, 
and Anatomy of a Revolt (1920) appeared on one.  I read all three. The first is a memoir that 
recites the events of the Arab Revolt during World War I and Lawrence’s participation in them.  
It reads easily, and while it is possible to extract Lawrence’s thought from the book, it is a 
tedious process because the purpose of the book is to tell the story of the Arab revolt, and not to 
relate observations that have theoretical implications.  The second is Lawrence’s advice to 
European advisors taking positions at the sides of Arab leaders.  Although some observations are 
dated, the work is still a must-read for officers assigned as advisors, and a helpful source for 
increasing cultural awareness, but it is not a work of the theory of counterinsurgency.  The last is 
a periodical article intended to explicitly and concisely state Lawrence’s theoretical observations.  
Exercising my judgment as researcher, I coded this work in preference to The Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom.  I also extracted quotes from the Twenty-seven Articles (1917) in order to capture 
Lawrence’s thoughts on troop professionalism and cultural awareness that were insufficiently 
contained in Anatomy of a Revolt. 
 Additionally, two works by West were in the population.  One is a description of the 
battle of Fallujah, which appeared on the Marine Corps’ component list.  It is not appropriate for 
our analysis as it refers to operations that are conventional in character, and not of the same 
nature as counterinsurgency.  His other work, The Village (1972/1985), differs somewhat from 
the other works in the sample.  It tells the story of a Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) 
that lived in a Vietnamese village and fought alongside Vietnamese militia to provide security 
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for the villagers and for the nation-building activities of the South Vietnamese Revolutionary 
Development cadres.  This work has the character of a memoir also, although the author was not 
a member of the squad depicted in the book. Still it is possible to extract theoretical implications 
from the work, and since no more concise version of West’s thought exists, I coded The Village. 
West was a Marine officer in Vietnam who had the opportunity to observe the operations and 
counterinsurgency success of the CAPs.  His Vietnam experience shaped his perception of 
events, and led to the writing of The Village following series of interviews with the Marines and 
their Vietnamese comrades.   
 The remaining six “theorists” (one is the Marine Corps) appear only once each in the 
population, so I coded each of their works.  I was unable to determine the original publication 
date of the first edition of Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1906).  A 
second edition was published in 1899 and a third in 1906.  Callwell studied a large number of 
small wars, classified them, and extracted lessons for the conduct of them.  It is therefore a 
synthetic work in itself, and contains some theoretical implications that are remarkably valid 
today.  I obtained a scanned copy of the 1906 edition.  I have read and coded portions of the 
book.  Other portions contain tactical advice that is obsolete and not germane to the study.  I 
coded Chapters 1-4, 7, and 11. 
 The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual (1940) was produced following the Marines’ 
participation in numerous small wars between the Spanish American War and the outbreak of 
World War II.  It presents characteristics of small wars, principles of strategy, advice on the 
relationship of the Marines with the State Department and local national agencies.  These topics 
are of interest to this study.  It also gives advice on organization of the force (based upon Marine 
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organization of the time), training, and tactical advice.  These issues are beyond the scope of this 
study.  I coded all sections of Chapter 1, portions of Chapter 2, and all sections of Chapter 5. 
 Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964) was the work of a 
French officer with experience as a combatant in World War II and Algeria.  He also witnessed 
irregular warfare as an observer in China and in Greece.  In the early 1960s, he reflected upon his 
experience, studied historical cases of insurgency, and produced a highly influential work on the 
theory and practice of counterinsurgency.  Nagl, in the Foreword to a 2006 edition of Galula’s 
work, describes it as “having primacy of place” among the classics of counterinsurgency, and 
Galula is required reading for U.S. Army officers in service schools.  I coded this entire book. 
 Trinquier (1964) was also a French officer with experience in China, Indochina, and 
Algeria.  He goes into great detail describing the organization of the guerrillas, especially the 
urban guerrillas who fought in Algiers.  Trinquier also elaborates on the organization the 
government needs to counter insurgent efforts.  He is controversial because much of what he 
says can be considered advocacy of what might be termed politely as “aggressive” interrogation.  
I coded his whole book. 
 Thompson was among the key architects of the British counterinsurgency success in 
Malaya, and was for a time an advisor to the U.S effort in Vietnam.  His work, Defeating 
Communist Insurgency (1966), is an account of a successful counterinsurgency effort.  I coded 
the entire book. 
 Kitson (1971/1974) was a British officer with counterinsurgency experience against the 
Mau Mau in Kenya and also in Malaya.  He served as a peacekeeper in Cyprus, and when 
writing Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping, originally published 
in 1971, he was a brigade commander serving in Northern Ireland.  I coded the entire work. 
 101
 In order to improve reliability, I have applied my judgment only to the selection of a less-
widely known work of Lawrence, and ignored portions of Callwell’s book and the Small Wars 
Manual because they do not meet the level criterion. 
Data Management 
Quotes from classic theorists were coded into an instrument—a list of principles 
representing the understanding required of effective counterinsurgents—to allow comparison and 
synthesis of theorists’ thoughts on each principle.  The instrument is found at Appendix A.  Stage 
1 culminated with the synthesis of a list of principles from the classic theorists. 
Since the “classic” works were somewhat dated, in Stage 2, I examined more recent 
periodical literature to determine what modifications to the list of principles were necessary.  
Specifically, I wanted to account for urbanization and the globalization of information systems.  I 
uncovered several important implications, but found the results were remarkably stable.  Stage 2 
findings were pooled with Stage 1, and the theoretical implications examined, resulting in a 
couple of observations that may have theoretical importance. 
Stage 3 tested the list of principles emerging from Stage 2 against additional 
contemporary scholarship.  The goal of this stage was to confirm or refine the list as appropriate, 
identify consensus for addition to the theoretical base, and identify issues subject to contention 
for additional research.  I accomplished this stage by coding recent literature into the same 
instrument as used in Stage 1 until saturation occurred.  Disagreements among theorists were 
discussed explicitly in the findings.  
Chapter 4 
Findings of the Study 
Stage 1: A Firm Foundation 
 The procedure used to collect and sort data was straight-forward.  I simply read the 
works, highlighted anything I thought important to the theorist’s argument or otherwise 
interesting.  Then I transferred these quotations into a word processor document and sorted the 
data by principle onto a series of coding sheets, one per theorist, as approved by the subject 
matter expert, Mr. Henthorne.   
 Sorting provided some difficulty.  Many items could apply to multiple principles, and the 
principles themselves are often closely related.  For example, the principle that “Polite and 
professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support” is related to “Government must 
establish the rule of law” because a great deal of the behavior proscribed by professional 
behavior is also proscribed by law, and the results on the counterinsurgency effort of widespread 
unprofessionalism is exactly the same as if the government behaved unjustly in violation of the 
law.  Another example is that “The political struggle is always primary” is very closely related to 
“Military action is not sufficient to win.” 
 Furthermore, the outline structure of the coding sheet contained in Table 4-1 shows 
relationships between principles.  For example, the idea that the people are the center of gravity 
implies the government will need to provide them security, to influence and persuade them, and 
to control them with reasonable restrictions in order to earn their support and isolate them from 
the insurgency, which denies their support to the insurgency.  In turn, people are influenced and 
persuaded by troops that behave professionally and are culturally aware, and by an effective 
information campaign that explains government actions and highlights progress.  Of course, 
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propaganda is an important means of persuasion for the insurgent as well.  So a quotation dealing 
with persuading the populace might also be appropriate for propaganda.    
Table 4-1: Coding Categories and Candidate Principles 
 
1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); 
the political struggle is always primary 
 
2: The population is the center of gravity 
 
 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support 
to the government 
 
 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government 
 
  2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support 
 
  2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents 
 
  2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences 
 
2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent  
 
3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength 
 
3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support 
 
3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival 
 
4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law 
 
4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not 
sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required) 
 
 
 During coding, the outline structure was not available to me; I had to code a quotation 
discreetly under a principle.  If it could fit under two or even three principles, I coded that 
quotation under each initially.  During the selection of data for the results tables, I attempted to 
remove this redundancy and avoid repeating quotes.  I was almost successful.  
 I frequently had more relevant quotations than I could possibly use, and therefore, I 
selected those that I thought best represented the theorist’s thought and that provided the most 
clarity without commentary from me.  It is possible that another researcher could pick other 
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quotations that would be just as valid, but I do believe the ones I have selected are representative 
of the theorists’ ideas, and therefore, the overall intent of each theorist and the consensus among 
all theorists that emerge from meta-synthesis are more certain.  In other words, another selection 
of other quotes would not greatly change the findings that emerge from this stage of the research. 
 I tried to keep my commentary to a minimum so that each theorist could speak for 
himself.  I clarified acronyms, supplied the antecedents for pronouns, and such things to assist 
the reader.  I may have added emphasis to several quotations; any italics in the results are mine.  
Quotation marks in the data are the theorist’s.  I also found it useful on occasion to shorten a 
quotation to make room in the results tables for an additional quotation or to clarify the 
significance of the quotations to the principle under which I listed it.  Typically, I dropped 
dependent clauses, lists of examples, or other things.  I worked hard not to change the meaning 
of the sentence.  Table 4-2 contains a couple of examples of this from Thompson (1966). 
 Any investigation of this nature is open to charges of proof-texting, the process by which 
someone carefully selects quotes to agree with a prior agenda or to serve a conscious bias.  I had 
no agenda, with the possible exception that I think that the practice of counterinsurgency can be 
made more humane with the understanding of the principles I have illuminated here, and as is 
suggested by the title of this report.  Fortunately, there is significant evidence to believe 
governments and armies can practice counterinsurgency humanely; indeed, most of the theorists 
thought it expedient as well as right to do so.  Otherwise, I simply wished to know the answer to 
the research question.  I had no conscious bias. 
 Additionally, my experiment is very replicable.  I found the books at the university and 
local public libraries.  The works of Callwell, Lawrence, and Trinquier I was able to find online.  
Callwell and Trinquier are also available as reprints.  While it is extremely unlikely that another 
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researcher would choose the exact same quotations, I think it would be difficult to come to much 
different conclusions on this set of principles. 
Table 4-2: Samples of shortening a quotation 
Long: There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerilla actions 
for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too 
cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an 
insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this 
morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than 
it solves (Thompson, 1966, p. 52). 
 
Short: There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerilla actions 
for government forces to act outside the law… Not only is this morally wrong, but… it will create 
more practical difficulties… than it solves (Thompson, 1966, p. 52). 
 
Long: There is a very clear distinction between the jungle bases and what the communist 
insurgents call their 'popular' bases. The jungle bases are areas where, without much risk of 
interference, guerilla units can obtain rest and sanctuary, where ammunition, food and other 
supplies can be stored in numerous caches, and where recruits can be trained and tactical 
headquarters established… The 'popular' bases, by contrast, are the villages under insurgent 
control from which most of the supplies and recruits are obtained in the first place (Thompson, 
1966, p. 37). 
 
Short: There is a very clear distinction between the jungle bases and… 'popular' bases. The jungle 
bases are areas where, without much risk of interference, guerilla units can obtain rest and 
sanctuary, where ammunition, food and other supplies can be stored… and where recruits can be 
trained and tactical headquarters established… The 'popular' bases, by contrast, are the villages 
under insurgent control from which most of the supplies and recruits are obtained… (Thompson, 
1966, p. 37). 
 
 Another researcher could also identify other principles for investigation.  I do not imagine 
that my list is exhaustive, and I know that there are other principles in the literature.   For 
example, I have identified the need for a study of insurgent organizations and detailed treatment 
of intelligence gathering and handling to be important.  They are topics for additional research.   
General Findings 
 A rigorous and systematic meta-synthesis of this literature produced considerable 
consensus.  Small differences of opinion among the theorists are due largely to differences of 
perspective based on the time a theorist wrote or the side of the conflict he was on.  Callwell, 
Lawrence, and the Marines (Small Wars Manual) wrote before World War II, before the 
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beginning of the Cold War and the break-up of the colonial empires.  Their perspective on 
asymmetric conflict differs somewhat from the writings of Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and 
Kitson.   
Callwell, for instance, discusses broader phenomena than insurgency.  “Small wars” 
include campaigns of conquest and punitive campaigns as well as the protracted suppression of 
insurrection.  Therefore, while sustained operations generally featured regular troops opposed by 
irregulars in a struggle characterized by guerilla tactics, Callwell’s regulars did not face an 
insurgency in the same sense as did the post-war counterinsurgents. Since his irregulars were 
defined by their ethnic, tribal, national or religious identities, and not by their adherence to a 
political cause, Callwell’s observations on “the cause” are different from the other theorists.  
Furthermore, given the transportation and communication infrastructures available in the time in 
which Callwell’s case studies were played out, governments did not truly penetrate into the 
vastness of the lesser-developed world.  Consequently, Callwell is very thin on interagency 
cooperation and on the use of propaganda. 
Lawrence’s work was qualitatively different from the others because he was the sole 
insurgent in the group.  Consequently, he had little to say about counterinsurgent operations such 
as interagency functioning or the rule of law, and nothing to say about the need to provide 
security for the population.  Those topics just do not come up. 
The Marines, by contrast, have much to say about interagency functioning, particularly 
with the U.S. State Department, and also much to say about multi-national cooperation with 
various agencies of the host nation.  Since their interventions in small wars invariably were 
assisting other countries, they also had a lot to say about troop professionalism and cultural 
awareness. 
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Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson are all products of the post-war world, where 
“wars of national liberation” were often led by communist parties and assisted by the Soviet 
Union, the People’s Republic of China or their client states.  Their adversaries were usually 
students of Mao, and practiced a rurally-based, mass mobilization model following Mao’s stages 
of insurgency.  (A brief discussion of these stages is found in Chapter 2.)  Only Trinquier had 
much to say about urban insurgents whom he termed “terrorists.”   Each of these men espoused 
remarkably similar counterinsurgency strategies.  Trinquier, Galula, and Thompson gave 
comprehensive treatment of the development of national strategy and operational campaign 
plans.  Kitson covered much of the same ground, but his work focused primarily on the Army’s 
role in counterinsurgency. 
Indeed, these theorists collectively make up what might be termed a “classical school” of 
counterinsurgency, and Hoffman (2007) termed the modern proponents of their ideas 
“classicists” in his critique of current doctrine as represented in FM 3-24.  He thought FM 3-24 is 
too dependent on the prescriptions of the “masters,” and that their theories need more adaptation 
to meet the needs of 21st century counterinsurgency.  His ideas will be examined more closely in 
Stage 2.  Hoffman specified the past “masters” as Kitson, Galula, and Thompson.  
West’s work was also different from the others.  He presented an ant’s eye view of the 
Vietnam War as conducted in a single village.  He describes the activities of a small collection of 
individuals conducting their own tiny war.  It is not a work of theory, but if theory is what we get 
from reading the others, a detailed example—theory in action—is found in West, and we can 
observe many of the principles there. 
Despite the differences in perspective, there is remarkably little contradiction.  A theorist 
may not address an issue, or he may approach from a different direction, have a different 
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emphasis, or merely imply something someone else explicitly states, but no one really 
contradicts another on any important theoretical principle except one.  The sole exception is this: 
Trinquier argues that harsh interrogation of “terrorists” is necessary and morally justifiable.  His 
argument runs like this: An urban guerrilla—a “terrorist,” in Trinquier’s words—is fighting for a 
political cause that he considers noble (or he has been coerced into terrorism); he is not merely a 
psychopath or a criminal for profit.  Although he attacks civilian targets, it would be hypocritical 
to condemn him out of hand for this given the widespread bombing of cities by regular forces 
during WWII.  But he does not carry arms openly or wear a uniform or distinctive insignia, and 
so he does not face the risk of a regular soldier that he will be killed or injured in combat.  
Rather, the risk he runs is that he will be interrogated harshly if he is caught.  The interrogation is 
justified because he has time sensitive information the counterinsurgent needs to locate other 
terrorists.  Since they do not wear uniforms, there is no other way to find them.  Once he has 
given this information, Trinquier specifies that he is to be treated well.  The consensus among 
other theorists is that “harsh interrogations” are wrong and not beneficial to the government’s 
cause.  At a minimum, such activities reduce support for the government among the populace 
and also around the world. 
A couple of additional issues emerged from the synthesis that are appropriately discussed 
before moving into the details.  Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson all described 
successful insurgency as moving through several recognized stages enroute to victory over the 
government.  These are very similar to those stages described by Mao, and that are termed by 
contemporary scholarship as the “Maoist model” (Metz, 1995).  A discussion of Mao’s three 
stages is contained in Chapter 2.  A similar five-stage model of insurgency posited by Galula is 
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also discussed in Chapter 2, and Galula also presents an alternative model more reliant upon 
terrorism.  Again, I have discussed this briefly in Chapter 2.   
Modern scholars (Hoffman, 2007; Metz, 1995) are questioning the value of the rurally-
based, mass mobilization “Maoist” model in light of recent experience.  They argue that 
urbanization has led to the decline of rurally-based insurgencies; that urbanized insurgencies are 
less dependent upon the support of the people; and recent insurgencies, such as the Sunni 
insurgency in Iraq, have not exhibited the sequential progression through recognized phases 
(Hoffman, 2007) and detailed organizational structure of Maoist insurgencies (Metz & Millen, 
2004).  This issue will addressed more completely in Stage 2. 
With the exception of Callwell, each theorist thought that each side the conflict was 
supported by an active minority of the population.  There was widespread consensus that the 
bulk of any population would prefer to sit the conflict out.  Therefore, the struggle was one 
between two active minorities to influence and control the uncommitted middle.  The situation is 
not different from U.S. political cycles in which each major party has a “base” and the election 
results hinge on the ability of the parties to attract the support of voters in the center. 
Despite the criticisms of Hoffman (2007) and others, the classic theorists still have a lot 
to say.  A particular tactic or program adapted for 1960s rural communities may not translate 
directly to 2000s urban centers.  However, if one steps back away from the specifics of the 
situation, changing his perspective somewhat, he will see that the purposes for which these 
tactics and programs were pursued are still valid.  Tactics will change; indeed FM 3-24 (2006) 
says that “if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week” (p. 1-28), but the principles 
involved probably do not change, because human needs have not changed that greatly.  Kilcullen 
(2007) called a list of principles similar to mine “enduring fundamentals” (slide 68). 
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For example, Thompson advocated a program to build strategic hamlets, and Trinquier 
used the same term to denote a similar program.  A strategic hamlet is both a collection of homes 
grouped in such a way as to provide security for its residents from insurgent coercion and the 
organization of the population of the hamlet for self-defense.  Strategic hamlets also allow the 
government to provide services to hamlet residents.  While converting a common rural hamlet 
into a strategic hamlet is an obsolete idea for rooting out insurgency among urban populations, 
the purposes—the principles—that the hamlets served are still operative.  People still require 
security from insurgent coercion so that they are free to choose to support the government.  They 
still need be controlled to prevent them from helping the insurgent, whether voluntarily or 
otherwise.  They still want and need essential services.  As Thompson put it: “The fundamental 
aim behind the establishment of the security framework based on strategic hamlets is to isolate 
the insurgent both physically and politically from the population” (p. 123).  While this is more 
difficult in an urban area, and will require different tactics and techniques, the fundamental aim 
is still valid.  So the classics can still inform us. 
 The generic campaign strategy contained in FM 3-24 (2006) is described “clear-hold-
build” and denotes the concentration of counterinsurgent power in a specified area experiencing 
overt insurgent activity.  The counterinsurgent “clears” the area of insurgents (and ultimately of 
underground political organization members); “holds” it against the return of insurgents; and 
“builds” a government presence there so that the people are controlled and can see the benefit of 
supporting the government.  Thompson referred to a similar process as “clear, hold, winning, 
won” (p. 111); Galula advocated an eight-step plan with greater detail, but along the same lines; 
Trinquier and Kitson advocated similar methods.  
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Examination of the Results by Principle 
Extracting relevant key syntheses requires the detailed examination of the results tables, 
and the interpolation of these results.  The results are presented as a series of thirteen three-page 
tables dispersed among my remarks in the following pages.  Each table includes a brief 
discussion of the implications of the syntheses.  More detail is found in the remarks below.  
Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a 
cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary. 
 
 Insurgents, like all other people who fight wars, are fighting for some political objective.  
Unlike conventional war, however, the antagonists in an insurgency campaign do not discontinue 
or greatly subordinate political action to military action.  Rather, the political objective is always 
in view, political action takes place prior to and alongside military action, and achievement of 
political effects always takes primacy over military action.  An examination of the results in 
Table 4-3 will demonstrate the following: 
 The cause (or grievances) provides the motivation that mobilizes a sufficient following to 
begin insurgent political organization and eventually violent resistance to authority.  Callwell 
does not examine this phenomenon in great detail, but he does observe that 19th century Afghans 
resisted the British because they perceived British presence in Afghanistan to be an “insult to 
their nation and their faith” (p. 36).  Lawrence articulated the cause of the Arab Revolt as 
seeking “national freedom” (p. 2). The Small Wars Manual noticed that revolutions start with 
“real or fancied grievances” causing popular “discontent” until resistance breaks out (p. I-20).  It 
goes on to say explicitly that causes are political, social, or economic, which foreshadows the 
dominant trend of post-war counterinsurgency.  The post-war theorists—Trinquier, Galula, 
Thompson, and Kitson—understand the essentially political nature of the conflict.  Their 
comments with theoretical import focus on the value—indeed, the necessity—of an insurgent
Table 4-3. Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political 
struggle is always primary 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
The country [Afghanistan] was in a state of 
suppressed anarchy, the tribes scarcely 
acknowledged the Amir to be their King, and when 
Kabul fell and the government such as it was, 
ceased to exist, the people generally cared little; but 
they bitterly resented the insult to their nation and 
to their faith which the presence of British troops in 
the heart of the country offered (p. 36). 
 
Their [expeditions to defeat rebellion] purpose is to 
ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the 
objective, the overawing and not the exasperation 
of the enemy is the end to keep in view (p. 42). 
 Military operations are always undertaken [by 
Great Powers] with some end in view, and are 
shaped for its achievement (p. 34).  
It is so often the case that the power which 
undertakes a small war desires to acquire the 
friendship of the people which its armies are 
chastising, that the system of what is called 
'military execution' is ill-adapted to the end in view 
(p. 41).  
[In small wars,] the beating of the hostile armies is 
not necessarily the main object even if such armies 
exist, that moral effect is often far more important 
than material success (p. 42). 
 
In it was Sherif Ali, Feisal”s eldest brother, with 
more tribal forces, and the beginnings of an Arab 
Regular Army, recruited from officers and men of 
Arab Blood, who had served in the Turkish Army, 
and were now willing to fight against their old 
masters for their national freedom (p. 2). 
 
We were serving a common ideal, without tribal 
emulation, and so we could not hope for any esprit 
de corps to reinforce our motives (p. 18). 
Then I thought of the Arab aim, and saw that it was 
geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands 
in Asia.  In the doing of it we might kill Turks; we 
disliked them very much.  Yet ‘killing Turks’ would 
never be an excuse or aim. If they would go 
quietly, our war would end. If not, we would try to 
drive them out: in the last resort we would be 
compelled to the desperate course of blood, on the 
maxim of  ‘murder’ war, but as cheaply as possible 
for ourselves, since the Arabs were fighting for 
freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive 
(p. 7). 
 
 
Political revolutions ordinarily result from real or 
fancied grievances, existing in the minds of some 
few men, but many other causes may produce them. 
The word ‘discontent’ sums them up. As soon as 
discontent becomes general a party is formed which 
often becomes strong enough to offer resistance to 
the government (p. I-20). 
In some revolutions, particularly of economic 
origin, the followers may be men in want of food 
(p. I-30). 
The motive in small wars is not material 
destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the 
social, economic, and political development of the 
people (p. I-18). 
The application of purely military measures may 
not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government 
because the fundamental causes of the condition of 
unrest may be economic, political, or social (p. I-
15). 
The solution of such problems [grievances causing 
a disturbance] being basically a political 
adjustment, the military measures to be applied 
must be of secondary importance and should be 
applied only to such extent as to permit the 
continuation of peaceful corrective measures (p. I-
16). 
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Table 4-3 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
The terrorist should not be considered an ordinary 
criminal. Actually, he fights within the framework 
of his organization, without personal interest, for a 
cause he considers noble and for a respectable 
ideal, the same as the soldiers in the armies 
confronting him (p. 20). 
 
Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions 
political, economic, psychological, military—that 
aims at the overthrow of the established authority in 
a country and its replacement by another regime. 
To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit 
the internal tensions of the country attacked—
ideological, social, religious, economic —any 
conflict liable to have a profound influence on the 
population to be conquered (p. 6). 
 
Our war aims must be clearly known to the people. 
They will have to be convinced that if we call upon 
them to fight at our sides it can only be in defense 
of a just cause. And we should not deceive them (p. 
49).  
 
 
The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an 
insurgency unless he has a well-grounded cause 
with which to attract supporters (p. 13). 
The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at 
more than simply making trouble is an attractive 
cause (p. 18). 
Since it is easier to unite “against” than “for,” 
particularly when the components are so varied, the 
general cause will most probably be a negative one, 
something like “throw the rascals out” (p. 24). 
The insurgent has a formidable asset—the 
ideological power of a cause (p. 7). 
He [the counterinsurgent] has to arm himself with a 
competing cause (p. 101). 
The objective being the population itself, the 
operations designed to win it over (for the 
insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the 
counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political 
nature (p. 9). 
As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even 
in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave 
rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the 
danger persists (p. 137). 
Essential though it is, the military action is 
secondary to the political one, its primary purpose 
being to afford the political power enough freedom 
to work safely with the population (p. 89). 
 
Every insurgency… requires a cause… (p. 21). 
 
Given a basic cause, many other issues can be 
tacked onto it… At the same time, all local seeds of 
conflict within a community can be exploited… 
There is always some issue which has an appeal to 
each section of the community… (p. 21). 
 
All governments are vulnerable to criticism, and 
every grievance, shortcoming or abuse will be 
exploited… Corruption is always another credible 
charge and rarely fails to stick (p. 22). 
 
First principle [first basic principle of 
counterinsurgency]. The government must have a 
clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, 
independent and united country which is politically 
and economically stable and viable (p. 50-51). 
 
Fourth principle [fourth basic principle of 
counterinsurgency]. The government must give 
priority to defeating the political subversion, not the 
guerillas.  (p. 55). 
 
To carry out these aims [controlling the population 
and neutralizing the armed forces] there is a joint 
[insurgent] political and military organization, with 
the military always subordinate to the political. 
Support for the political aim of gaining control over 
the population by continued subversion and terror is 
always the primary task of the communist guerilla 
units (p. 30). 
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Table 4-3 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
… the most important factor is that the immediate 
object of those organizing subversion is to gain 
control of the population, and that the normal 
system for doing this is to select a cause and then 
form a party which can project it into the 
population (p. 48). 
 
Yet if no cause exists it will have to be invented. If 
a genuine one exists but is not capable of attracting 
sufficient support it must be amended until it does. 
If a good one exists but has lost its appeal for one 
reason or another, it must be revived (p. 29). 
 
If it is absolutely impossible to produce a cause 
with enough popular appeal, the enterprise will 
have to be abandoned because it will be found use 
to try and promote subversion or insurgency 
without one (p. 29). 
 
Broadly speaking it is almost always recognized 
that the [insurgent] political leadership should take 
precedence over the military because the ultimate 
aim is usually political, and the means of achieving 
it are also political in so far as they are concerned 
with gaining control of the population (p. 41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hunger fed politics, and in 1930 famine struck 
Quang Ngai [province] when a high wind washed 
the rivers across the rice crops and drove the fish 
from shore.  The French colonial government 
allowed the local Vietnamese satraps to collect their 
normal rice taxes from a starving people. Secret 
antigovernment societies flourished during the next 
ten years, and the people strongly supported the 
Viet Minh in their struggle against the French after 
World War II (p. 8). 
 
 
An insurgency is political in its nature.  Like 
conventional conflict, it is fought for political 
reasons, but unlike conventional conflict, political 
maneuvering and political organization are not set 
aside while hostilities are joined.  Rather these 
constitute the primary dimension of the conflict.  
Insurgents engage in military action at times and at 
places that are carefully chosen to maximize the 
political effect of the attack.  Likewise, the 
government must weigh every planned operation in 
terms of its political effects.  An operation which 
kills or captures insurgent fighters, but creates 
grievances among the population, is a net loss for 
the government. 
 
Insurgents draw popular support by endorsing a 
cause or championing a grievance.  The 
government counters by addressing grievances or 
developing a “counter-cause” to regain or retain 
support. 
 
Caveat: Mao thought guerrilla warfare could not be 
decisive, but that it was a process of slowly 
destroying government strength while building 
insurgent strength until conventional insurgent units 
could defeat government units in battle.   
having a cause to motivate its initial supporters and mobilize support and sympathy in the 
broader population.  There is consensus on the idea that the government must address the issues 
or grievances that constitute the insurgents’ cause to woo away their support.  The post-war 
theorists also observe that a cause or grievance can be manipulated by a party which may care 
little for the popular cause, but has an agenda of its own that is served by using the cause to 
generate popular support. 
 There is widespread consensus across the board that the struggle between the insurgent 
and the government is essentially political, and that political activity takes priority over military 
activity.  Even Callwell, who does not delve deeply into insurgent causes, observed from a 
colonial powers’ perspective that “beating of the hostile armies is not necessarily the main 
object” (p. 42) of a small war campaign.  The object of such campaigns was “to ensure a lasting 
peace” (p. 42). 
Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity. 
 The “center of gravity” as a military concept refers to “the source of power that provides 
moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act… the loss of a center of gravity 
ultimately results in defeat” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 6-8). 
 An examination of the results in Table 4-4 will demonstrate the overwhelming consensus 
that the population is the center of gravity in asymmetric conflict.  The quotes indicate that both 
sides must have the support of the people, and that the support of, or control of, the people is 
necessary to win.  Since the primary military and political problem for the counterinsurgent is 
simply finding the insurgents, the theorists agreed widely that the support of the people was 
necessary to provide the intelligence needed to locate and destroy insurgent armed units and
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Table 4-4. Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
He [a regular European commander] perceived that 
he had to deal not with a hostile army but with a 
hostile population (p. 128-129). 
The crushing of a populace in arms and the 
stamping out of widespread disaffection by military 
methods, is a harassing form of warfare even in a 
civilized country with a settled social system; in 
remote regions peopled by half-civilized races or 
wholly savage tribes, such campaigns are most 
difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion (p. 
26).  
 
It is so often the case that the power which 
undertakes a small war desires to acquire the 
friendship of the people which its armies are 
chastising (p. 41).  
In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far 
the people of the hostile country, or in minor 
operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire 
strength (p. 49). 
The Spanish troops were obstructed by the intense 
hostility of the inhabitants. They could get no good 
information of the rebel movements, while the 
rebels were never in doubt about theirs. An 
insurgent was distinguished from the peaceful 
cultivator only by his badge which could be 
speedily removed, and by his rifle which was easily 
hidden (p. 132). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then I estimated how many posts they [The Turks] 
would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition 
putting up her head in every unoccupied one of 
these hundred thousand square miles… The Turks 
would need six hundred thousand men to meet the 
combined ill wills of all the local Arab people.  
They had one hundred thousand available (p. 8). 
 
We had won a province when we had taught the 
civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: a 
presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary 
matter (p. 12). 
 
Our aim was to seek its weakest link, and bear only 
on that till time made the mass of it fall. Our 
largest available resources were the tribesmen, 
men quite unused to formal warfare, whose assets 
were movement, endurance, individual intelligence, 
knowledge of the country, courage (p. 12). 
 
It gave us priceless advantages in pursuit, for the 
force renewed itself with fresh men in every new 
tribal area, and gave us always our pristine energy 
(p. 18). 
 
It [rebellion] must have a friendly population, not 
actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not 
betraying rebel movements to the enemy. 
Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a 
striking force, and 98 per cent passively 
sympathetic (p. 22). 
 
 
With all this accomplished [restoration of normal 
government or an improvement of government], 
one should be able to leave the country with the 
lasting friendship and respect of the native 
population (p. I-32). 
This fact is further emphasized because in the small 
wars we are dealing not only with our own forces, 
but also with the civil population which frequently 
contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic 
sentiments. The very nature of our own policy and 
attitude toward the opposing forces and normal 
contacts with them enable the personnel of our 
Force to secure material advantages through the 
knowledge and application of psychological 
principles (p. I-17). 
Every native is a potential clever opponent who 
knows the country, its trails, resources, and 
obstacles, and who has friends and sympathizers on 
every hand (p. I-15). 
The extent to which the intelligence service can 
obtain information depends largely on the attitude 
adopted toward the loyal and neutral population. 
The natives must be made to realize the seriousness 
of withholding information, but at the same time 
they must be protected from terrorism (p. I-26-27). 
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Table 4-4 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
We know that the sine qua non of victory in 
modern warfare is the unconditional support of a 
population (p. 8).  
The inhabitant in his home is the center of the 
conflict (p. 29).  
It is accepted that the final stake of modern warfare 
is the control of the populace (p. 104). 
According to Mao Tse-tung, it [the unconditional 
support of the population] is as essential to the 
combatant as water to the fish (p. 8). 
An army can throw itself into a campaign only 
when it has the moral support of the nation (p. 27). 
 
The bulk of the population is by habit or tradition 
normally devoted to established authority and the 
forces of order. The people will be ready to help if 
we ask their aid, on the condition that we will at all 
times support and protect those who are on our side 
(p. 33). 
Modern warfare requires the unconditional support 
of the populace (p. 19). 
The goal of modern warfare is control of the 
populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate 
weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. (p. 
16). 
 
 
… the insurgent has involved the population in the 
conflict since its beginning; the active participation 
of the population was indeed a sine qua non for his 
success (p. 15). 
Objective: The Population… If the insurgent 
manages to dissociate the population from the 
counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its 
active support, he will win the war (p. 7-8). 
The First Law [of Counterinsurgency Warfare]: 
The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for 
the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent (p. 74). 
What makes it possible for the guerrillas to survive 
and to expand? The complicity of the population. 
(p. 50). 
But the turning point really comes when leaders 
have emerged from the population and have 
committed themselves on the side of the 
counterinsurgent (p. 82). 
A victory is that [the destruction of the insurgents’ 
organization] plus the permanent isolation of the 
insurgent from the population, isolation not 
enforced upon the population but maintained by 
and with the population (p. 77). 
Intelligence is the principal source of information 
on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the 
population (p. 72). 
 
 
 
 
An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It 
stands to reason that government measures must be 
directed to restoring government authority and law 
and order throughout the country, so that control over 
the population can be regained and its support won (p. 
51). 
 
It is most important that province chiefs and the 
responsible military commanders should fully 
understand the concept which lies behind successful 
anti-communist guerrilla operations, i.e. the physical 
and political separation of the guerillas from the 
population. One must get all the 'little fishes out of the 
'water' and keep them out; then they die (p. 123-124). 
 
Without the people's support, the Viet Cong cannot 
win… (p 130). 
 
The political aim is to gain control over the 
population, starting in the rural areas, and to destroy 
the government's prestige and authority… (p. 29). 
 
The guerrillas are now operating within the 
population, and this is the period when one can apply 
Mao Tse-tung's dictum that the guerilla must be to the 
population as little fishes in water. The population is 
not only providing the guerilla with his food and 
intelligence, but giving him perfect cover and 
concealment. Dressed as a peasant, the guerilla, except 
when he is carrying arms, is indistinguishable from the 
rest of the people. In fact, he can be both a peasant by 
day and a guerilla by night (p. 34). 
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Table 4-4 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
… the government itself will be trying to retain or 
regain the support of the population.  It is this 
interplay of operations designed by both sides to 
secure the support of the population (p. 48). 
 
Translated into normal terms the aim of the 
government is to regain if necessary and then retain 
the allegiance of the population, and for this 
purpose it must eliminate those involved in 
subversion. But in order to eliminate the subversive 
party and its unarmed and armed supporters, it must 
gain control of the population (p. 50).  
Thus, in the way that the first aim of those involved 
in subversion is to gain control of the people so that 
the purpose of the uprising can be achieved, so also 
the first aim of these involved in counter subversion 
is to gain control of the people… (p. 50). 
These [early insurgent] cells in their turn have to 
work on the people around them in order to get the 
degree of support required, which may range from 
benevolent neutrality to the provision of funds, 
equipment or intelligence (p. 35). 
All actions designed to retain and regain the 
allegiance of the population are relevant to the 
process of collecting background information 
because its provision is closely geared to the 
attitude of the people (p. 97). 
 
 
The police believed that the Viet Cong, for their 
part, would have to attack the combined unit or lose 
influence among the villagers (p. 22). 
 
The [VC] district committee had to defeat the 
attempt [to pacify the village with the combined 
unit] and disprove the theory that a few Americans 
could work among many Vietnamese (p. 42). 
 
[At the beginning of the Americans’ tenure in the 
village, the American squad leader described the 
VC control of the village as] “It’s their turf” (p. 19). 
 
The Viet Cong so dominated the three My Hue 
hamlets that any stranger ran the risk of being 
denounced as a GVN [government] spy.  The 
villagers were organized into committees, the better 
to watch each other while working for the common 
cause of the National Liberation Front (p. 21). 
 
From the villagers, the PFs [militiamen] had heard 
that a large enemy force planned to attack that night 
(p. 34). 
 
The frequency of contacts started to drop off, and 
the PFs [militia] heard from the villagers that the 
Viet Cong were starting to move by side trails to 
avoid contact with the combined unit patrols (p. 
93). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The antagonists compete for legitimacy in the eyes 
of the populace.  The one that controls the populace 
will win the conflict.  This control can be gained by 
persuasion, by terror, by organization, and by 
restriction of the movement of people and 
resources. 
 
The population under insurgent control provides 
material support, sanctuary, and intelligence to the 
insurgency.  They do this willingly or because they 
are coerced. 
 
The counterinsurgent must deny these things to the 
insurgency in order to defeat it. 
 
The principal tactical problem in counterinsurgency 
is finding the insurgents.  Someone among the 
people knows who they are, therefore, 
counterinsurgents rely on the people for the 
intelligence they need to find and eliminate 
insurgent military and political organizations. 
  
political cadres.  Callwell, Lawrence, the Small Wars Manual, and Thompson all agree that a 
population in arms is more difficult to defeat than a mere army.   
 The point that the people are the center of gravity cannot be overstated.  The next five 
principles will examine in more detail the ways in which the population is influenced and 
controlled. 
Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they 
can give support to the government. 
 
  Callwell and Lawrence had nothing to say about this principle.  For Callwell, the 
“people” were generally defined by an ethnic or religious grouping, so he did not give much 
attention to entering a nation at war with itself and wooing the uncommitted bulk of the 
populace, and would not expect a rebel group to terrorize or intimidate their own,so the people 
would not need protection.  Lawrence was an insurgent, and his “people” were also ethnically 
defined in such a way that Arabs were unlikely to actively support the Turks.  The character of 
Lawrence’s war was such that intimidation of the population of the Hejaz was unnecessary. 
 An inspection of the results in Table 4-5 will indicate a couple of items of consensus: 
first, the people cannot support or provide information to a government which cannot protect 
them, and second, insurgents can extort material and moral support, and prevent the populace 
from sharing information with the government through coercion or “terror.”  A quote from 
Trinquier suggests that counterinsurgency requires the development of a self-defense capacity in 
the people.  While the selected quotes from other theorists to do not demonstrate this, the concept 
is found within their work.  For example, the Small Wars Manual discusses the establishment of 
local national “constabularies;” Thompson advocated the strategic hamlet, which included a  
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Table 4-5. Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the 
government 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
   
While the peasant hopes for the restoration of peace 
and order, the constant menace and fear of 
guerrillas is so overpowering that he does not dare 
to place any confidence in an occasional visiting 
patrol of the occupying forces (p. I-25). 
 
When the patrol leader demands information, the 
peasant should not be misjudged for failure to 
comply with the request, when by so doing, he is 
signing his own death warrant (p. I-25). 
 
The extent to which the intelligence service can 
obtain information depends largely on the attitude 
adopted toward the loyal and neutral population. 
The natives must be made to realize the seriousness 
of withholding information, but at the same time 
they must be protected from terrorism (p. I-26-27). 
 
The population will be honeycombed with hostile 
sympathizers, making it difficult to procure reliable 
information. Such difficulty will result either from 
the deceit used by hostile sympathizers and agents, 
or from the intimidation of friendly natives upon 
whom reliance might be placed to gain information 
(p. I-14). 
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Table 4-5 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
In the presence of this permanent danger 
surrounding him [the citizen], he has the depressing 
feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. 
The fact that public authority and the police are no 
longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his 
distress. He loses confidence in the state whose 
inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety.  He is 
more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, 
who alone are able to protect him (p. 16-17). 
 
The intended objective [of terror], which is to cause 
the population to vacillate, is thus attained (p. 17). 
Since the stake in modern warfare is the control of 
the populace, the first objective is to assure the 
people their protection by giving them the means of 
defending themselves, especially against terrorism 
(p. 29). 
 
[If the insurgent organization is strong enough to 
intimidate them], the inhabitants will reject any 
responsibility [cooperation with the government] 
that might subject them to the adversary's 
retaliation (p. 31). 
A few brutalities, such as savagely executed 
preventive assassinations in the surrounding 
villages, will cow the inhabitants into providing for 
the maintenance of the bands and will discourage 
them from giving useful information to the 
authorities (p. 24). 
 
This is not necessarily so because the population’s 
attitude in the middle stage of the war is dictated 
not so much by the relative popularity and merits of 
the opponents as by the more primitive concern for 
safety. Which side gives the best protection, which 
one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, 
these are the criteria governing the population’s 
stand. So much the better, of course, if popularity 
and effectiveness are combined (p.14). 
The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the 
population is not, and does not feel, protected 
against the insurgent (p. 119). 
Effective political action on the population must be 
preceded by military and police operations against 
the guerrilla units and the insurgent political 
organizations (p. 78-79). 
Political, social, economic, and other reforms, 
however much they ought to be wanted and 
popular, are inoperative when offered while the 
insurgent still controls the population (p. 79). 
 
 
It is essential for the communists to eliminate or 
neutralize potential opponents. There will be a 
spate of murders of… prominent citizens… This 
policy of wholesale murder has a further purpose, 
which can only be described as selective terrorism 
designed to keep the local population completely 
cowed (p.24). 
 
The first step after [clearing an area] is to create the 
conditions in which the population has the security 
to exercise the choice between supporting the 
insurgent forces and supporting the forces of the 
government (p. 142). 
 
[It is essential to] give the conditions which make it 
safe for a villager to decide to support the 
government against the insurgent (p. 142). 
 
In these circumstances [areas which are not yet 
secure] no effort should be made to involve the 
inhabitants on the side of the government: it is 
merely asking them to commit suicide (p. 114). 
 
When they [government military patrols] arrive at a 
village, they will find it vacated except for women, 
children and old men, none of whom will be 
prepared to give any information or even to 
fraternize willingly with the government forces. 
These people know only too well that within a few 
days the government forces will withdraw, and that 
anyone who has stepped out of line will have his 
throat cut by the insurgents (p. 34). 
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Table 4-5 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
The means by which… these people [insurgents]… 
get what they want from the population as a whole 
vary considerably but are likely to include the 
spoken, written, and broadcast word with coercion 
in the form of blackmail and even physical violence 
thrown in where necessary (p. 35). 
 
During the early stages of preparation in rural or 
urban areas the party has little need for armed 
forces because it is concerned with gathering of 
support by mean of the various forms of persuasion 
and non-violent coercion already described. But 
eventually the moment arrives when persuasion has 
to be supplemented by rougher methods and strong-
arm groups have then to be brought into (p. 39). 
 
In the Philippines the communist party issued its 
Strategy Directive in 1946 but it was not until 1950 
that the People's Liberation Army started their 
military offensive, although before that, coercion 
was used on uncooperative elements of the 
population (p. 32). 
 
If a pacified area is allowed to slip back completely 
under insurgent control it will be more difficult to 
reclaim, because many those sympathetic to the 
government will have shown their hand during the 
period of the government's ascendancy and will 
have been killed when the insurgents regained 
control (p. 133). 
 
 
Thanh [the police chief] believe that the 
accommodation between the Vietcong and most of 
the villagers was based, not upon political ideology, 
but upon the villagers’ sense of self preservation. 
The Viet Cong were stronger than the PFs [militia], 
and it was wiser to obey the stronger side (p. 62). 
None [villagers] called out [to the passing 
combined unit patrol], or waved, or in any way 
acknowledged what they saw, lest a watching 
neighbor interpret the action as an active 
commitment to the GVN [Government] cause and 
denounce the waver to the Vietcong (p. 95). 
The Popular Forces had no formal rank structure 
and the district chief had never even appointed a 
leader… because he did not want to waste a good 
man on a suicidal assignment (p. 15). 
He [an anti-VC school teacher] was not there, or 
rarely did he dare go home in the evening. His 
father, however, was there, and they [the VC] killed 
him… Yet, six days a week, he walked down the 
road to the school room and taught children, an act 
for which he was marked for assassination (p. 23). 
One [American] general thought that the disruption 
proved his point that the people went with the 
winner… ‘Give them security,’ he said, ‘and they’ll 
give you information and cooperation’ (p. 272). 
 
 
Callwell and Lawrence had little to say on this 
topic.  The experiences of both men were in 
environments where traditional modes of life were 
still practiced. The people that provided Callwell’s 
and Lawrence’s irregulars did not require security 
from any government. 
 
Other theorists believe a government is constituted 
to provide security to the people.  A government 
which cannot do that, cannot be perceived as 
legitimate, and cannot command the allegiance of 
the people. 
 
Insurgents can extract all manners of support and 
require silence from the people with effective 
intimidation.   
 
The government must provide the people with 
security before it can expect people to rally to the 
government’s side, provide the information 
necessary to find the insurgents, and deny the 
insurgents the support they need to survive. 
 
village militia; and West describes in detail the operations of such a militia in cooperation with a 
Marine squad. 
Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government. 
 Quotes on the need for the government to influence or persuade people to support the 
government, found in Table 4-6, reinforced the importance of persuasion (as opposed to coercion 
or control) as a tool to gain popular support, the need for the people to be persuaded the 
government had the capability and will to win, and the importance of the government being 
perceived as providing benefits to the people.  The strongest consensus was on the principle that 
the government must convince the people that it can win.  All theorists, except Lawrence (the 
only insurgent), have comments to this effect.  There was also strong consensus that the 
government should be seen as providing benefit to the people and acting in the interests of the 
people.  The Marines wanted to be perceived as “friendly” (p. I-46) to the local national people 
and enjoy a “cordial relationship” (p. I-45) with them. 
Callwell was out of sync with the others.  His work suggests persuasion of a rebellious 
people is best affected by threatening or destroying something they value, usually flocks or 
herds, and he wrote that that objective of a small war campaign might be to inflict “punishment” 
(p. 41) on the rebels. However, he tempered his remarks by writing the “purpose [of a campaign] 
is to ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing and not the 
exasperation of the enemy is the end to keep in view” (p. 42).  
Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage 
support. 
 
 The results for this principle are contained in Table 4-7.  Callwell and Lawrence were 
mute on this subject.  In a European man of Callwell’s era, the treatment of the “natives” by 
soldiers would not be given much thought.  Also, Callwell usually envisioned the bulk of a local 
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Table 4-6. Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
“In planning a war against an uncivilized nation 
who has, perhaps, no capital," says Lord Wolseley, 
“your first object should be the capture of whatever 
they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation 
of which will probably bring the war most rapidly 
to a conclusion" (p. 40).  
 
[Discussing the destruction or confiscation of 
enemy property] If the enemy cannot be touched in 
his patriotism or his honor, he can be touched 
through his pocket (p. 40). 
 
And the great principle which regular troops must 
always act upon in small wars--that of overawing 
the enemy by bold initiative and by resolute action, 
whether on the battlefield or as part of the general 
plan of campaign (p. 24). 
 
When, however, the campaign the form of quelling 
an insurrection, the object is not only to prove to 
the opposing force unmistakably which is the 
stronger, but also to inflict punishment on those 
who have taken up arms. In this case it is often 
necessary to injure property (p. 41).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We had won a province when we had taught the 
civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: a 
presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary 
matter (p. 12). 
 
The third factor in command seemed to be the 
Psychological… of which our propaganda is a 
stained and ignoble part.  Some of it concerns the 
crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it 
becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement 
of a changing opinion to a certain end (p. 11). 
 
We could not knit man to man, for our tribesmen 
were in arms willingly, by conviction. There have 
been many armies enlisted voluntarily: there have 
been few armies serving voluntarily under such 
trying conditions, for so long a war as ours. Any of 
the Arabs could go home whenever the conviction 
failed him (p. 18). 
 
 
Every means should be employed to convince such 
people of the altruistic intention of our Government 
(p. I-23).   
Every endeavor should be made to assure the 
civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. 
No effort should be spared to demonstrate the 
advantage of law and order and to secure their 
friendly cooperation (p. I-46). 
Cordial relationship between our forces and the 
civilian population is best maintained by 
engendering the spirit of good will (p. I-45). 
In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness 
should be the keynote of our relationship with the 
mass of the population (p. I-32). 
Once armed force is resorted to, it should be 
applied with determination and to the extent 
required by the situation (p. I-13). 
Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept 
responsibility for its employment when the 
situation clearly demands it, will always be 
interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will 
encourage further disorder, and will eventually 
necessitate measures more severe than those which 
would have sufficed in the first instance (p. I-27).  
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Table 4-6 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
The surest means of gaining their [the people’s] 
confidence will be to crush those who want to 
oppress them (p. 49). 
 
As long as we have not arrived at such a point 
[where people feel safe from insurgent 
intimidation], any propaganda, any solution, 
however skillful, will be ineffective on a populace 
infected by clandestine organisms that penetrate 
like a cancer into its midst and terrorize it (p. 49). 
 
During the course of interrogations, we should 
always bear in mind that the majority of individuals 
arrested, if we have enough flexibility, can change 
camp. Many among them have passed over to the 
service of the enemy only through duress … If we 
generously offer them another path with our 
protection, they will become our most faithful 
collaborators (p. 37). 
 
Once peace has been established, even in a small 
part of the territory, extensive and generous social 
assistance will be of prime importance in bringing 
to our cause many people who are unhappy and 
often disoriented by the military operations and 
who will not have always understood the 
underlying reasons for them (p. 50-51).   
 
 
 
 
 
The Fourth Law: Intensity of Efforts and Vastness 
of Means Are Essential…  
The operations needed to relieve the population 
from the insurgent’s threat and to convince it that 
the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are 
necessarily of an intensive nature and of long 
duration (p. 79). 
 
The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as 
early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has 
the will, the means, and the ability to win (p. 79). 
 
The Third Law: Support from the Population Is 
Conditional… 
… the emerging counterinsurgent supporters will 
not be able to rally the bulk of the population so 
long as the population is not convinced that the 
counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the 
ability to win (p. 78). 
 
A practical method [of redressing grievances], 
therefore, would consist in investigating objectively 
the people’s demands, making a list of them, 
crossing out those that cannot be granted safely and 
promoting the rest (p. 103). 
 
Security by itself is not enough to make the peasant 
willingly choose to support the government. 
Without it he cannot, even with it he still may not. 
The next step, therefore, is to influence his choice, 
which must still remain a free choice. He can only 
be made to choose freely to support the government 
if the government can show him that what it has to 
offer is something better than the insurgent can 
offer him (p. 143). 
 
Finally, if its cause is to be effective, the 
government must demonstrate both its 
determination and its capacity to win. These are the 
foundations of popular support. After all, there are 
not many backers for a losing side. At the height of 
an insurgency, if the issue is evenly balanced, 
neither the government nor the insurgent cause is a 
matter of great importance. At that stage there is 
only one political question: 'Who is going to win?' 
(p. 69). 
 
All this [measures to improve governance and 
provide services] helps to give the impression not 
only that the government is operating for the 
benefit of the people but that it is carrying out 
programs of a permanent nature and therefore 
intends to stay in the area. This gives the people a 
stake in stability and hope for the future… (p. 113). 
 
 125
Table 4-6 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
This means that persuasion will become more 
important in comparison with armed offensive 
action, although both will continue to be required 
(p. 199). 
 
Before considering ways in which the government 
can coordinate its efforts in order to achieve its aim, 
it is necessary to point out one fundamental matter, 
which is that few individuals can possibly support a 
government which is obviously going to lose, even 
if they sympathize with its policies and detest those 
of the insurgents (p. 50). 
 
Such a program [to regain or retain the allegiance 
of the population] should include measures 
designed to maintain and if possible increase the 
prosperity of the country… because not only is 
prosperity itself a potent weapon in the struggle 
against those who wish to overthrow the existing 
order, but also there would be little point in 
defeating the insurgents only to be left with a 
ruined community (p. 50). 
 
The [government’s] program should also cater for 
rectifying genuine grievances, especially those in 
which the enemy are exploiting as part of their 
cause, and for attracting support by implementing 
popular projects and reforms. (p. 51). 
 
The [police] raids only bought time, while affecting 
the localized perceptions of the villagers 
concerning the relative strengths and chances of 
success of the two opposing sides (p. 22). 
This upset Lam [the police chief], who insisted it 
was up to the marines and the PFs [militia] to 
dominate the night.  If they could not, the village 
would remain under Vietcong control.  No police 
work, no RD [Revolutionary Development 
organization] promises, no political popularity of 
Phoc [a local official], could compensate for the 
lack of military superiority within the seven 
hamlets (p. 43). 
[Following a series of intelligence indicators that 
the squad (10-12 men) would be attacked by a large 
VC unit] It was not for nothing. In a sense, it was 
the most important battle the Americans at Fort 
Page [the combined unit outpost] ever prepared to 
fight. They had chosen to stay; the PFs [militia] 
knew it, and soon so would the entire village (p. 
195). 
 
Yet the children of Viet Cong families were free to 
attend the school after it was built, and they did so 
(p. 219). 
 
 
Callwell’s “persuasion” centered on military action 
designed to convince his enemy that resistance is 
futile and too expensive to contemplate.  The 
destruction or confiscation of property also denied 
the enemy the resources needed to continue to fight. 
 
Lawrence explained how the Arab Revolt relied 
entirely upon persuasion.  The Small Wars Manual 
wanted Marines to develop a cordial relationship 
with local national people, and not to show 
indecision that could be construed as weakness.  
 
Otherwise, there is consensus on three points: the 
government can persuade the people to give it their 
support if: 1) it can demonstrate the will and the 
capacity to win the struggle; 2) it is willing to 
redress legitimate grievances; and 3) it will sponsor 
development activities to demonstrate that it acts in 
the people’s interests and can provide benefits that 
insurgents cannot. 
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Table 4-7. Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
  
[The following are from Twenty-seven Articles 
(1917)] 
 
Win and keep the confidence of your leader. 
Strengthen his prestige at your expense before 
others when you can (p. 1). 
 
Your ideal position is when you are present and not 
noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or 
too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too 
often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the 
expedition. To do your work you must be above 
jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are 
associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable 
feuds (p. 2). 
 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. 
Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it 
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, 
not to win it for them (p. 3). 
 
Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what 
you like about your own side, and avoid criticism 
of theirs (p. 4). 
 
A failure to use tact when required or lack of 
firmness at a crucial moment might readily 
precipitate a situation that could have been avoided 
had the commander been familiar with the customs, 
religion, morals, and education of those with whom 
he was dealing (p. I-19). 
 
The personal pride, uniform, and bearing of the 
marines, their dignity, courtesy, consideration, 
language, and personality will have an important 
effect on the civilian attitude toward the forces of 
occupation (p. I-29). 
 
… care should be exercised not to humiliate the 
natives. They are usually proud and humiliation 
will cause resentment which will have an 
unfavorable reaction. Nothing should be said or 
done which implies inferiority of the status or of the 
sovereignty of the native people (p. I-30). 
 
The indoctrination of all ranks with respect to the 
proper attitude toward the civilian population may 
be accomplished readily by means of a series of 
brief and interesting lectures (p. I-31). 
 
In brief, a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation 
between members of the military forces and civil 
officials on a basis of mutual independence of each 
other should be cultivated (p. I-43). 
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Table 4-7 (cont). 
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
Nevertheless, even if some brutality is inevitable, 
rigorous discipline must always be enforced to 
prevent wanton acts. The army has the means of 
demanding and maintaining firm discipline. It has 
at its disposal its own system of justice, precisely 
created to check quickly misdeeds or crimes 
committed by military personnel in the exercise of 
their duties. The army must apply the law without 
hesitation (p. 48).  
 
These [operations] they [soldiers] should carry out 
firmly, but with tact and discretion, not to alienate 
themselves unnecessarily from the people with 
whom they will be in permanent contact (p. 90). 
 
[During a cordon and search operation] Every 
inhabitant is individually and privately interrogated, 
without any resort to violence (p. 77). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since antagonizing the population will not help, it 
is imperative that hardships for it and rash actions 
on the part of the forces be kept to a minimum. The 
units participating in the operations should be 
thoroughly indoctrinated to that effect, the 
misdeeds punished severely and even publicly if 
this can serve to impress the population. Any 
damage done should be immediately compensated 
without red tape (p. 108-109). 
 
The necessity for eradicating the insurgent political 
agents from the population is evident. The question 
is how to do it rapidly and efficiently, with a 
minimum of errors and bitterness (p. 123-124). 
 
 
The one vital aspect of civic action which the army 
failed to develop was good, strict, disciplined 
behavior towards its own population. Without that, 
all assistance or other good works m the rural areas, 
which the army can so admirably provide for the 
population, and which would contribute generally 
to better relationships, are so much eyewash (p. 60). 
 
It is only natural that in these circumstances [troops 
encounter uncooperative civilians] troops will begin 
to lose their temper. If nothing else, chickens and 
vegetables will be seized from the villages, and any 
suspects picked up will be ill treated and tortured to 
provide information… with the result that most 
search-and-clear operations, by creating more 
communists than they kill, become in effect 
communist recruiting drives (p. 34). 
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Table 4-7 (cont). 
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications  
 
There are plenty of other ways of getting 
background information and most soldiers and 
policemen are quite capable of getting it in a 
friendly and civilized way, provided that they are 
told what is required (p. 130). 
 
Traditionally a soldier is trained and conditioned- to 
be strong, courageous, direct and aggressive but 
when men endowed with these qualities become 
involved in fighting subversion they often find that 
their good points are exploited by the enemy. For 
example firm reaction in the face of provocation 
may be twisted by clever propaganda in such a way 
that soldiers find the civilian population regarding 
their strength as brutality, and their direct and 
honest efforts a helping to restore order as the 
ridiculous blunderings of a herd of elephants (p. 
200). 
 
 
The officers were aware from their own surveys 
that over 40 percent of the marines disliked the 
Vietnamese… in addressing the problem, the 
marine command had written that its surveys 
‘suggest that of our squad leaders… less than one in 
five marches forth with a positive attitude toward 
the ARVN [South Vietnamese Army] and the PF 
[Popular Forces militia], and that probably one 
third go forth with a strong dislike for the local 
people. This is not just academic. It is costing us 
lives’ (p. 11). 
 
[Marine General] Walt asked the battalion officers 
to send only men who could get along with the 
villagers [to the Combined Action Platoon]… it 
slowed the selection procedure (p. 11). 
 
[Following a destructive and deadly attack on the 
combined unit, and American Marine said:] “This 
is our village” (p. 134). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was strong consensus that the professional 
behavior of soldiers will decrease resistance and 
avoid antagonizing the populace needlessly. 
 
West suggests that American dislike for 
Vietnamese was “costing us lives” (p. 11). 
 
national group—a tribe or the following of a religious leader—to be rebellious.  Callwell’s 
insurgent was defined by his ethnic or religious identity, and any members of the group 
encountered by soldiers were likely to be naturally sympathetic to the irregular warriors.  
Lawrence was an insurgent himself, and would not explain to the Turkish government how to 
undermine support for the Arab Revolt.  However, Lawrence also wrote Twenty-seven Articles 
(1917) describing the attitudes and behaviors a Western advisor to an Arab leader would need to 
cultivate.  In this forum, his advice is to be courteous and professional, showing deference to the 
leaders and a slight superiority to underlings so as to work within the class structure of Arab 
society at that time.  He advised also to “never lay hands on an Arab” (p. 3) because it will fuel 
resentment. 
 In other works, there emerged a strong consensus that the people should be treated 
tactfully and with respect.  The Small Wars Manual was the strongest on this point.  The Marines 
also thought that soldier bearing and carriage displayed professionalism, which affected local 
national attitudes toward the Marine force, which in turn, affected campaign outcomes.  
Interestingly, West quoted some Marine Corps documents from 1960s Vietnam that indicated a 
majority of Marines thought poorly of the Vietnamese.  The documents also contained the 
Marines’ institutional realization that this attitude cost lives.  Fortunately, West’s story is about a 
group of Marines who felt differently about the Vietnamese.  These men lived and worked with 
the Vietnamese daily; their impressive success was directly related to their ability to work with 
local nationals on the basis of mutual respect and friendship.  
 Another consensus emerged on the need for the army to discipline itself to behave 
professionally and not to mistreat the people in any way.  Trinquier mentioned the need to punish 
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soldiers, and Thompson even observed that poorly behaved soldiers could create more insurgents 
than they kill. 
Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign 
counterinsurgents. 
 
 An examination of the selected quotes for this principle, found in Table 4-8, indicate the 
consensus on the need for cultural awareness was considerably weaker than for most other 
principles.  This was unexpected and contrasts strongly with the huge importance that the current 
U.S. Army leadership places on it.  Therefore, I need to explore why. 
 Callwell argued that officers need to study “the enemy” in detail before setting the 
campaign plan.  He neglects the remainder of the population throughout his work except in one 
instance when he writes, “In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the 
hostile country, or in minor operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength” (p. 49).  
Otherwise “the enemy” refers to the group opposing imperial forces, usually ethnically distinct in 
some way, and the remainder of the people is ignored.  Nevertheless, he has stated the 
importance of understanding the cultural features of the enemy when planning a campaign. 
 Lawrence comments on the religious objections Arabs have to non-Muslim armies in the 
Hejaz, on their cultural incapacity for regular warfare, and on the need to take their cultural 
strengths into account when choosing a form of warfare more conducive to these strengths.  
Moreover, Lawrence’s Twenty-seven Articles (1917) is completely about cultural awareness 
given that its purpose is to advise British officers who will assume duties as advisors to Arab 
leaders. Overall, Lawrence was a big advocate of cultural awareness. 
 The Small Wars Manual advocates the need for cultural awareness strongly, in keeping 
with the consensus of modern opinion.  It is the post-war theorists Trinquier, Galula, and 
Thompson who neglect the topic, possibly because they believed that colonial administrators 
Table 4-8. Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
It is that in small wars the habits, the customs, and 
the mode of action on the battlefield of the enemy 
should be studied in advance (p. 33). 
 
But when conflicts of this nature are in prospect, 
the strength and the fighting methods of the enemy 
must always be most carefully considered before 
any decision as to the form of operations to be 
adopted is arrived at; the tactics of such opponents 
differ so greatly in various cases that it is essential 
that these be taken fully into consideration (p. 29).  
 
… but they [the Afghans]bitterly resented the insult 
to their nation and to their faith which the presence 
of British troops in the heart of the country offered 
(p.36).   
 
Uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity (p. 
148). 
 
 
… nor would a single Arab have remained with the 
Sherif if he introduced British troops into the Hejaz 
(p. 3). 
 
It was impossible to mix or combine tribes, since 
they disliked or distrusted one another. Likewise 
we could not use the men of one tribe in the 
territory of another (p. 18). 
 
… it occurred to me that perhaps the virtue of 
irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had 
been the threat of attack by them upon the Turkish 
northern flank which had made the enemy [the 
Turks] hesitate for so long (p. 4). 
 
The Arab Army just now was equally chary of men 
and materials: of men because they being irregulars 
were not units, but individuals, and an individual 
casualty is like a pebble dropped in water: each 
may make only a brief hole, but rings of sorrow 
widen out from them. We could not afford 
casualties (p. 9-10). 
 
That implies a serious study of the people, their 
racial, political, religious, and mental development. 
By analysis and study the reasons for the existing 
emergency may be deduced; the most practical 
method of solving the problem is to understand the 
possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to 
be expected from any actions which may be 
contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply 
correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may 
be avoided and the success of the undertaking 
assured (p. I-18). 
 
The correct application of the principles of 
psychology to any given situation requires a 
knowledge of the traits peculiar to the persons with 
whom we are dealing (p. I-19). 
 
The knowledge of the people at any given moment 
of history involves an understanding of their 
environment, and above all, their past (p. I-19). 
 
A knowledge of the character of the people and a 
command of their language are great assets… If not 
already familiar with the language, all officers upon 
assignment to expeditionary duty should study and 
acquire a working knowledge of it (p. I-26). 
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Table 4-8 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
   
There are three main forces which influence the 
people of a country: nationalism and national 
policies, religion and customs, material well-being 
and progress (p. 63). 
 
A government must also pay the closest attention to 
the second main force, that of religion and customs, 
often complicated by the most conservative 
superstitions, which more than any other is capable 
of releasing the strongest emotional feeling (p. 64). 
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Table 4-8 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
No matter how well  a person [from an allied 
nation] from outside a the country may think that he 
knows the way in which the minds of the local 
people work, he is none the less likely to make 
mistakes when preparing propaganda for them (p. 
78-79). 
 
Instead, commanders would be better employed in 
explaining the fundamental realities of the situation 
to their subordinates and in encouraging them to 
submerge themselves in the atmosphere of the 
country. Only by so doing will they be able to see 
things from the point of view of the population 
whose allegiance they are trying to regain and 
retain (p. 201). 
 
 
The noncommissioned officer chosen to lead the 
volunteer squad was known to like the Vietnamese 
(p. 12). 
 
The marines saw too much of the villagers, and 
lived too closely with them, not to be affected by 
their personal grief (p. 36). 
 
The marines had accepted too many invitations to 
too many meals in too many homes to believe they 
were not liked by many and tolerated by most (p. 
102). 
 
[An officer] had instructed the Marines to be 
meticulous in material matters on such visits [to the 
homes of villagers].  Four bottles of warm beer cost 
a PF [militiaman] one-tenth of his monthly salary.  
As a host, a PF could be put in debt after a few 
visits by a thoughtless, guzzling American friend 
(p. 246). 
 
Whatever else they may have been, the 
summertime invitations [for Americans to socialize 
with villagers] were a signal that the inviters did not 
expect Viet Cong retribution for their actions. Nor 
were the invitations given out of fear of the 
Americans… These Americans lived in their 
village, ate their food, worked with their men, died 
in their paddies (p. 247). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The consensus on the need for culturally aware 
soldiers was not as strong as I expected.  Callwell 
admitted the need to understand the habits and 
customs of the enemy.  Lawrence gave examples 
where cultural knowledge was important to 
achieving his objectives.  West described the 
interpersonal relationships developed between 
Vietnamese villagers and American Marines due, in 
part, to the Marines capacity to act within the 
culture.  The Small Wars Manual is completely 
consistent with modern opinion on the value of 
culturally aware soldiers, and Kitson shows some 
appreciation of the matter. 
 
However, the post-war theorists—Trinquier, 
Galula, and Thompson—had much less to say.  
Thompson acknowledged the need to consider 
culture, the others said nothing significant.  
Perhaps, with long colonial experience, they 
thought themselves sufficiently knowledgeable 
about local cultures or perhaps they had enough 
local national presence on appropriate staffs that the 
issue did not come up.  
 
were sufficiently knowledgeable of local national cultures, or perhaps they believed that they had 
enough local nationals working beside them, that they did not perceive awareness as an issue.  
Heuser (2007) took both Trinquier and Galula to task for this oversight writing that “their lack of 
emphasis on and sympathy for cultural differences, and local resistance against becoming French 
clones may have been the Achilles heel of their counterinsurgency operations” (p. 155) in 
Algeria and Vietnam.  Kitson, one-half generation later, was sensitive enough to know that 
outsiders could not execute effective propaganda because that task required a cultural insider, 
and he advocated commanders encouraging soldiers to “submerge themselves in the atmosphere 
of the country” (p. 201).  West’s quotations are not theoretical in their nature, but tend to refer to 
interpersonal relationships between Marines and villagers, but I think these would not have been 
possible without Marines having learned to fit into village cultural life. 
Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple 
audiences. 
 
 The informational dimension of asymmetric war is critically important.  The essential 
weakness of the insurgency in its early stages requires insurgents not to confront the government 
in open combat.  Successful insurgents survive by avoiding decisive military confrontation long 
enough to win.  They do this “either by making the political and psychological realms decisive… 
or by postponing decisive military encounters until they weakened the government through 
guerrilla, political, and psychological operations” (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 5).  Since the 
insurgents are fighting in the “political and psychological realms,” counterinsurgents must 
oppose them there, particularly since effective insurgents cannot be cornered and destroyed 
militarily. 
 Several themes emerge from the selected results, located in Table 4-9.  Propaganda is the 
most effective method asymmetric antagonists use to persuade the public to support their side 
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Table 4-9. Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
  
We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, 
just as carefully and formally as other officers 
arranged their bodies: and not only our own men’s 
minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, 
so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind 
of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, 
and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the 
verdict, and the neutrals looking on (p. 11). 
 
The printing press is the greatest weapon in the 
armory of the modern commander (p. 11). 
 
 
In extremely remote, isolated, and illiterate sections 
an educated revolutionary leader may easily lead 
the inhabitants to believe that they, in the act of 
taking up arms, are actually engaged in repelling 
invasion. Many such ruses are employed in the 
initial stages and recruiting is carried on in this 
manner for long periods and the inhabitants are in a 
state of ignorance of the actual situation (p. I-21-
22). 
 
Every endeavor should be made to assure the 
civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. 
No effort should be spared to demonstrate the 
advantage of law and order and to secure their 
friendly cooperation (p. I-46). 
 
Propaganda at home also plays its part in the public 
support of small wars. An ordinary characteristic of 
small wars is the antagonistic propaganda against 
the campaign or operations in the United States 
press or legislature (p. I-28). 
 
At this time [as the intervention is drawing to a 
close], public opinion shows little patience in the 
enterprise, and accepts with less patience any 
explanation for the delay necessary to bring the 
operation to a close (p. I-29). 
 
To off-set this situation [the perception of Marine 
intervention as unfriendly], recourse must be had to 
propaganda clearly stating the definite purpose 
of the intervening forces in order to show the 
friendly aid that is being offered to the country (p. 
II-4). 
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Table 4-9 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
Internal warfare within a population, particularly in 
cities… there is also an intensive propaganda effort, 
destined primarily to make the steps that are taken 
understood (p. 43). 
 
People who know our adversaries will not protest in 
submitting to inconveniences they know to be 
necessary for the recovery of their liberty. But our 
enemies will not fail to exploit the situation for 
their propaganda needs (p. 48). 
 
Our war aims must be clearly known to the people. 
They will have to be convinced that if we call upon 
them to fight at our sides it can only be in defense 
of a just cause. And we should not deceive them (p. 
49). 
 
With the gradual return to peace, however, 
propaganda will play an important role in causing 
the sometimes impatient masses to understand the 
variety of problems that must be resolved before a 
return to normal existence is possible (p. 49-50). 
 
 
 
An efficient propaganda machine can turn an 
artificial problem into a real one (p. 22-23). 
 
The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to 
use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, 
exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged 
by what he promises, not by what he does. 
Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon 
for him (p.14). 
 
The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities 
and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than 
words. He is judged on what he does, not on what 
he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not 
prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, 
but at the price of being discredited for good… For 
him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary 
weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not 
to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or 
nonexistent policy with propaganda (p. 14-15). 
 
To be sure, the better the [government’s] cause and 
the situation, the larger will be the active minority 
favorable to the counterinsurgent and the easier its 
task. This truism dictates the main goal of the 
propaganda—to show that the cause and the 
situation of the counterinsurgent are better than the 
insurgent’s (p. 77). 
 
Thus, a mimeograph machine may turn out to be 
more useful than a machine gun (p. 94). 
 
 
The communists are not slow to make propaganda 
capital out of all excesses committed by the 
government, with the result that most search-and-
clear operations, by creating more communists than 
they kill, become in effect communist recruiting 
drives (p. 35). 
 
[In information services] There needs to be a 
closely integrated effort so that the government 
speaks with one voice. The task naturally falls into 
two categories: information work directed at the 
insurgents… and information work directed at the 
public… The aim of the first is to reduce the will of 
the insurgents to fight and to encourage surrenders, 
while the aim of the second is to rally the 
population to the side of the government… (p. 90). 
 
These [public information] services are responsible 
for putting across all that the government is trying 
to do in accordance with its policies. The services 
are responsible for publishing and making known 
all new laws and regulations and the reasons for 
them, and for giving publicity to the government's 
achievements in the material field (p. 95). 
 
If the function of information is to inform, that of 
propaganda is to persuade. In order to persuade 
people of something, it is necessary that it should 
be believed. There are certain guiding principles on 
which the information services should work. The 
most precious propaganda asset of the government 
is its credit in the eyes of the people (p. 96). 
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Table 4-9 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications  
 
In the first place there is the obvious one directly 
concerned with the progress of a particular 
campaign which covers the production of news 
sheets by illegal printing presses and the making of 
broadcasts by illegal wireless stations. These 
activities form a most important part of any 
subversive campaign, particularly in the early 
stages when the population is being mobilized to 
support the cause (p. 17). 
 
It [the government] must also promote its own 
cause and undermine that of the enemy by 
disseminating its view of the situation, and this 
involves a carefully planned and coordinated 
campaign of what… must regrettably be called 
psychological operations (p. 71).  
 
The next area in which the army can make a 
contribution before the outbreak of violence lies in 
the field of psychological operations and 
propaganda, where the government not only has to 
counter the steps which the enemy are taking to get 
their cause across to the population, but also has to 
put across its own program in an attractive way (p. 
77). 
 
From one side of the world to the other the 
organizers of subversion have access to the people 
through these means [all sorts of media] and 
although the same channels of communication are 
available to those involved in protecting the 
existing order, they seldom manipulate them so 
skillfully as their opponents (p. 17). 
 
For a week he [an effective VC operative] 
displayed his captives [government officials] in a 
series of hamlet’s, and then one noon in the main 
marketplace of the Phu Longs [VC hamlets] of the 
beheaded all five (p. 42). 
 
A propaganda squad scattered dozens of leaflets…  
The Vietnamese [language] message stressed that 
the GVN [government] was going to lose the war, 
so it would better for the people to join the victors 
[the VC] (p. 126). 
 
The [pro-government] fair began at noon on 
Christmas Day and the people came in droves, 
using the RD [a government agency] coercion [the 
fair was mandatory] as an excuse to gather and 
gossip, to gamble and to be entertained (p. 153). 
 
They [singers] were followed by a series of skits, 
each containing a political message but which were 
well received because the village actors had laced 
them with ribald humor (p. 155). 
 
A propaganda squad scattered dozens of leaflets, 
some in English… the message ran: “Stop raping 
our women and butchering our babies, leave our 
country, refuse to fight, and protest the war.” The 
names of two U.S. senators to whom the marines 
should write were given (p. 126). 
 
 
The military weakness of the insurgent forces him 
to confront the government in the psychological 
dimension.  He will use propaganda to sell his 
cause, to magnify grievances, to complain of 
government excesses and miscues.  The 
government must answer his charges, promote their 
own programs, and explain their actions. 
 
The government may not lie. 
 
There are multiple audiences: the insurgents, 
government forces, the local national population, 
and the world population.  If the government is 
receiving support from a foreign supporter, the 
population of the supporting nation is also 
vulnerable to propaganda. 
 
and to undermine the other.  Also, there are multiple audiences to be influenced.  For example, 
Lawrence identifies five separate audiences: the combatants of each side, the supporters of each 
side, and the “neutrals looking on” (p. 11).  Claessen (2007) has made the case that a foreign 
counterinsurgent is most vulnerable through his home population, who may abandon support for 
the war and force the withdrawal of their government’s soldiers, and the Small Wars Manual 
made the same observation over sixty years earlier.  Finally, insurgent propaganda may mislead 
or manipulate populations, but a government attempt to do the same eventually results in the loss 
of credibility. 
 Callwell had nothing to say about propaganda and little to say about the press.  Again, 
this may be because the rebels are defined by their ethnic identity and not by their self-chosen 
adherence to an ideology.  His only remark about the press was to observe that the press 
sometimes gave away information that was valuable to the rebels.  Lawrence, on the other hand, 
understood he needed to influence multiple audiences—indeed the press coverage of his exploits 
is probably why we know of him—and he emphatically stated that the “printing press is the 
greatest weapon in the armory…” (p. 11). 
 The Small Wars Manual understood the motivational power of the insurgent cause and of 
a charismatic leader.  The Marines also understood that they were under attack in the “United 
States press and legislature” (p. 28), and that their campaign was vulnerable to this “attack.”   
 The post-war theorists agree that propaganda is an important part of the insurgent’s 
campaign, and that insurgents will use propaganda to manipulate public perception of current 
events to their favor.  They also agree an information program needs to be part of the 
government’s campaign as well, and that a government cannot lie in its campaign because a lie 
will be discovered and the government’s credibility will be damaged.  All acknowledge the 
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existence of multiple audiences.  Galula even addressed each audience separately (insurgents, 
counterinsurgents, and the populace) in the chapter of his book explaining the development of a 
counterinsurgency campaign plan. 
Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the 
insurgent. 
 
 Principle 2 has demonstrated the importance of the people to the outcome of an 
asymmetric struggle, and we have examined the role of persuasion in gathering people’s 
voluntary support.  However persuasive either side can be, most theorists observed that only an 
active minority would voluntarily support either side, and the remainder of the populace would 
prefer to remain neutral until it was apparent which side would win.  Therefore, the ability to 
control the people was crucial to winning this vital center of gravity. 
 Controlling the people can be accomplished in a couple of ways.  Insurgents are known to 
control people through terror, which extorts compliance, support, and silence from the common 
people; Principle 2A discussed this in more detail.  Governments can also use terror, but that is 
discredited among these theorists, as we will see when we examine Principle 4A.  A government 
can also use the punishments associated with the law to deter people from supporting the 
insurgency.  Table 4-10 shows that governments also control people with a variety of measures 
including a census, identification cards, travel passes, curfews and other measures, and they may 
control valuable resources, such as food, munitions, certain machine parts, and so on, to prevent 
the insurgents from using them.  The purpose of these measures is to make it impossible for 
sympathizers to support active insurgents, and give neutral people an excuse not to.  This 
undermines the insurgent’s terror campaign; he cannot extort from a person who cannot help him 
without attracting the attention of authorities.
Table 4-10. Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent  
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
Clearing the country of supplies and, in some cases, 
rendering it impossible for an enemy to exist in the 
country at all owing to no food or shelter being left, 
may become part of the program. (p. 133). 
 
The adoption of guerilla methods by the enemy 
almost necessarily forces the regular troops to 
resort to punitive measures directed against the 
possessions of their antagonists, It must be 
remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight 
[so he can decisively defeated] is to make raids on 
his property (p. 145). 
 
But when there is no king to conquer, no capital to 
seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when 
there are no celebrated strongholds to capture, and 
no great centers of population to occupy, the 
objective is not so easy to select. It is then that the 
regular troops are forced to resort to cattle lifting 
and village burning and that the war assumes an 
aspect which may shock the humanitarian (p. 40). 
 
The destruction of the crops and stores of grain of 
the enemy is another way of carrying on hostilities. 
This method of warfare is more exasperating to the 
adversary than carrying off livestock; for while they 
appreciate the principle that the victor is entitled to 
the spoils, wanton damage tends to embitter their 
feeling of enmity (p. 40-41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We were in occupation of 99 per cent of the Hejaz. 
The Turks were welcome to the other fraction till 
peace or doomsday showed them the futility of 
clinging to our window pane (p. 6). 
 
They [the riding camels] lived on grazing as we 
marched (we never gave them grain or fodder), and 
after their six weeks on the road they would be 
worn thin, and have to be sent to pasture for some 
months’ rest, while we called out another tribe in 
replacement, or found fresh riding-beasts (p. 16). 
 
 
Another advantage of such government is the 
authority to require natives to carry identification 
cards on their persons constantly. It has been found 
that the average native is not only willing and 
anxious, but proud to carry some paper signed by a 
military authority to show that he is recognized (p. 
I-25). 
 
The ability of a hostile force to oppose the 
intervening force may be limited by the availability 
of subsistence, natural resources, finances, arms, 
equipment, and ammunition. The forces opposing 
the intervention often live off the country by 
forcing contributions of money, subsistence, and 
other supplies from the peaceful inhabitants, or by 
donations from local civilians sympathetic to their 
cause (p. II-3). 
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Table 4-10 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
We know that it is not at all necessary to have the 
sympathy of a majority of the people in order to 
rule them. The right [insurgent] organization can 
turn the trick (p. 4). 
 
[Insurgent] Control of the masses through a tight 
organization, often through several parallel 
organizations, is the master weapon of modern 
warfare… Only when we have created a similar 
organization… (p. 30). 
 
First, they [the government] conduct a careful 
census of the entire population (p. 31). 
 
[An identity card] in the course of frequent checks, 
enable us to keep tabs on each individual (p. 32). 
In case of emergency, this organism [the self-
defense organization] would be in a position to 
establish without delay very strict control over food 
supplies, animals, and all resources our adversaries 
could use against us (p. 33). 
 
The inhabitants are allowed to leave the village 
only by the gates, and all exits will be controlled. 
They are permitted to take neither money nor 
supplies with them. (p. 74). 
 
A census is also taken of all animals—draft 
animals… and bovines… will be branded with the 
card number of their owner. We know how 
important supplies are to the guerrilla (p. 75). 
 
 
As long as the population remains under his 
control, the insurgent retains his liberty to refuse 
battle except on his own terms (p. 15). 
 
Establish contact with the population, control its 
movements in order to cut off its links with the 
guerrillas (p. 80). 
 
Such is, in the author’s view, the basic mechanism 
of counterinsurgency warfare. Whether in the cold 
or in the hot revolutionary war, its essence can be 
summed up in a single sentence: Build (or rebuild) 
a political machine from the population upward (p. 
136). 
 
Control of the population begins obviously with a 
thorough census (p. 116). 
 
A census, if properly made and exploited, is a basic 
source of intelligence. It would show, for instance, 
who is related to whom, an important piece of 
information in counterinsurgency warfare because 
insurgent recruiting at the village level is generally 
based initially on family ties; or who owns property 
or who works outside of the village and has, 
therefore, legitimate reasons to travel; or what is 
each man’s source and amount of income, which 
would immediately separate those who can afford 
to indulge in abnormal activities from those who 
cannot. The census should, consequently, be well 
planned, and conducted in a systematic fashion so 
that the format and the results do not vary from 
sector to sector (p. 117-118). 
 
 
As a basis for these measures the first requirement 
is an identity card system throughout the country, 
covering all persons preferably down to the age of 
12… A list of the occupants of a house, together 
with their photographs, should be maintained in 
each house, with a copy at village or district 
headquarters. This makes it easy to check absentees 
and visitors. Areas where there is no habitation or 
cultivation should be declared prohibited areas. 
Dusk-to-dawn curfews outside hamlets should be 
imposed and strictly enforced… Bulk supplies of 
food and other articles of value to the insurgents 
should be convoyed between towns and villages, 
and no individual should be allowed to take such 
articles outside the hamlet. In areas where a really 
strict control is required, rice may have to be 
distributed on a ration basis… and canned goods 
should be punctured by the shopkeeper as they are 
sold. Check points should be established to enforce 
all these regulations, and snap checks should be 
carried out on all roads, rivers and tracks (p. 144). 
 
Any caches of food supplies or other materials 
which can be found should be destroyed, together 
with any crops in remote areas that are obviously 
grown for Viet Cong consumption. We should aim, 
by the end of this year, to regain control of all the 
densely populated areas… (p. 135). 
 
If roads in the vicinity of a hamlet are cut, all the 
population should be turned out to repair them. 
Strict control over the movement of people and 
supplies should be enforced (p. 144). 
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Table 4-10 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications  
 
The [government] committees [working among the 
people] provided a framework which helped to 
engender a feeling of security and commitment 
amongst the people which in turn encouraged them 
to give information. This enhanced still further the 
power of the teams which were able to impose 
effective sanctions or work for the benefit of the 
community, according to the extent to which the 
people were supporting the government. In short 
the system greatly increased the power of the 
government in the areas where it was working (p. 
80). 
 
In Algeria the French developed the system to a far 
greater extent by sending out teams into the towns 
and countryside whose job was to set up a complete 
chain of committees and cells supporting the 
government on similar lines to those established by 
the enemy. In this way they got right under the skin 
of the population, and by introducing identity cards, 
branding livestock with the identity card numbers 
of their owners, and by other similar methods they 
soon imposed a tight control over the people. As 
the system developed the influence of the 
government increased. (p. 80). 
 
 
Binh Nghia belonged to the Viet Cong.  By 1964 
the National Liberation Front was the full-time 
government in five of the village’s seven hamlets 
and controlled of boat traffic moving toward the 
fishing beds at sea. Two strong local-force Viet 
Cong companies roamed from outlying hamlet to 
hamlet, village to village, destroying or dislocating 
the Popular Forces (PF) militia and declaring the 
villages liberated.  By 1965 the government of 
South Vietnam had conceded all its seven hamlets 
to the Viet Cong (p. 10). 
 
[After a patrol made contact] Loung [a militiaman] 
spoke to him [Thanh], identifying one of the dead 
guerrillas by name.  Thanh [the police chief] took 
out the book in which were recorded the names and 
affiliations of every adult in the village, with a 
special roster of those who had joined the Viet 
Cong… Thanh drew a neat line through one of 
them (p. 91). 
 
That morning the police chief had arrested a short, 
muscular man… [who] was not on the census roles 
of the village, recently updated (p. 93). 
 
All the teenagers were forced to participate [in a 
pro-government rally and fair]; such mandatory 
attendance absolved of the participants from later 
retribution by the Viet Cong (p. 153). 
 
Things were so comfortable many store owners had 
stopped getting a cut of their earnings to the VC (p. 
259). 
 
Callwell focused on the destruction of enemy 
property to deny him those resources or to force 
him to defend them, thus bringing him to battle.  
Lawrence, who enjoyed nominal control of the 
Bedouin, focused on controlling the desert which 
was his aim.  The Small Wars Manual noted that 
control measures could work. 
 
The remainder of the theorists understood that the 
conflict was over control of the people.  Insurgents 
control through persuasion and coercion.  The 
government controls through persuasion and 
control measures, such as a census, ID cards, travel 
passes, and so on.  The government will also seek 
to control resources that the insurgent needs. 
 
Strong administrative organizations were important 
to both sides for controlling the people. 
 
 In the literature, “control” has two connotations. It refers to a beneficial control where the 
government directs activities so that they are accomplished in an orderly way.  This is like the 
control our government exerts over us.  They force us to drive on the right of the road, to stand in 
line, or even to submit to security procedures at airports.  We understand the purposes and 
benefits of this control, and voluntarily submit to it.  When an insurgent establishes a 
government in a “liberated zone,” he does the same.  “Control” also refers to the ability to coerce 
compliance.  Most remarks of this nature refer to the terror activities of the insurgency, but the 
government has significant coercive abilities as well. 
 Callwell paid a great deal of attention to the need for “clearing the country of supplies” 
(p. 133) rebels could use while resisting, and to the destruction of property to bring guerrillas to 
battle, force their capitulation, or punish their rebellion.  Again, he is a little out of sync, but 
similar things may work in a modern setting.  Laws permitting the seizure of assets probably 
discourage illegal activities of all types, and denying the enemy resources is always important to 
warfare.  Lawrence understood his war with the Turks was best accomplished not by fighting, 
but by controlling the “sea” of the desert that surrounded the “islands” of towns controlled by 
Turks.  He controlled the countryside through the cultivation of “desert power” supplied by the 
tribes who lived on it and by camel-mounted tribal warriors drawn from them. 
 The Small Wars Manual briefly discussed basic population control measures such as the 
identification card.  The importance of this measure and similar ones to keep track of people and 
resources pervades the work of post-war theorists, and West gives a couple of examples of the 
value of a village census.  West also shows how the control of people’s movement was valuable 
to the Viet Cong before the intervention of the combined unit of Marines and village militia. 
 144
 145
Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases 
to build strength. 
 
The relative military weakness of the insurgency requires it to avoid decisive military 
confrontation with the government until it can build military and political power.  One way 
insurgents avoid contact is to hide.  The selected quotations in Table 4-11 show unanimous 
consensus that insurgents require secure bases or sanctuaries to rest, refit, receive recruits, train, 
and absorb the external support required to develop political and military capacity.  Sanctuary 
areas also provide the opportunity to extend incremental insurgent control over increasingly 
larger segments of the national territory and population.  Insurgents find sanctuary in rugged or 
remote terrain, across the borders of adjacent states, between jurisdictions within a state, or 
among the people.  
Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external 
support. 
 
 Table 4-12 shows the utility of external support to an insurgency.  Support from outside 
the country provides the insurgency with the material it needs to fight and perhaps with advice 
and training.  External support greatly complicates the counterinsurgent’s problem.  Callwell 
described the difficulty caused by the hostility to regular forces of a people adjacent to the rebels 
he is fighting.  Lawrence did not make his need for external support explicit, but Lawrence’s 
presence was a form of external support, and Lawrence discussed the use of weapons and other 
materials that were of foreign manufacture.  He also mentions the importance of a secure route 
from his “seabases” (see Table 4-11) to the locations his irregulars chose to fight.  I did not find a 
place where the Small Wars Manual discussed the issue, but their presence was a form of 
external support, although it was usually to a government.  The remainder of the theorists show 
Table 4-11. Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need for sanctuary or bases to build strength 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
The terrain has much to say to effective conduct of 
partisan warfare on the part of the enemy…  
Hilly and broken ground or districts clothed in 
jungle growth and thickets especially lend 
themselves to these very desultory operations (p. 
127). 
 
  
 
The process was to set up ladders of tribes, giving 
us a safe and comfortable route from our sea-
bases( Yenbo, Wejh or Akaba) to our advanced 
bases of operation. These were sometimes three 
hundred miles away, a long distance in lands 
without railways or roads, but made short for us by 
an assiduous cultivation of desert-power, control by 
camel parties of the desolate and unmapped 
wilderness which fills up all the centre of Arabia (p. 
14). 
 
It [widely distributed forces] gave us priceless 
advantages in pursuit, for the force renewed itself 
with fresh men in every new tribal area, and gave 
us always our pristine energy (p. 18). 
 
It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable 
base, something guarded not merely from attack, 
but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the 
Red Sea Parts, the desert, or in the minds of the 
men we converted to our creed (p. 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146
 
Table 4-11 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
Sometimes the inhabitant's home is the guerrilla's 
refuge, where he can disappear in case of danger 
(p.64). 
 
In the villages, however, we of ten find one or two 
empty houses, where the bands usually stay while 
in transit, which we can occupy (p. 73). 
 
This territory [inside a neighboring state friendly to 
the insurgent] will very often serve as a base of 
departure for attacks launched into our territory. It 
is there that the enemy will, at the opening of 
hostilities, set up his command structure, and will 
shape it gradually into the provisional government 
he hopes to set up on our territory as soon as there 
is a large enough area conquered (p. 97). 
 
 
The role of geography, a large one in an ordinary 
war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war. If 
the insurgent, with his initial weakness, cannot get 
any help from geography, he may well be 
condemned to failure before he starts (p. 35). 
 
…what results can the counterinsurgent expect 
from his operations in these other [non-priority] 
areas? To prevent the insurgent from developing 
into a higher form of warfare, that is to say, from 
organizing a regular army. This objective is fulfilled 
when the insurgent is denied safe bases (p. 81). 
 
[Insurgents set up:] Regular bases, areas garrisoned 
by regular troops (at rest, in training, or in the 
process of being organized) and local troops, with 
an openly functioning government carrying out 
administration, economic policy, taxation, justice, 
education, and public services, safe from enemy 
penetration… [And] Guerrilla bases, with active 
regular troops in addition to the other types, fully 
organized under the insurgent’s political control, 
with administrative organs devised to function 
either openly or underground, as circumstances 
dictate… (p. 55). 
 
The border areas [between jurisdictions] are a 
permanent source of weakness for the 
counterinsurgent whatever his administrative 
structures, and this advantage is usually exploited 
by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent 
stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side 
of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able 
to escape (p. 35). 
 
 
The jungle terrain provided a safe initial sanctuary. 
Given an established base or sanctuary from which 
to work, the first aim of any insurgent movement 
must be to gain momentum by capturing more 
weapons, ammunition and explosives (p. 29). 
 
Training camps for new recruits, however, are 
normally maintained still within the jungle areas, 
together with supplies and ammunition dumps and 
small armories which are early established to make 
primitive weapons and to repair those which are 
damaged (p. 32). 
 
They [areas for expansion of insurgent control] are 
also likely to be areas along the boundary lines 
between government administrative regions or 
provinces in which there is a lack of co-ordination 
on the part of the government. Guerilla units can 
often find sanctuary merely by crossing such 
boundaries from one government operational area 
to another (p. 37). 
 
There is a very clear distinction between the jungle 
bases and… 'popular' bases. The jungle bases are 
areas where, without much risk of interference, 
guerilla units can obtain rest and sanctuary, where 
ammunition, food and other supplies can be 
stored… and where recruits can be trained and 
tactical headquarters established… The 'popular' 
bases, by contrast, are the villages under insurgent 
control from which most of the supplies and 
recruits arc obtained… (p. 37) 
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Table 4-11 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications  
 
The size of the armed [guerrilla] groups naturally 
depends on the plan of campaign which in turn 
depends on such factors as the cover afforded by 
the terrain, the proximity or otherwise of a friendly 
country, the availability of weapons, recruits, food 
and money, and above all on the political situation 
(p. 40). 
 
From the start of the [Malayan] emergency the 
central, state and district committees all operated 
from camps within the jungle but many of the 
branch committees lived with squatters on the 
jungle edge. Later these committees also moved 
inside the jungle… (p. 43).  
 
In the earlier stages the war is fought by people 
who strike at a time and place of their own 
choosing and then disappear. Sometimes their 
disappearance is achieved by the physical process 
of movement into an area of thick cover such as a 
jungle, and at other times by merging into the 
population. In either case those who are supporting 
them by the provision of money, food, recruits, 
intelligence, and supplies rely for their security on 
remaining anonymous.  The problem of destroying 
enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore 
consists very largely of finding them (p. 95). (also 
in mobility) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1960 the Viet Cong movement had started to 
gain momentum, and four years later the Viet Cong 
could realistically claim control over most of [the 
province’s] villages and over all the jungle, 
allowing their main forces to establish a huge base 
camp in the mountains (p. 8). 
 
Several villagers had given a similar report: an 
enemy main-force unit had come across the river 
from the Phu Longs [VC-controlled villages and 
base camp] and entered Binh Yen Noi [a hamlet in 
the friendly village] (p. 73-74). 
 
They [the VC attack force] had come across from 
[VC controlled] Thoung Hoa village… where they 
had rehearsed and planned the attack for two weeks 
(p. 112). 
 
 
Insurgents need bases or sanctuaries to rest, refit, 
train, integrate recruits, and receive supplies. 
Without sanctuaries, the insurgents have difficulty 
building their strength. 
 
Rugged terrain, the borders of neighboring states, 
the lines between jurisdictions, and the people can 
provide sanctuary. 
 
 148
Table 4-12. Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far 
the people of the hostile country, or in minor 
operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire 
strength. The attitude, moreover, of neighboring 
peoples and tribes is at times a subject of great 
uncertainty. [It is a] very serious inconvenience… 
when a neighboring tribe unexpectedly assumes an 
unfriendly demeanor (p. 49). 
 
 
We had great quantities of light machine guns 
[obtained from the British], used not as machine 
guns, but as automatic rifles, snipers” tools, by men 
kept deliberately in ignorance of their mechanism, 
so that the speed of action would not be hampered 
by attempts at repair (p. 17). 
 
On some occasions we strengthened tribal raids by 
armored cars, manned by Englishmen (p. 17).  
 
 
… funds… may be received from foreign sources 
for the purchase of modern arms and munitions of 
war. As a result, the intervening force usually finds 
the forces opposing them armed and equipped with 
modern weapons and capable of sustaining 
themselves in the field for an unlimited period (p. 
II-3). 
 
Due to the ease with which modern arms and 
equipment can be obtained from outside sources, it 
can be expected that, in the future, irregulars will 
have weapons and equipment equally as effective 
as those of the intervening forces (p. II-5). 
 
Irregular forces in active operations always attract 
foreign soldiers of fortune of varied experience and 
reputation whose fighting methods influence the 
character of opposition encountered (p. II-6). 
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Table 4-12 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
The enemy, however, before moving to open 
warfare, will attempt to assure himself of the 
support of one or more friendly, nonbelligerent 
foreign nations (p. 97). 
 
Material support and the assurance of strong and 
continuing aid from abroad are essential to 
maintaining a high morale among those fighting in 
our interior (p. 98). 
 
When diplomatic intervention proves ineffective, 
attempts will be made to establish along the 
frontiers of the territory under attack a system 
capable of depriving the enemy of delivery of 
support from without (p. 99). 
 
They [the Vietminh] continued to receive all their 
military provisions from the outside… We were 
never able to stop that traffic (p. 100). 
 
If our opponents [in Algeria] are stalemated, if they 
have not been successful in creating guerrilla units 
larger than company size, it is in large part because 
the border fence has not permitted them to receive 
the supplies vital to the normal development of 
their activities (p. 100). 
 
 
Outside support to an insurgency can take the form 
of: 
1. Moral support, from which the insurgent will 
benefit without any effort on his part, provided his 
cause goes along with “the wind of history”… 
Moral support is expressed by the weight of public 
opinion and through various communications 
media. Propaganda is the chief instrument of moral 
support, used to sway public opinion when it is 
adverse, or to reinforce existing public sympathy. 
2. Political support, with pressure applied directly 
on the counterinsurgent, or indirectly by diplomatic 
action in the international forum… 
3. Technical support, in the form of advice to the 
insurgent for the organization of his movement and 
the conduct of his political and military 
operations… 
4. Financial support, overt or covert.  
5. Military support, either through direct 
intervention on the insurgent’s side or by giving 
him training facilities and equipment (p. 39). 
 
When the time comes, however, for the insurgent to 
pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of 
operations, to create a regular army, the need for 
much larger and more varied supplies becomes 
acute. Either he is able to capture it from the 
counterinsurgent, or it must come from the outside. 
If not, the development of the insurgent military 
establishment is impossible (p. 40). 
 
 
 
In view of the greatly expanded base of support for 
the insurgents in those areas of the countryside 
under their control, there will be a corresponding 
increase in the insurgent capacity to absorb further 
aid from outside. Whereas in the past this aid may 
have been limited to a continual flow of small 
parties of men and materials, the insurgent 
movement will now be in a position to absorb 
whole regular units and heavier weapons (p. 166). 
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Table 4-12 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
Such a situation [insurgents were strong enough to 
oppose the government in open combat] could arise 
if, for example, a significant number of government 
troops were to defect to the enemy, or if the 
insurgents were supported from outside the country 
(p. 4). 
 
Sometimes when the impetus for subversion comes 
from a foreign power or when a foreign power is in 
sympathy with the cause, the organizers are 
allowed to make use of broadcasting facilities in the 
friendly country concerned (p. 17). 
 
[As of 1971] Russia, China, and Cuba, in particular, 
openly encourage what they like to call wars of 
national liberation which is to say any form of 
subversion or insurgency carried out in such a way 
as to advance their interests (p. 19). 
 
In many cases other nations took advantage of these 
uprisings and gave support of one sort or another, 
either because they genuinely sympathized with the 
aims of the subversive movement, or because it was 
in their interest to see the existing government 
replaced by the insurgents (p. 43). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rumor [that members of an enemy unit spoke 
with North Vietnamese accents] upset the PFs 
[militia]… The North Vietnamese fought in 
platoon-, company-, and battalion-sized units (p. 
74). 
 
Nguyen Son, the quick tempered leader of the local 
forces [VC] in the Phu Longs [a VC-controlled 
area] had been reinforced for the attack [on the 
combined unit fort] by the 5th Company of the 409th 
NVA Battalion [North Vietnamese Army] (p. 112). 
 
 
There was wide acknowledgment of the prevalence 
and value of external support to insurgents.  
Without it, insurgents can rarely build the capacity 
they need to overthrow any moderately efficient 
state. 
 
they value external support to the insurgent movement.  Galula lists the types of support as 
moral, political, technical, financial, and military. 
Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent 
survival. 
 
 We have seen that the relative weakness of the insurgent causes him to avoid decisive 
contact with government forces.  If he did not, the government would quickly destroy him and 
the struggle would be resolved.  Insurgent forces can avoid contact through dispersal and 
mobility.  By moving quickly about the contested areas, insurgents can avoid destruction by 
superior government forces, and they can mass at the time and place of their choosing to deliver 
a blow to the government.  These military blows are always calculated to serve a political 
purpose, such as embarrassing the government, increasing the cost of the government’s effort, 
undermining government morale, etc.  When mass is not needed they remain dispersed to avoid 
detection, or when an insurgent unit is faced with a contact it does not want, it simply disperses 
to avoid destruction.  Effective counterinsurgent forces attempt to match or exceed insurgent 
mobility in order to bring units to battle as part of the larger counterinsurgent campaign.  The 
results are in Table 4-13. 
Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law. 
 On this topic Lawrence and West had little to say.  Most likely, the insurgents in 
Lawrence’s experience were governed by tribal tradition, and Lawrence talked about the lack of 
“discipline” in the Arab irregular army, where men served because they believed in the cause and 
not because any law compelled them.  West’s protagonists also had relatively little to say about 
the law.  One passage discussed captured suspects as being able to choose between jail and a 
government indoctrination center, but the main thrust of the passage was about the district 
government’s use of the indoctrination center to recruit informants (p. 22).  Otherwise, West 
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Table 4-13. Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
The enemy lives in fact from hand to mouth, and it 
follows from this that he does not need 
communications as a channel for replenishing food 
or warlike stores, nor does he need lines of 
communications to retreat by if defeated. Warriors 
such as form the enemy in small wars simply 
disperse when they are worsted. They disappear in 
all directions, but unless awed by their experience 
into submission they are ready to collect again 
should an opportunity offer at a later period (p. 86). 
 
The rapidity of the hostile movements, which arises 
partly from the freedom from impedimenta and 
partly from the singular marching power which are 
characteristics of irregular warriors, prejudices the 
course of the campaign to their great benefit.  If 
defeated they disperse, so that the victory cannot be 
followed up (p. 87). 
 
The troops [fighting guerrillas] forming such 
columns must be thoroughly equipped for the tasks 
they have to perform, and they should be able to 
travel light. Mobility is the first essential (p. 136). 
 
To regular troops such antagonists are very 
troublesome, they shun decisive action and their 
tactics almost of necessity bring about a protracted, 
toilsome war (p. 32). 
 
… the very essence of partisan warfare from the 
point of the enemy being to avoid definite 
engagements (p. 125).  
 
 
If the action had continued till the enemy had 
changed his dispositions to resist it, we would have 
been breaking the spirit of our fundamental rule of 
denying him targets (p. 15). 
 
In consequence, we aimed at the widest distribution 
of forces, in order to have the greatest number of 
raids on hand at once, and we added fluidity to their 
ordinary speed, by using one district on Monday, 
another on Tuesday, a third on Wednesday (p. 18). 
 
At length we developed an unconscious habit of 
never engaging the enemy at all.  This chimed with 
two numerical plea of never giving the enemy’s 
soldier a target (p. 10). 
 
Our war should be a war of detachment: we were to 
contain the enemy by a silent threat of a vast 
unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till the 
moment of attack.  This attack need be only 
nominal directed not against his men, but against 
his materials: so it should not seek for his main 
strength or his weaknesses but for his most 
accessible material (p. 10). 
 
We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed.  
Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind, and we 
wanted nothing material to live on, so perhaps we 
offered nothing material to the killing.  It seemed a 
regular soldier might be helpless without a target. 
We would own the ground he sat on, and what he 
could poke his rifle at. (p. 8). 
 
 
 
 
If these large groups [of irregulars] can be engaged 
and decisively defeated, armed opposition to the 
intervention may be brought to an end and an early 
peace achieved. If this fails, the larger groups either 
retire to more remote areas, or are dispersed into 
numerous small bands which remain in the same 
general locality, and the action becomes one of 
protracted guerrilla warfare (p. II-5). 
 
Further, by energetic patrolling of the area and 
vigorous pursuit of the hostile forces once contact 
is gained, the irregulars should be forced to disband 
completely or to move to more remote and less 
fertile areas (p. II-6). 
 
Their [irregulars] knowledge of the terrain and their 
mobility permits them to move quickly and safely 
to avoid combat and then to launch an attack 
against a defenseless village or some isolated 
outpost (p. II-5). 
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Table 4-13 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
We are trying in the course of repeated complex 
operations to seize an adversary who eludes us (p. 
4). 
 
Dispersion is a necessary part of their [insurgents’] 
defense (p. 52). 
 
… the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect 
knowledge of an area (which he himself has 
chosen) and its potential, and the support given him 
by the inhabitants (p.62). 
 
He chooses the terrain and imposes it upon us (p. 
63). 
 
If we were to have an opportunity to meet this 
enemy on the traditional field of battle, a dream 
vainly pursued for years by many military 
commanders, victory would be assured in a matter 
of hours (p. 8). 
 
Except for the rare exception, it [the fight against 
the guerrilla] will never achieve spectacular results 
(p. 65). 
 
… the army will operate in light detachments p. 
44). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…the insurgent is obliged to remain fluid at least 
until he has reached a balance of forces with the 
counterinsurgent (p. 12). 
 
The trouble here is that the enemy holds no territory 
and refuses to fight for it. He is everywhere and 
nowhere (p. 72). 
 
The insurgent is fluid because he has neither 
responsibility nor concrete assets; the 
counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both, and 
no amount of wailing can alter this fact for either 
side (p. 12). 
 
 
To start with, they [armed guerrilla units] are 
seldom concentrated (except for an action on their 
own initiative), and arc scattered over wide areas of 
jungle or other inaccessible terrain. Even if, as a 
matter of luck, the government forces make contact, 
the action is immediately broken off by the 
guerrillas (p. 31). 
 
The net result is that large-scale military operations 
based on very meager intelligence are mounted to 
seek out and destroy these units. Guerilla units are 
designed to cope with exactly this form of 
government reaction. To start with, they are seldom 
concentrated (except for an action on their own 
initiative), and arc scattered over wide areas of 
jungle or other inaccessible terrain (p. 31). 
 
The requirement is for a small, elite, highly 
disciplined, lightly equipped and aggressive army, 
with a supporting air force and navy of sufficient 
capability to make the army highly mobile… (p. 
62). 
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Table 4-13 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
In the earlier stages the war is fought by people 
who strike at a time and place of their own 
choosing and then disappear. Sometimes their 
disappearance is achieved by the physical process 
of movement into an area of thick cover such as a 
jungle, and at other times by merging into the 
population. In either case those who are supporting 
them by the provision of money, food, recruits, 
intelligence, and supplies rely for their security on 
remaining anonymous.  The problem of destroying 
enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore 
consists very largely of finding them (p. 95).  
 
 
Viet Cong doctrine [was] to avoid fights with 
strong forces and not to use guerrillas in steady 
combat (p. 41). 
 
 
The insurgent must avoid military confrontation 
with the superior forces of the government while 
his is weak.  Therefore, the essence of “guerrilla 
warfare” is highly-mobile, widely-dispersed units 
that concentrate to fight and then disperse before 
the government can react.  In this way they survive 
as their strength grows and the government’s 
wanes.  It follows that counter-guerrilla units must 
also be mobile and widely dispersed. 
 
The principle also applies to political cadres.  If 
they are found, they are easily arrested, and so they 
must be very effective at moving about, or very 
effective at hiding, or both. 
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Table 4-14. Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
 
… but in the suppression of a rebellion the 
refractory subjects of the ruling power must all be 
chastised and subdued." Still there is a limit to the 
amount of license in destruction which is expedient 
(p. 41). 
 
Wholesale destruction of the property of the enemy 
may sometimes do more harm than good (p. 149). 
 
Similarly in Burma great care was taken not to 
exasperate the people of the newly acquired 
province, and to punish only the dacoits [guerrillas] 
and marauders who invested the country and were 
reducing it to anarchy… but great care had to be 
exercised not to punish villages which were merely 
victims of dacoity [rebellion by the dacoits]. Fines 
were sometimes inflicted to make the villagers give 
up their arms if it was thought they were in league 
with the marauders. (p.147-148). 
  
If the local judicial system is weak, or broken down 
entirely, it is better to endow the military authorities 
with temporary and legal judicial powers in order to 
avoid embarrassing situations which may result of 
from the illegal assumption (p. I-7). 
 
Our military forces must not assume any judicial 
responsibility over local inhabitants beyond that 
expressly provided by proper authority (p. I-7). 
 
National policy and the precepts of civilized 
procedure demand that our dealings with other 
peoples be maintained of a high moral plan [sic] (p. 
I-13). 
 
Although this procedure [a functioning local 
national judiciary allied to the ruling party] is not 
always conducive to the best interests of the 
military forces, it is a situation that normally exists 
and must be accepted (p. I-44). 
 
Reprisals and punitive measures may result in the 
destruction of lives and property of innocent 
people; such measures may have an adverse effect 
upon the discipline of our own troops (p. I-27). 
 
Adherence, on the part of our personnel, to the 
dictates of the local laws and regulations… is 
essential… to the end that we maintain the respect 
and confidence of the community as a whole (p. I-
44). 
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Table 4-14 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
When it has been decided to kill someone sometime 
somewhere, with the sole purpose of terrorizing the 
populace and strewing a certain number of bodies 
along the streets of a city or on country roads, it is 
quite easy under existing laws to escape the police 
(p.18). 
 
The fact that modern warfare is not officially 
declared, that a state of war is not generally 
proclaimed, permits the adversary to continue to 
take advantage of peacetime legislation (p. 27). 
 
… the peacetime laws gave our enemies maximum 
opportunities for evading pursuit; it was vital to 
them [insurgents] that legality be strictly applied (p. 
47). 
 
No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If 
the prisoner gives the information requested, the 
examination is quickly terminated; if not, 
specialists must force his secret from him (p. 21). 
 
The organization [of citizen’s to promote internal 
security] will have to be seriously controlled, so 
that it remains solely a means of protection against 
the external enemy [the insurgents] and does not 
become a vehicle for internal political pressure (p. 
34). 
 
Nevertheless, even if some [army] brutality is 
inevitable, rigorous discipline must always be 
enforced to prevent wanton acts. The army has the 
means of demanding and maintaining firm 
discipline. (p. 48). 
 
 
If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the 
police, take advantage of the many normal 
safeguards built into the judicial system and are 
released, the police can do little. Prompt adaptation 
of the judicial system to the extraordinary 
conditions of an insurgency, an agonizing problem 
at best, is a necessity (p. 31). 
 
Since legal changes are slow, the counterinsurgent 
may be tempted to go a step further and to act 
beyond the borders of legality. A succession of 
arbitrary restrictive measures will be started, the 
nation will soon find itself under constraint, 
opposition will increase, and the insurgent will 
thank his opponent for having played into his hands 
(p. 66). 
 
Can the counterinsurgent use terrorism too? It 
would be self-defeating since terrorism is a source 
of disorder, which is precisely what the 
counterinsurgent aims to stop (p. 74). 
 
The arrested cell members normally ought to be 
punished according to laws, since they have taken 
part in a conspiracy against the government. 
Nothing, however, is normal in a revolutionary war. 
If the counterinsurgent wishes to bring a quicker 
end to the war, he must discard some of the legal 
concepts that would be applicable to ordinary 
conditions… Leniency seems in this case a good 
practical policy (p. 126). 
 
 
In the pre-insurgency circumstances of murder and 
terror, it is very likely that the normal processes of 
law and order will fail to cope with the situation (p. 
25-26). 
 
Statute law can be modified by emergency law, and 
laws of procedure and evidence can be simplified. 
There is nothing to prevent a government enacting 
very tough laws to cope with the situation, but the 
golden rule should be that each new law must be 
effective and must be fairly applied (p. 53). 
 
Second principle [second basic principle of 
counterinsurgency]. The government must function 
in accordance with law [Thompson devoted a 
complete section to this issue] (p. 52). 
 
If the government does not adhere to the law, then 
it loses respect and fails to fulfill its contractual 
obligation to the people as a government (p. 54). 
 
There is a very strong temptation in dealing both 
with terrorism and with guerilla actions for 
government forces to act outside the law… Not 
only is this morally wrong… it will create more 
practical difficulties… than it solves (p. 52). 
 
It puts torture and the shooting of captured 
terrorists in their proper place: however great the 
provocation, both are crimes and the latter is 
murder (p. 54). 
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Table 4-14 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
An excellent example [of civil military cooperation] 
concerns the way in which the Law should work. 
Broadly speaking there are two possible alternatives, 
the first one being that the Law should be used as just 
another weapon in the government's arsenal, and in 
this case it becomes little more than a propaganda 
cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the 
public… The other alternative is that the Law should 
remain impartial and administer the laws of the 
country without any direction from the government. 
Naturally the government can introduce new 
legislation to deal with the subversion which can be 
very tough if necessary, and once this becomes law 
legal services will administer justice based on it. But 
the resulting situation is very different from that 
described in the first alternative because in the second 
case the officers of the law will recognize no 
difference between the forces of the government, the 
army, or the uncommitted part of the population. 
Anyone violating the law will be treated in the same 
way, and the full legal procedure, complete with its 
safeguards for the individual will operate on behalf of 
friend and foe alike. As a rule the second alternative is 
not only morally right but also expedient… (p. 69). 
 
For the purposes of this study no account will be taken 
of the simplest method of all, which is to suppress the 
movement by the ruthless application of naked force, 
because although non-violent campaigns are 
particularly vulnerable to this sort of action, it is most 
unlikely that the British government, or indeed any 
Western government, would be politically able to 
operate on these lines even if it wanted to do so (p. 
87). 
 
 
The man had been busy haranguing crowds and 
organizing support for a Buddhist struggle against 
the Saigon government. Acting on an informer’s 
advice, Lam had the man seized at his home, where 
a quick search revealed correspondence which 
identified the prisoner as a member of the Viet 
Cong… Yet the prisoner spent less than a day in 
jail before his political friends of convinced the 
district chief it would be unwise to press charges (p. 
6). 
 
 
Callwell did not discuss the need for the “rule of 
law” possibly because the legal system in remote 
lands was not greatly developed, but he did stress 
the need for restraint in the authority’s use of 
violence.  Also, colonial governments often 
imposed law and a measure of order on regions that 
had been characterized by intermittent warfare.  
Thompson reports that a village headman, asked in 
1942 if he was glad the colonialists were being 
driven off by the Japanese, replied, ‘You slept in 
peace under the British’ (Thompson, p. 123). 
 
Lawrence had nothing to say about the law.  
Disputes among Arab tribesmen were settled in 
traditional ways.  In the Twenty-seven Articles 
(1917), he instructs future advisors to Arabs to 
remain above the ‘feuds.’  
 
West observed a failure of the law, and the negative 
impact it had on the morale of police and militia 
facing the Viet Cong daily. 
 
The Small Wars Manual stressed the need to 
respect local national legal authority and to operate 
within the authority granted Marines by their 
orders. 
 
The post-war theorists agreed on several ideas: 1) 
the peacetime law might be insufficient to deal with 
a counterinsurgency effort and need to be changed; 
2) the government must obey the law, and enforce 
the law fairly. 
 
Caveat: They disagree on interrogation techniques. 
 
 
expressed disappointment at the corruption of the South Vietnamese government in two 
particulars: First, a politically connected man was found to be a member of the Viet Cong, but 
was released quickly from jail which hurt the morale of men risking their lives to find and arrest 
or kill insurgents.  Second, connected individuals were diverting humanitarian aid supplies for 
their personal benefit and damaging the credibility of the government. 
 Callwell did not discuss the law, as there probably was no effective law in many of the 
areas from which his cases were drawn, but he was emphatic that there is a limit to the utility of 
destruction.  He maintained that too much destruction created enmity while the objective of the 
campaign was usually to gain the “friendship of the people” (p. 41) and a “lasting peace” (p. 42). 
 The Small Wars Manual discussed the military assumption of civil authority in extreme 
cases, and then the need to remain inside the limits of whatever authority Marines were 
permitted.  They also believed U.S. operations should remain on a high moral plane, and that 
Marines must respect local national legal authority. 
 The post-war theorists were agreed that the law that existed in peacetime may be 
insufficient to cope with the demands of an insurgency, and that the laws needed to be changed.  
They insisted, however, that the government must act within the law, and that soldiers who 
violated the law should be subject to discipline.  Only Trinquier says anything else.  As we have 
seen, he advocated harsh interrogation of captured terrorists, but the remainder of his work 
suggests that this activity should be legally permitted, and otherwise he joined the others in 
affirming that the government should behave within the limits of the law.  The most harsh and 
direct condemnation of Trinquier’s opinion on interrogation comes from Thompson who 
declares torture and summary executions “both are crimes and the latter is murder” (p. 54).  An 
examination of the results in Table 4-14 will show the strength of the consensus on these items. 
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Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; 
Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required). 
 
 Callwell and Lawrence had little to say about interagency operations, probably because 
the environments they operated in lacked an institutional structure that would permit interagency 
operations.  Otherwise, an inspection of Table 4-15 will show that the need for interagency 
operations was the subject of strong consensus.  Several principles emerge: First, all others agree 
on the importance of a variety of agencies working together to attack insurgency with a 
combined plan featuring military, political, social, and economic initiatives to improve the 
legitimacy of the government. The Small Wars Manual adds that cooperation must be multi-
national when one state comes to the aid of another.  Second, the government must have or must 
develop the institutional capacity to administer the combined program effectively.  Finally, the 
program is best administered with a unified command structure.  
 The consensus among the theorists is remarkable.  Despite the differences in perspective 
and some differences of emphasis, a majority of theorists agreed on every issue, and usually the 
consensus was much stronger than a mere majority.  In my judgment, an attempt to quantify the 
strength of consensus on each item would not add to the value or quality of this research.  There 
are too many implications contained in the results, and the quotations contained in the results 
tables are too few to believe that we have exhausted all the implications in the work of a 
particular theorist.  Indeed, one of my hardest tasks was to narrow the results such that they 
would fit into the tables.  I was able to identify only one major disagreement, that concerning the 
use of harsh interrogations.  The considerable strength of the consensus on each item suggests 
that this list of principles could be used as a model for counterinsurgency campaign planning.  
The planner would address each principle within the plan.
Table 4-15. Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to 
win (capacity-building will be required) 
Callwell (1906) Lawrence (1920) Small Wars Manual (1940) 
   
In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function 
and the State Department exercises a constant and 
controlling influence over the military operations 
(p. I-4). 
 
In general, a plan of action states the military 
measures to be applied… The same consideration 
must be given to a part to be played by local 
government and the civil population. The efforts of 
the different agencies must be cooperative and 
coordinated to the attainment of the common end 
(p. I-16). 
 
The organization of a native military and police 
force is undertaken (p. I-6). 
 
Native troops, supported by marines, are 
increasingly employed as early as practicable in 
order that these native agencies may assume their 
proper responsibility for restoring law and order in 
their own country as an agency of their government 
(p. I-7). 
 
Finally, when order is restored, or when the 
responsible native agencies are prepared to handle 
the situation without other support, the troops are 
withdrawn (p. I-8). 
 
The application of purely military measures may 
not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government 
because the fundamental causes of the condition of 
unrest may be economic, political, or social (p. I-
15). 
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Table 4-15 (cont).  
Trinquier (1961) Galula (1964) Thompson (1966) 
 
Internal warfare within a population, particularly in 
cities, generally involves an extensive police 
operation. There is also an intensive propaganda 
effort, destined primarily to make the steps that are 
taken understood. A broad social program follows, 
the objective of which is to give the people the 
material and moral assistance necessary to permit 
them to resume their normal activities quickly after 
operations are over (p. 43). 
 
Such projects include construction of new roads, or 
the repair of those that have been sabotaged; 
construction of new strategic hamlets to receive 
people falling back from the danger areas; school 
construction, and economic development of the 
department to give displaced persons means of 
subsistence. A well-conceived plan, executed with 
determination, courage, and foresight, will save 
from needless distress a population that will have 
had more than its share of suffering (p. 81). 
 
It will be the role of the social services to lessen the 
miseries war engenders (p. 50). 
 
Since it is the population that is at stake, the 
struggle will assume two aspects: Political—direct 
action on the population; and military—the struggle 
against the armed forces of the aggressor (p. 40). 
 
Victory no longer depends on one battle over a 
given terrain. Military operations… are of only 
limited importance and are never the total conflict 
(p. 6-7). 
 
Destroying or expelling from an area the main body 
of the guerrilla forces, preventing their return, 
installing garrisons to protect the population, 
tracking the guerrilla remnants—these are 
predominantly military operations. Identifying, 
arresting, interrogating the insurgent political 
agents, judging them, rehabilitating those who can 
be won over—these are police and judicial tasks. 
Establishing contact with the population, imposing 
and enforcing control measures, organizing local 
elections, testing the new leaders, organizing them 
into a party, doing all the constructive work needed 
to win the wholehearted support of the 
population—these are primarily political 
operations. The expected result—final defeat of the 
insurgents—is not an addition but a multiplication 
of these various operations; they all are essential 
and if one is nil, the product will be zero. Clearly… 
counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a 
single direction. A single boss must direct the 
operations from beginning until the end (p. 87). 
 
The counterinsurgent leader… has to take into 
account the problems of the various civilian and 
military components of his forces before reaching a 
decision, especially when their actions interrelate 
intricately and when their demands often conflict 
with each other (p. 90). 
 
Adapting the judicial system to the threat, 
strengthening the bureaucracy, reinforcing the 
police and the armed forces may discourage 
insurgency… (p. 67). 
 
Third principle [third basic principle of 
counterinsurgency]. The government must have an 
overall plan… This plan must cover not just the 
security measures and military operations. It must 
include all political, social, economic, 
administrative, police and other measures which 
have a bearing on the insurgency (p. 55). 
 
It is essential, too, that there should be a proper 
balance between the military and the civil effort, 
with complete coordination in all fields, Otherwise 
a situation will arise in which military operations 
produce no lasting results because they are 
unsupported by civil follow-up action. Similarly, 
civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed 
with the insurgents, are a waste of time and money 
if they are unsupported by military operations to 
provide the necessary protection (p. 55). 
 
Without a reasonably efficient government 
machine, no program or projects, in the context of 
counter-insurgency, will produce the desired results 
(p. 51). 
 
If the government performance is going to be 
effective and keep pace with the aspirations of the 
people, while at the same time creating an 
atmosphere of order and stability, the main 
essentials to establish a sound administrative 
structure (p. 70). 
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Table 4-15 (cont).  
Kitson (1971) West (1972) Implications 
 
But the important aspect from the point of view of 
the military officer engaged in countering 
insurgency is not to know how to build up overall 
government programs so much as to understand 
how totally interdependent all the various measures 
must be, and how  important it is that they should 
not cut across each other (p. 51). 
 
Even in the operational sphere civil and military 
measures are inextricably intertwined (p. 52). 
 
On the one hand military officers are required to 
initiate proposals for wearing down and defeating 
insurgents which representatives of other 
government departments have to scrutinize in order 
to ensure that they do not cut across long-term 
government aims (p. 52). 
 
Soldiers, policemen, local volunteers and junior 
officials of departments such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Buildings 
and Works would all have to work together on such 
an operation [to destroy guerrillas, impose curfews, 
deny food and resources] (p. 52). 
 
In this connection it is worth pointing out that as 
the enemy is likely to be employing a combination 
of political, economic, psychological and military 
measures, so the government will have to do 
likewise to defeat him (p. 7). 
 
 
The police wanted no part of the night patrols.  
Although well trained and not afraid to run 
ambushes, they left such military chores to the 
Marines and PFs [militiamen]… His men [the 
police] were day people, specialists in the 
intelligence rather than the operational field of war 
(p. 20).  
 
Although the RDs [Revolutionary Development 
cadres] carried weapons, their task was not to beat 
the enemy by force.  They were supposed to show 
the villagers that the Saigon government cared for 
them and that the Viet Cong were to be shunned (p. 
38). 
 
Within a few days it was apparent that the RDs 
were of little use.  Few of them were from the 
village, many were in their teens and none were 
married. [Their leader] frequently looked like an 
exasperated Boy Scout master with a high spirited 
troop.  Send them to work in the fields, and he 
would find them trying to coax the girls into the 
bushes (p. 38). 
 
The district adviser, [Marine] Major Braun was 
concerned with reports that as the Marines at the 
fort became more proficient in patrolling, they 
tended to shoulder more tactical responsibilities and 
to shove the PFs [militia] and even the police 
assigned (p. 63). 
 
 
 
Callwell and Lawrence had little to say about 
interagency functioning.  The institutional 
infrastructures of their experiences were so 
underdeveloped as to make this unimportant.  
 
The remaining theorists greatly stressed the need 
for a multi-disciplinary, interagency approach to 
counterinsurgency.  Given the political nature of 
this type of conflict and the social, political, or 
economic nature of the insurgents’ cause, military 
force was insufficient to win.  Indeed, its purpose 
was to make political action among the people 
possible.  They also stressed the need for a unified 
plan directed by a unified command structure, and 
the need to develop the administrative capacity of 
the government to address the nation’s problems 
effectively.   
 
The Small Wars Manual also stressed the need to 
cooperate on a multi-national level. 
 
 
 
 
Now we turn to the task of testing these “classical” principles against the contemporary 
environment. 
Stage 2: Update for the 21st Century: Understanding the Environment 
 The review of literature indicated that classical ideas on counterinsurgency might be 
outdated by changes in the contemporary global political environment and in the nature of 
insurgency (Hoffman, 2007; Kilcullen, 2006a; Metz, 1995).  To determine the relevance of the 
classical principles uncovered in Stage 1 and to achieve Objective 3 of this study—identify and 
describe the changes to the classical model that are necessary—I found it necessary to explore 
these criticisms more closely. 
Changes in the Contemporary Environment 
 A number of authors, from a variety of backgounds, have joined in describing the 
changes in the global environment.  Hoffman (2007), Cobbold (2006), Mills (2007), Metz 
(1995), Metz (2007), Kilcullen (2006a), and others have contributed to the following list: 
 1. More states are in the international system than during the Cold War. 
 2. The proliferation of important and powerful non-state actors, including corporations, 
NGOs, international organizations, transnational terrorist organizations, all sorts of media 
organizations, and others. 
 3. More news agencies, more outlets and more websites, capable of transmitting imagery, 
which is much more powerful than mere text description.  Hoffman (2007) even pointed out that 
some analysts consider the media to be participants in the conflict. 
 4. Globally dispersed communities provide what Siqueira and Sandler (2006) termed 
diaspora support. 
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 5. Globalized information and communication technologies, particularly the internet, 
permit the mobilization of support internationally. 
 6. Perception management is more difficult without a monopoly on media. 
 7. The incidence of state sponsorship has declined with the end of the Cold War. 
Revolutions are no longer exported as part of superpower rivalry. 
 8. Increasing incidence of state failure. 
 9. War in many regions is becoming endemic; entire generations know nothing but 
conflict. 
 10. Urbanization; conflict is increasingly conducted in densely populated areas.  The 
tactics used, particularly bombings, rely on terror to divide society. In this environment 
bystanders are always present to bear witness to violent action, and the media is available to 
spread the news globally. 
 11. Western home populations are now vulnerable to a terrorist threat. 
 Given, as Hoffman (2007) contends, that counterinsurgency campaigns are won in the 
“political and psychological dimensions” (p. 79), global information systems provide a new 
battlefield.  Global media certainly affect sympathies and can affect political decision-making.  
The media choose what is shown based upon the biases of journalists, the prevailing attitudes of 
their primary audiences, and on what is likely to produce either ratings or enhance journalistic 
reputations.  Modern insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists, are very good at manipulating the media 
to get their message out (Mills, 2007).   
 Hoffman (2007) believes this has several important implications.  The battlespace—a 
conceptual “space” that includes the physical battlefield plus the friendly and enemy forces and 
civilian population in it, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum and, most important for our 
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purposes, the information environment (FM 3-0, 2001)—is much more complex and difficult to 
define.  It is more difficult to define the nature, strategy, structure, and means of the adversary.  
States no longer monopolize media, and the insurgents have become very effective at getting 
their message out.  Metz (1995) has added that the end of the Cold War has changed the U.S. 
definition of its interests, and the UN is freed from the stasis imposed by superpower rivalry. 
Changes in the Nature of Insurgency 
 A number of authors (Hammes, 2004; Cobbold, 2006; Cohen, Crane, Horvath & Nagl, 
2006) have commented that the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. has discouraged 
potential adversaries from facing U.S. military forces in conventional battle.  However, potential 
adversaries also recognize our weakness in protracted asymmetric conflict.  Cohen et al (2006) 
are representative; they write, “They respect our immense firepower and logistical capabilities; 
they do not have equal regard for our strategic acumen or operational skill in fighting 
[asymmetric] wars” (p. 53).  Hammes argues that the U.S. has lost this sort of asymmetric 
conflict on three occasions—Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia—and that this is not lost on our 
potential adversaries. 
 Lacina (2007) has observed that in regions with weak rule of law, insurgents may survive 
as criminal organizations without popular support. She argues that counterinsurgency strategy 
must deal with the weakness in the rule of law which, she argues, is the source of turmoil in 
many regions. 
 Hoffman (2007) argues that insurgent organizations are no longer the tight, well 
disciplined, hierarchical organizations described by Trinquier, Galula, or Thompson.  Today’s 
insurgent organizations are flatter and more federated; they may also be linked to organized 
crime.  Kilcullen (2006a) argues modern insurgents operate “more like a self-synchronizing 
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swarm of independent, but cooperating cells” (p. 6), and also he calls the jihadist movement a 
global insurgency comprised of “a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks” 
(Kilcullen, 2005, p. 602).  The implication is that counterinsurgents have less insurgent 
organization to attack; therefore they have more trouble winning.  The flip side is that until 
insurgents can organize themselves they are unlikely to topple any reasonably effective 
government and seize national power.  Insurgents may be able to stretch out the conflict 
indefinitely, however.  Metz (2007) observes that in protracted situations like this, when the U.S. 
is not already committed to a side, the insurgency is not the real threat to U.S. interests, but the 
instability that results from protracted conflict is.  In such situations, the appropriate policy 
response is not to assist the regime to gain victory, but to assist parties to the conflict to resolve 
their dispute. 
Hoffman (2007) also contends that insurgents may not seek clearly defined objectives; 
particularly they may not desire to overthrow a government.  Strictly speaking, according to our 
definition of insurgency from Chapter 1, this prevents us from describing such groups as 
insurgents; however, his point does highlight the difficulty of coming to grips with these issues.  
Mills (2007) argues insurgent objectives may have more to do with political aspirations of a local 
national leader or with the interests of an external sponsor.  Some groups may benefit from the 
state of anarchy that results from sustained conflict and may not want peace.  Kilcullen (2006a) 
adds that some groups may not want power, but only to scavenge from the carcass of a failed 
state; other groups may merely want to expel foreigners from the country. 
 Hoffman (2007) also points out that urbanization has provided the new “terrain” in which 
insurgents hide.  In urban areas, insurgents have access to people and to money, strangers are not 
out of place, and lucrative infrastructure targets abound, because the population is dependent 
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upon infrastructures and government services.  The population density limits the government’s 
ability to collect intelligence, to enforce the law, or conduct military operations.  Additionally, 
urban areas provide the opportunities for insurgents to support themselves with criminal acts so 
that they are less dependent upon the populace for everyday support. Perhaps most importantly, 
insurgents have increased access to media for disseminating their message.  Hoffman believes 
that counterinsurgency is won in the political and psychological dimensions; a “compelling 
narrative” disseminated through modern information technology can generate a critical 
advantage for the side that does it best. 
 Kilcullen (2005) adds that transnational movements, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
are best perceived as insurgencies, therefore, in addition to national insurgencies, there are 
transnational ones as well. These transnational organizations have no unified command structure, 
may not attempt to control territory or create a shadow government, do not collect taxes, and do 
not attempt to have frequent personal interactions with a local population.  Al Qaeda’s objective 
is more ambitious than seizing power in a single state; it is the establishment of a caliphate from 
which they can attack the West. 
If, as Kilcullen (2005) has argued, the confrontation between jihadist groups and the 
West is best perceived as a global insurgency, the West should prefer a permutation of 
counterinsurgency doctrine to combat this threat over counter-terror doctrine. The essence of 
Kilcullen’s argument is that the counter-terror paradigm perceives the terrorist as an aberrant and 
evil individual with whom we do not negotiate, while the counterinsurgency paradigm considers 
the insurgent to be an individual with a cause or a grievance that may be legitimate. The apparent 
popularity of Al Qaeda in corners of the Islamic world indicates that Al Qaeda has a considerable 
constituency.  This, in turn, suggests that a significant number of Muslims perceive a legitimate 
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grievance against the West.  Part of an effective counterinsurgency response would be to address 
this perception.  Moreover, a counterinsurgency paradigm would open an opportunity for 
“compromise and negotiation” (p. 605) and for hearts and minds campaigns designed to persuade 
Muslims we are not their enemies, and which might isolate jihadists psychologically and 
ideologically from the remainder of the Muslim community. 
In this paradigm, terror is not the definition of the group (“the terrorists”), but simply is a 
tactic that an insurgent group, in this case, a transnational one, uses to achieve its goals.  The use 
of terror as a tactic is not new; we have seen it in classical insurgency as well. 
Several other authors adopt similar perspectives to Kilcullen’s.  Sederberg (1995), 
writing before September 11, 2001 and before Al Qaeda was commonly known, observed that 
“If we consider terrorism as one possible tactic available to a challenger group engaged in a 
political struggle we push the question of response back into the political context where it 
belongs” (p. 309).  He argued that conciliation addressing the political causes of conflict was 
more appropriate to a just and long-term solution to the underlying political problem than a 
strictly military response.  Solving the political problem, he thought, will end terror.  Atran 
(2004) argued that “military and counterinsurgency actions are tactical, not strategic, responses 
to suicide terrorism” (p. 67) that fail to address the underlying problem.  He proposed a layered 
counter-terror approach that defended sensitive populations and installations from attack and 
sought out terrorist networks with intelligence and military action, but emphasized understanding 
and acting upon the root causes of terror through political, economic, and social programs. 
(Atran’s definition of counterinsurgency is likely very different—too focused on military 
action—from the practice described by classical model. The classical model includes political, 
economic, and social programs.) 
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Other authors question the ability of hearts and minds approaches to deal with religious 
or ethnic insurgencies (or terrorists).  Hoffman (2007), for example, argued religious conflicts 
are not amenable to compromise or to political settlement, and that economic inducements are 
not effective against religious convictions.  Ajami (1997), on the other hand, says, “A frightened 
middle class [in Middle Eastern states], desperate to hold on to its small cultural liberties against 
the Islamists' reign of virtue and terror, is willing to sanction and live with autocratic rule” (p. 
145), suggesting that a measure of despotism is favorable to the rule of radical Islam.  Kerry (no 
date), in a yet-unpublished memoir of his service in Iraq as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade, 
describes the events following the capture of a jihadist suicide bomber who failed to reach his 
target.  Kerry’s humane treatment of the young man and Kerry’s willingness to protect him from 
the threat of harsh treatment by the Iraqis contrasted starkly with his expectations of his 
treatment following capture, with his false impressions of Americans, and also with the manner 
in which he would have treated Kerry had their positions been reversed.  Ultimately, the young 
jihadi agreed to speak out on Iraqi television acknowledging the humane treatment he had 
received.  This suggests that it is possible to win hearts and minds of some radical Muslims, and 
Ajami’s comment indicates that the Muslim community is hardly monolithic in its support of 
jihadist groups. 
Implications of the Contemporary Environment for the Classical Principles 
 Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a 
cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary. 
 
The objective of modern groups may not have the specificity exhibited by the examples 
found in the classical theorists.  They may be satisfied to fracture or paralyze the state (Hoffman, 
2007), or individuals may fight because it is a job, a means of providing for themselves 
(Kilcullen, 2006a).  They may be paid with money from outside the local system.  Soldiers in 
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Iraq have captured individual insurgents who planted bombs or carried arms because they were 
paid by one of the insurgent organizations fighting inside Iraq.  This turns the normal 
relationship of the people supporting the insurgents on its head; the insurgents may support the 
people with a job.  We know from classical theory that the political struggle is primary.  Global 
media has increased the propaganda and political dimension of any given conflict (Kilcullen, 
2006a) so that the military dimension is even less important than in the classical era. 
The fact that a group does not aim to take power may have more to do with its assessment 
of its own capability—that goal is beyond its reach—than with its actual desires.  Kilcullen 
(2006a) cites Cordesman (2006) who observed that insurgent groups in Iraq have not established 
internal sanctuaries, won significant engagements, or done other things that successful classical 
insurgencies have done.  However, their activities have halted the development of the state.  
Cordesman’s point was that, in the traditional sense, the insurgents were not in any danger of 
winning, but they appeared, at the time, to be denying victory to the U.S. and the new 
government.  I caveat his thought with this one.  The insurgents’ limitations are probably due to 
a lack of capacity—they cannot hold a sanctuary against U.S. and government soldiers.  Indeed, 
Metz and Millen (2005) observed that at the time, the Iraqi insurgency was young and sorting 
itself out.  The insurgents’ limitations may also relate to a priority of activities.  They want 
Americans out, the diverse groups can agree on that, and they will each adjust their objectives 
once Americans leave.     
For a group to want to perpetuate a state of anarchy, its leaders must expect to profit in 
some way, collectively or personally, from disorder.  This group must still establish itself with 
sufficient strength to survive and then to prosper in that environment.  At any rate, the group’s 
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leaders are fighting for a reason, and the rank and file members are also fighting for a reason.  
Either or both of these may be “attacked” through political or psychological means.   
If the group’s goals are unacceptable to the government, such that redress of grievance is 
not possible, the government will have to coerce them to stop fighting.  Many groups fighting 
today are founded on an identity (religious or ethnic).  They may be members of the same tribe 
or clan, or beholden to a warlord, that refuses for whatever reason to seek accommodation.  
Ironically, Callwell (1906), who was often out of sync with the other classic theorists, has much 
to say about this situation (Kilcullen, 2006a).  Indeed, many of the enemies faced by the British 
Empire were tribes, and were led by tribal leaders.  They could not be persuaded out of that 
identity, and had to be brought into compliance with force.   
For Callwell, the insurrection of an entire relatively homogenous group, the members of 
which overwhelmingly supported the insurgents, but who could be easily identified as members, 
was more easily resolved by force.  This is still true.  For example, the U.S. military campaign 
with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban was somewhat analogous to many small war 
campaigns that Callwell studied.  The U.S. military found the Taliban and its supporters easy to 
pick out and subsequently easy to defeat.  For insurgents that cannot command the loyalty of an 
entire relatively homogenous population, and few groups can today, the difficulty in imposing a 
solution by force is that counterinsurgents cannot easily identify insurgents from among the 
remainder of the population.  But these insurgents are vulnerable to an integrated, interagency 
counterinsurgency campaign designed to isolate them from the population or even from a global 
constituency.   
A group or groups that are successful at reducing a country to anarchy without having the 
capacity to seize power is not too great a problem for a foreign counterinsurgent.  When the cost 
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becomes too great to stay, he can take his tattered credibility and leave, as did many colonial 
powers from their former colonies and the U.S. from Vietnam (Lynn, 2005). In fact, forcing the 
“occupier” out may be the limited objective—the cause—of an insurgent group that lacks the 
capacity to take power, or this may be the shared cause that binds together disparate groups, who 
will fight each other once the foreigner leaves.  The government of the foreign counterinsurgent 
nation is rarely threatened with its own collapse.  The Republicans lost the 2006 mid-term 
elections badly, at least in part due to conditions in Iraq, but the government was not in any 
jeopardy.  The real victims are the common people of the failed state. 
So it is possible for an insurgent group’s agenda or the cause it espouses to be something 
other than taking control of the state, but still this cause exists, whatever it is, and it may be 
amenable to political action. The principle is still valid.  Campaign planners will still need to 
determine and address the reason insurgents are fighting. 
Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity. 
Kilcullen (2006a) observed that terrorists do not require a mass base.  This idea is not 
new.  Galula (1964) discussed it as part of the “bourgeois-nationalist” pattern of insurgency 
discussed in Chapter 2 and movements have operated without a mass base.  However, I do not 
know of any movement without a mass following that has succeeded in taking power from an 
efficient government, although there may be some that have extracted significant concessions or 
have destabilized a weak regime to the point of collapse. 
Global communications make it possible for insurgents to seek moral or financial support 
globally.  Kilcullen (2006a) posits that the winner in an asymmetric conflict may be the side that 
can mobilize global and regional support in addition to support from the local population.  For 
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example, Siqueira and Sandler (2006) cite the Tamil Tigers and the Irish Republican Army as 
two groups who are very successful at fundraising among expatriates.   
Nevertheless, the fact that movements have existed without a mass base does not imply 
that most movements do not seek or do not need the support of the local populace.  Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) learned how much their group relied on the support of the Iraqi Sunni community 
when they lost it in late 2007.  The “Sunni Awakening” has displaced AQI from its former 
stronghold in Anbar province, and the jihadis are being driven from the country as of the summer 
of 2008.  So, the principle still applies. 
Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they 
can give support to the government. 
 
Since the modern insurgent needs less from the people, Hoffman (2007) believes he may 
not seek significant support from them, or may coerce from them what he needs.  In the latter 
case, effective protection of the people from the insurgent will deny him whatever support he 
requires from them.  Admittedly, this is more difficult than in the classical model.  Lynn (2005) 
argues that security is critical to legitimacy; if the state cannot provide the former, it does not 
enjoy the latter.  I personally have known Iraqis who have been killed or kidnapped, and I have 
seen the chilling effect that these actions have on the people nearby.  The principle that people 
need security has not changed. 
Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government. 
It certainly helps the government’s cause to convince people it has the will and capacity 
to win.  This has not changed.  The foreign counterinsurgent is vulnerable, however. Supporting 
governments have often left when the cost of staying became too high (Lynn, 2005).  In fact, 
Claessen (2006) has argued persuasively that the foreign policy of a democracy engaged in 
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counterinsurgency is vulnerable to the decay of home population’s support for the war.  In other 
words, the people at home are a democracy’s center of gravity. 
The improvement of people’s living standards and the redress of their grievances is still 
powerful counterinsurgency.  Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005) demonstrate the coincidence 
between insurgent activity and the lack of basic services in the Sadr City section of Baghdad.  
They also demonstrate the correlation of increased funding to hire Sadr City residents to work on 
infrastructure projects—decreasing unemployment and increasing the availability of services—
with the decrease in insurgent activity.  Apparently, this sort of persuasion is still useful. 
 Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage 
support. 
 
 Courtesy and respect never hurt.  For a foreign counterinsurgent, the troops’ 
professionalism reduces the natural resistance people have to foreign occupation, and lengthens 
what Petraeus (2006) called the “half-life” of the “army of liberation.”  For the local national 
counterinsurgent, courtesy and professionalism reduces resistance from the local population, and 
enhances the perception of the government in the international arena.  A poorly perceived 
government is denied external support that may be critical.  Hammes (2004) explains how 
negative perceptions of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua led to the abandonment of the regime 
by the Western world.  This principle still appears to be important. 
Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign 
counterinsurgents.  
 
 This principle only applies to a counterinsurgent that is from a different culture than the 
populace.  Understanding a culture decreases cultural faux pas and aids in communication.  
McFarland (2005) explains the mere translation of spoken or written words may be insufficient 
to convey meaning.  The way in which a man speaks is influenced by his culture, and a mere 
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translation may not accurately convey meaning.  Understanding a culture also decreases the 
natural resistance people exhibit toward outsiders, and so cultural awareness increases the “half-
life” of the “army of liberation” (Petraeus, 2006).  Aylwin-Foster (2005), in a critique of 
American military performance in the early stages of the effort in Iraq, cites the lack of 
understanding of the culture to be a major impediment to mission accomplishment.   
 Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple 
audiences. 
 
 Propaganda has increased in importance.  The number of information outlets and the 
internet have made it possible for anyone to convey a story to the rest of the world.  The impact 
is huge, and counterinsurgents cannot afford to abandon this battlespace to their enemies.  The 
importance of effective information campaigns can hardly be overstated.  As important as it was 
in the classical era, it is more so now. 
 Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the 
insurgent. 
 
 The support of a local population may not be as critical for the modern insurgent as it was 
for his classical predecessor.  Modern insurgents have other methods for generating support, and 
a small group can carry out a terror campaign without the benefit of popular support or a tightly 
controlled organization.  However, in many cases, particularly those likely to involve large 
numbers of U.S. soldiers abroad, the support of the local populace is still critical to significant 
success.  For example, local Iraqi insurgent groups still need control of local populations just like 
the classical groups, and even Al Qaeda in Iraq was crippled when it lost the cooperation of 
Sunni leaders in the summer of 2007. The incidence of terror, such as assassinations of key local 
leaders, demonstrates the insurgents still value control over the populace. 
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The counterinsurgent must still have control over the population in order to defeat 
insurgency.  This control is, in many ways, more difficult.  There is no practical way to control 
people’s movements or communications in cyberspace, for example.  Indeed, coping with the 
challenges of modern communications technology is among the most important challenges that 
today’s counterinsurgents face.  Classical theory still insists that control is important, but it does 
not recommend any techniques. 
Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases 
to build strength. 
 
Insurgents can work in small cells among urban populations or among friendly rural 
populations, but the movement cannot grow without sanctuary areas to rest, refit, integrate 
recruits, train, or receive support.  If the only physical sanctuaries to be found are contained 
within a single building in a city, such as an apartment, a garage, or a warehouse, growth is 
limited.  However, insurgents can communicate their messages, study new techniques, receive 
advice and support in “cyber-sanctuaries” online.  So this principle still applies. 
Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external 
support. 
 
External support is still critical.  With a decrease in state sponsorship of insurgency, 
insurgent groups have turned to other methods for generating support.  Siqueira and Sandler 
(2006) think external sponsorship is critical for insurgent success, and posit that external support 
can come from diaspora support and outside financing as well as from states, such as Iran, that 
are still sponsoring insurgency.  Outside financing comes from several sources.  It is raised from 
sympathetic individuals around the world, often via the internet, or it may come from illegal 
activities, such as narcotics, or from alliances with organized crime. 
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 Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent 
survival. 
 
 The imperative of an insurgent remaining hidden or out of reach and of avoiding contact 
with government forces except on the insurgent’s terms has not changed.  The tactics have.  
Insurgents are far more likely to hide among urban populations than in inaccessible terrain as in 
the past.  The trick for the government is still to find and root them out. 
 Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law. 
 This principle remains important to maintaining legitimacy and receiving external 
support.  Important objections to U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have to do with our 
treatment of captured enemy combatants.  The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghreib bought the U.S. 
a great deal of resistance from the Iraqi people, and caused a howl of protest from our own 
population (our center of gravity) and from the rest of the world, particularly the Western allies, 
which we wanted to help us.  A local national counterinsurgent also has to be perceived as 
obeying the law and operating within human rights limitations.  Hammes (2004) details the way 
in which the Sandinista insurgency successfully depicted the Somoza regime as corrupt and 
abusive, which effectively denied the regime the external support that it needed.  It is possible 
that the conditions of an insurgency may require changes to the law to facilitate counterinsurgent 
efforts.  For example, U.S. law changed in important ways following the 9-11 attacks.   
 Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; 
Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required). 
 
 This principle was very important in the 1950s and 1960s.  It is more important now.  
Urban populations are much more dependent on government services than rural populations a 
half-century ago.  Also urban insurgents are less vulnerable to military attack than their rural 
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forebears.  These changes require an integrated, interagency plan addressing social, political, and 
economic factors in addition to military factors. 
It appears that all of the classical principles identified in Stage 1 of this study are still 
valid.  Indeed, the use of propaganda has dramatically increased in importance, and the value of 
interagency cooperation has also increased.  The support of the population is less important for 
urban insurgents to survive, but it appears that it is still crucial to insurgent success, if success is 
defined as taking national power from the government.  Furthermore, the professionalism and the 
cultural awareness of foreign counterinsurgents are better seen to be important.  It is certain that 
the tactics and techniques associated with each principle will be different than they were in the 
past, but each principle will still need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive campaign plan. 
A New Theoretical Insight? 
There are additional implications to the changes in the environment and in insurgency 
that provide an opportunity for new theoretical insight.  The literature contains recognition that 
local insurgencies have developed global reach.  Propaganda efforts, enabled by modern 
communications technologies, particularly the Internet, permit the delivery of insurgent 
messages to a world audience (Hoffman, 2007) and the “attack” of the home population of a 
foreign counterinsurgent, which is also his center of gravity (Claessen, 2007). The Internet 
permits the solicitation of moral and financial support globally, and allows insurgent groups to 
receive advice and cooperation from similar groups. It is even possible for local insurgent groups 
to physically attack the home population of foreign counterinsurgents or the citizens of third 
nations through terrorism. 
 The literature also contains arguments that global terrorist networks intervene in local 
conflict and exploit local grievances by sponsoring the violent activities of local insurgent 
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groups.  They also conduct terrorist activities in stable states such as the United States or 
Western Europe (Kilcullen, 2005). In addition, the literature suggests that Western policy makers 
should perceive these networks as an insurgency and apply to them a counterinsurgency 
paradigm. 
 However, I have not found in the literature an indication that theorists have explored the 
question: “Can we apply the same modification of counterinsurgency theory to both problems?”  
In order to distinguish between the two, “local national insurgency” will refer to an insurgent 
group that is a product of local grievances fighting within a state to achieve a set of objectives; 
“transnational insurgency” will refer to global terrorist networks that operate globally, that may 
sponsor local national insurgent groups, and are serving global objectives.  The former begin 
locally and expand operations abroad as they develop the capacity to do so. The latter have a 
global agenda and seek to pursue it by aiding like-minded groups engaged in local conflict.  It is 
also possible that affiliates of global network will enter a conflict and establish themselves as one 
of the competing groups.  Al Qaeda in Iraq is an example of this. 
 Conceptually, this distinction is important in determining policy and in adopting tactics 
and techniques. Unfortunately, neither policy nor tactics is the topic of this study. Rather this 
study attempts to generate a list of principles that would aid campaign planning at the operational 
level of conflict.  One lesson that has emerged from this study is that the classical principles are 
relevant to internal conflict—that is conflict within a state. Since the research question asked 
“what principles do military officers need to understand…” and since the vast majority of 
military officers engaged in counterinsurgency will be engaged in an internal conflict, these 
principles, and the modifications noted in Stage 2, appear remarkably valid.  It remains to be 
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seen whether these principles are appropriate to assist national strategists, who may or may not 
happen to be military officers, fighting the global dimension of insurgency. 
 Practically speaking, it is important to observe who is conducting operations against local 
national insurgencies and who is conducting operations against transnational insurgencies. 
Military officers, indeed, all members of the military to the lowest ranks, their interagency 
partners, and local national counterparts are fighting both the former and the latter locally or 
internally.  Other agencies, the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense; 
national level intelligence agencies; law enforcement agencies; and others; and their counterpart 
agencies in other nations around the world are fighting the global operations of both the former 
and the latter.  While it is axiomatic that a national strategy for counterinsurgency would 
mobilize all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic—whether in the global or local national arenas, the relative share of the 
counterinsurgency effort carried by the military is much greater in the local national arena than 
in the global arena. 
 Therefore, a strategist at State, Justice, or Homeland Security would not say, “I work to 
combat global/transnational terrorist groups” (which, according to Kilcullen (2005), we should 
combat using a counterinsurgency paradigm).  Rather, the same strategist would say, “I work to 
combat the global effects of both transnational and local national insurgent groups.”  Similarly, a 
soldier committed to counterinsurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere would not say, “I am 
fighting a local insurgency.”  He would say I am fighting the local effects of both local national 
insurgents and the affiliates of transnational insurgencies.  A picture of this concept might look 
like Figure 4-1. 
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  Transnational insurgency Local national insurgency 
-has global objectives -has local objectives 
-motivated by global grievance -motivated by local grievance 
-sponsors insurgents motivated by  -may accept support from  
     local grievances      transnational groups 
-conducts direct attacks against  -may conduct operations  
     targets in states in pursuit of       internationally through  
     global agenda      propaganda and terror 
 
Figure 4-1: The Levels of Insurgent Effects. 
 Conceptually, Americans think we have two problems: The first is the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), represented by the column on the right, which Kilcullen (2005) and others have 
argued is actually a “global insurgency.” This network has an affiliated group of mostly foreign 
(not Iraqi) recruits that have traveled to Iraq to fight Americans.  It also has affiliates, many not 
Afghani, that seek to rebuild sanctuary in Afghanistan in cooperation with the Taliban.  The 
second problem, depicted by the column on the left, is made up of the local national insurgencies 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In Iraq, the “insurgency” has actually been several groups (Metz, 2004) 
fighting the U.S.-led multi-national force and the government of Iraq, and often fighting each 
other.  The matter is complicated by the entrance of foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda in 
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Iraq to fight Americans.  In Afghanistan, the Taliban is fighting the new Afghani government.  In 
theory, they want to return to power.  They are assisted by Al Qaeda who wants the restoration of 
sanctuary and to fight the Western troops involved there. 
 Some people insist on viewing the situation in Iraq as part of the GWOT.  I argue this is 
not really a useful idea for several reasons: First, there were no jihadis in Iraq until the 
opportunities to fight the coalition led them there.  Second, there has been a substantial Iraqi 
resistance which is not related to jihadi objectives and grievances.  Third, the multi-disciplinary 
counterinsurgency techniques that soldiers (and a limited number of interagency partners) use in 
Iraq are working on both Iraqi resistance groups and on jihadists.  In other words, the essentially 
classical counterinsurgency campaign to isolate the insurgents, regardless of their motivations, is 
working as of the summer of 2008.  Finally, the GWOT creates a conceptual lens (Mooney 
(2007) suggested this idea in reference to U.S. policy toward Hezbollah in southern Lebanon) 
which has confused our view of the Iraqi campaign, and caused us to focus too long on the 
pursuit of the “enemy” and not long enough on separating him from the people, convincing the 
people to point him out for arrest, or even convincing him to stop fighting and go home.  Of 
course, the situation in Iraq is related to the GWOT in that it draws jihadis there that might 
otherwise be making trouble elsewhere, and in that a U.S. failure in Iraq would be heralded as a 
disastrous defeat by Al Qaeda and others, potentially increasing the threat from them in the 
future (Metz, 2004).  The case that Afghanistan is part of the GWOT is much stronger, but there 
is no reason to believe that increasing insurgent activity in the summer of 2008 cannot be 
addressed with modifications of an essentially classical model of counterinsurgency. 
 In other words, the classical model, with small conceptual modification (and larger 
tactical modification), is proving to be effective where our soldiers are fighting insurgents among 
 183
a local national population regardless of the motivation of the particular insurgents.  Indeed, it is 
probably easier to separate foreign-born jihadis from the population than the native insurgents, in 
part, because the jihadis are outsiders and are subject to the same “half-life” rule that Americans 
are.   
In the global arena, soldiers, in large numbers, are not confronting the enemy, so their 
knowledge of appropriate theory for conducting that struggle is moot.  The interagency 
strategists in Washington or in embassies around the world need to know how to combat these 
effects.  Thus, the real conceptual division between sets of techniques developed to combat local 
national effects and transnational effects needs to be where the people involved change—at the 
battle handover.  
 If we insisted on having a single model for all counterinsurgency, it might look like an 
onion with concentric layers that correspond to the layers of strategy required to meet all 
insurgents’ threats. Tentatively, it might look like Figure 4-2. 
 In the tentative “onion” model depicted here, I have identified four levels that require 
separate campaign plans.  Expanding from the center, we have the local operational level, the 
theater strategic level, the U.S. national strategic level, and the global strategic level. The first is 
the “tip of the spear” where American soldiers encounter both insurgents and common people on 
the streets and in rural areas of nations in conflict.  At this level, soldiers provide security and 
conduct focused combat operations, assist in governance capacity-building, train local national 
security forces, assist in the restoration of essential services, and encourage economic pluralism 
(Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005; FM 3-24, 2006).  These categories of activities are termed logical 
lines of operation (LLOs) in FM 3-24. 
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Theater Strategic (Local national) 
Local Operational 
Battle Handover 
 
Figure 4-2: Layers of Insurgent Effects Requiring Separate Campaign Plans. 
 
The second level develops the overall strategy for the campaign in the local nation, 
integrating the LLOs at that level. Additionally, it is concerned with isolating the insurgents from 
external support through border interdiction, denying sanctuary areas throughout the country, 
and assisting the host nation to develop national political, economic, and security institutions to 
assist in the subsequent development of the country.  
The third is concerned with protecting the American center of gravity, which is U.S. 
public support of a counterinsurgency or nation-building effort abroad (Claessen, 2007).  At this 
level, the U.S. government is also concerned with defending American borders, controlling the 
movement of people and materials across our borders, developing defensive strategies and 
damage mitigation plans in the event of an attack on American soil.  
The final level concerns American diplomatic, informational, military, and economic 
initiatives to isolate global insurgents and the global dimension of local national insurgencies. 
These include all sorts of aid to develop capacity of partner nations in the rule of law, law 
enforcement, strategic intelligence, and so on. They also include cooperation with the 
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counterpart agencies of all governments that will assist us.  Military support at this level is 
almost entirely training, advising, and supporting foreign militaries, but it may include the rare 
precision attack on identified key targets, i.e. if bin Laden were located, the military or other 
agency might employ violent action to kill or capture him.   
 The real difference in execution from one level to another may not be in separate lists of 
principles or other types of models that guide action, but in the people and agencies that conduct 
the effort at each level. The military carries the lion’s share of the burden at the first two levels 
whenever U.S. troops are committed to counterinsurgent combat. At the larger two levels, other 
agencies carry the burden.  There is a “battle handover” between the second and third level. 
 My original research question asked “what principles military officers need to understand 
to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency.”  That question presupposed the large scale 
commitment of soldiers to a local national insurgency.  I now see that this does not necessarily 
answer “what principles American strategists need to understand…” 
 I think the list of classical principles with modifications will serve campaign planners at 
the local operational level well and is probably useful to theater strategic planners as well.  My 
guess is that the list of principles will also assist planners at the global strategic level, although 
the techniques will be very different.  The causes and objectives of the important groups, the 
relevant populations, the information environment, the nature of external support and sanctuary, 
the nature of mobility and dispersal, the legal infrastructure, and the nature of interagency and 
multinational cooperation will all be very different.  But these issues will all still be relevant, and 
so the identified principles will still be useful. 
 Given that the people and agencies conducting the effort, the answers to relevant 
questions, and the techniques selected for implementation are very different beneath and above 
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the battle handover line, it might be best to address each situation with a separate modification of 
counterinsurgency theory.  It might be best to have two or more models, sharing a common 
ancestry, that each addresses a different level of conflict.  Given the uniqueness of every 
situation in which counterinsurgency is an appropriate response (i.e. Iraq is very different from 
Afghanistan), one of these several general models will be selected and refined to be most useful 
in that situation. The list of principles can serve as one basis of more specialized models. 
 I have imagined the use of these principles as a checklist that tells campaign planners the 
things that need to be addressed.  I have imagined that the list might be useful in both the global 
and local national arenas.  I have not claimed that the list is exhaustive, and I expect that users of 
the list would modify it to be more useful at the level in which they work. 
It is likely that additional models will be useful for understanding the entire 
counterinsurgency problem.  Some of these will nest within this list of principles, such as the 
LLOs model, that is one way of looking at interagency coordination.  Other models may be 
parallel.  A systems analysis model, such as that found in Lynn (2005), is a graphical depiction 
of an insurgency.  The model depicts key relationships and resource and influence flows among 
actors, but does not provide the detail that would enable campaign planning.  A model such as 
this might be useful alongside a set of principles such as I have produced. These models may 
vary from level to level. 
Stage 3: Testing the Model Against Contemporary Experience 
Stage 2 showed that the classical principles emerging from Stage 1 are remarkably 
durable despite important changes in the contemporary political environment and in the nature of 
insurgency.  Of course, the practical application of the principles required important modification 
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for use at the tactical level.  It only remains to test the list of principles against the judgment of 
recently published scholarship. 
The research objective that motivated the Stage 3 investigation was the fourth: “Test 
modified principles against literature emerging from ‘contemporary experience’ to determine 
additional changes required to a list of counterinsurgency principles.”  Since Stage 2 required no 
additions or deletions from the list of principles, I coded a series of articles from the last decade 
in the same way I coded classical theorists in Stage 1.  The results are presented in a series of 
thirteen one-page tables in the following pages. 
The list of principles remained durable and relevant.  In fact, little further discussion was 
required.  Most of the key points were discussed in Stage 2.  The tables contain some discussion 
internally; the section in each labeled “Caveats and Commentary” contains additional quotes that 
seemed to challenge the consensus or voice a disagreement.  These are contained in quotes to 
distinguish them from my commentary which is in bold face type. 
 Only two more issues can benefit from clarification.  One, the consensus that cultural 
awareness is important for a counterinsurgency effort comes out much more strongly in the 
recent scholarship than it does in the classical literature (see Table 4-21).  The recent literature 
asserts strongly that cultural awareness is critical to the efforts of foreign soldiers to conduct 
counterinsurgency.  Two, the classical theorists believed that the government must establish 
security in an area before the significant interagency work could begin (see Table 4-28).  This 
created an established sequence for localized counterinsurgency campaigns.  However, Chiarelli 
and Michaelis (2005) and Mooney (2007) have argued that economic recovery and restoration of 
essential services are helpful in the struggle to establish security.  This implies simultaneous  
efforts to establish security and build political and economic capacity.  This may be because 
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urban residents depend on government services, critical infrastructures, and economic exchange 
for daily necessities.  A rural population is much more self-sufficient, at least in the short run, 
growing its own food and making do without water systems, sewer, trash collection, and the like.  
Therefore, in rural areas there is not as strong an imperative to restore or maintain these systems.  
In fact, in some rural areas, these systems have never existed.  
 The remainder of the issues presented requires no commentary other than what appears in 
the table.  The authors are quite capable of speaking for themselves.
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 Table 4-16. Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political 
reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
… specific grievances against the ruling regime usually supplied the most compelling arguments for the 
[insurgents’] claim to legitimacy (Lynn, 2005, p. 22). 
 
… the insurgent can inflict a political penalty on the government by prolonging the conflict, changing the 
perception of its nature (e.g., from a “war of liberation” to a “war against imperialist oppression and cruelty”), 
and/or increasing its cost. None of these require the insurgent to attain military victory (Claessen, 2007, p. 99). 
 
If there is little change in the number of violent incidents, whether the military outcome is tactical victory or defeat 
almost does not matter: the constituent concludes that ‘realities’ do not fit his expectations and becomes frustrated 
[and suspends his support of the government’s effort] (Claessen, 2007, p. 101). 
 
With the mass migration of humanity to cities and the inability of developing nations to keep abreast of basic city 
services relative to growth, discontent erupts. Such conditions create advantageous conditions ripe for 
fundamentalist ideologue recruitment (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 5). 
 
The security of the people must be assured as a basic need, along with food, water, shelter, health care, and a 
means of living. These are human rights, along with freedom of worship, access to education, and equal rights for 
women. The failure of counterinsurgencies and the root cause of the insurgencies themselves can often be traced to 
government disregard of these basic rights (Sepp, 2005, p. 9). 
 
At a somewhat finer level of resolution, successful insurgencies had four characteristics in common… 
Effective ideology. There are many variants of effective insurgent ideologies, but [they] are unifying and 
mobilizing (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 3). 
 
An insurgency is born when a governing power fails to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, 
endemic corruption, crime, various forms of radicalism, or rising expectations. The margin of error is narrower for 
an outside occupying power than for an inept or repressive national regime as people tend to find the mistakes or 
bad behavior by one of their own more tolerable than that of outsiders (Metz, 2004, p. 26). 
 
This attitude was sufficiently well ingrained throughout the Vietnam era that the enemy’s destruction on military 
terms prevailed as the dominant operational intent, despite the many indicators that might have driven the Army 
towards the necessary realization that the military objectives must be subordinate to wider political goals (Aylwin-
Foster, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Caveats and Commentary: 
 
 “Victory against the fervent and fanatical individual who finds the notion of transcendence through death enticing 
rather than forbidding, will not be gained by out-governing those that do not seek to govern. Nor will the solution 
to today’s so-called ‘irregular’ challenges be found by laminating yesterday’s framework into current doctrine and 
strategy” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 84). 
 
Hoffman believes the hearts and minds of religiously-motivated people cannot be won by better governance 
or better economic opportunity.  I think he is wrong.  Not everyone is a fanatic, and political, social, and 
economic overtures can separate the many average Muslims from the fanatic Islamists.  
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Table 4-17. Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
For a counterinsurgency to succeed, the majority of the population must eventually come to see insurgents as 
outsiders, as outlaws (Lynn, 2005, p. 27). 
 
The LLOs [logical lines of operation- a model of interagency coordination espoused by FM 3-24] clearly situate 
the population as the centre of gravity in COIN… According to the FM, stability and security lead to Host-Nation 
legitimacy which is mostly a function of popular perception (Mattox & Rodgers, p. 109). 
 
The majority of the counterinsurgent’s electorate is only marginally interested in politics. In a democracy, three 
types of actors can generate the political interactions necessary to make the neutral majority choose sides on an 
issue: the government, the opposition, and active minorities (Claessen, 2007, p. 98). 
 
The first group [of several groups] defined as insurgents (and terrorists) [in Iraq] were those who cannot be 
changed, who cannot be influenced, and who, although politically and ethnically different in scope, had essentially 
the same desired endstate— to perceptually delegitimize the current Iraqi Government and drive a wedge between 
the Iraqi populace and coalition forces  (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 5). 
 
The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States 
and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate the base and other networked terrorist groups who seek 
sanctuary, support, and recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas where the humiliated and the have-nots 
struggle to survive (Cassidy, 2004, p. 41). 
 
Simultaneously, Hezbollah developed a popular base by providing social services to the neglected and 
impoverished Shia community (Mooney, 2007, p. 32). 
 
The key to winning the war against the insurgency is to separate the insurgents from the surrounding population 
(McFate, 2005, p. 40). 
 
Similarly, the operational art of counterinsurgency remains fundamentally concerned with displacing enemy 
influence from social networks, supplanting insurgent support within the population, and maneuvering to 
marginalize the enemy and deny them a popular base. Thus, at the operational level, counterinsurgency remains a 
competition between several sides, each seeking to mobilize the population in its cause. The people remain the 
prize (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 6). 
 
Observation Number 4 reminds us that increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success… we began to 
realize that more important than our winning Iraqi hearts and minds was doing all that we could to ensure that as 
many Iraqis as possible felt a stake in the success of the new Iraq (Petraeus, 2006, p.  5). 
Caveats and Commentary: 
 
“The insurgents were wealthier than the population, and routinely paid poverty-stricken locals to conduct attacks 
for cash. Thus, efforts to isolate the insurgents (intended, based on classical theory, to hurt the guerrillas… had 
precisely the opposite effect [of depriving people of income]” (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7). 
 
This is a special case where isolating insurgents prevented them from paying common people to plant 
bombs, etc.  Improved economic opportunities will decrease incidence of this phenomenon. 
 
“A successful insurgency requires only the active support of a small cadre and acquiescence from the rest” (Metz, 
2004, p. 32). 
 
Metz, among others, explains that an active minority of supporters can take power if the neutral middle—
the uninterested, uncommitted, fence-sitters—acquiesce. 
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Table 4-18. Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before 
they can give support to the government 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Historically, the critical test of legitimacy is the ability of one side or the other to guarantee the security of the 
population (Lynn, 2005, p. 23). 
 
Lessons learned... Success cannot be achieved without providing the general population with security (Lynn, 2005, 
p. 27). 
 
Intimidation of the people, in particular, those who work for the coalition, public sector employees, and 
government officials is a technique used quite effectively… It takes few insurgents specifically targeting a small 
group of select individuals to achieve resonance across a large portion of the population (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 
2005, p. 5-6). 
 
‘Kiss of Death’ syndrome 
We ‘surge’ into areas and introduce civil programs, which exposes moderates and cooperative leaders to 
insurgents.  Then security improves, we reduce our presence in that district.  Then insurgents kill those who 
cooperated with us (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 22). 
 
Every insurgent attack that occurs, even if the attackers lose more lives than the defenders, is a victory for the 
insurgents because it fuels fear among the public and dissatisfaction with the governing power, both within the 
beleaguered country and internationally (Metz, 2004, p. 33). 
 
Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were mistaken. A 
gun on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to 
long-term security grounded in a democratic process (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 4). 
 
What is certain, though, is that the delicate tasks of building governmental capacity and gaining the confidence of 
the people will not be accomplished in an environment characterized by chaos, violence, and fear (MNC-I 
Guidance, no date, p. 1) 
 
We must secure the population. This is our focus. It is the clearest, most visible demonstration of excellence in the 
practice of counterinsurgency (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1). 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…  
1. Secure the people where they sleep. Population security is our primary mission, one that will take time, and one 
we must carry out deliberately (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
The people’s need for security has not changed.  If anything, the people’s dependence upon infrastructure 
and government services has increased due to urbanization.  The vulnerability of these to attack makes the 
government’s job of maintaining order and ensuring safety more difficult. 
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Table 4-19. Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the 
government  
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of a people, but an intervening power does well simply to 
gain willing compliance with its policy. To speak of winning hearts and minds is probably misleading (Lynn, 2005, 
p. 24) 
 
The ultimate determinant of the outcome in an insurgency is the perception of the eventual outcome held by the 
parties involved—the insurgents, the counterinsurgents, the population, and, to a lesser extent, other actors. If the 
counterinsurgents are able to create and sustain the impression that no matter how long it takes, they will ultimately 
persevere, they will (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Observation Number 2 is that, in a situation like Iraq, the liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of 
liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation (Petraeus, 2006, p. 4). 
 
This race against the clock in Iraq has been complicated by the extremely high expectations of the Iraqi people, 
their pride in their own abilities, and their reluctant admission that they needed help from Americans, in particular 
(Petraeus, 2006, p. 4). 
 
The essence of Observation Number 5—that we should analyze costs and benefits of operations before each 
operation—is captured in a question we developed over time and used to ask before the conduct of operations: 
‘Will this operation,’ we asked, ‘take more bad guys off the street than it creates by the way it is conducted?’ 
(Petraeus, 2006, p. 5). 
 
… as soon as possible after completion of an operation, we explained to the citizens in the affected areas what 
we’d done and why we did it (Petraeus, 2006, p. 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
The increasing importance of the political and psychological dimensions of the struggle increases the 
emphasis that the government must place on persuasion.  Moreover, the government’s inability to control 
information flows means that the insurgents’ story will be told.  The government must have a story that can 
compete. 
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Table 4-20. Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and 
encourage support 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Military forces learned to act in a way that did not convey the impression that they regarded the general population 
as enemies. A population that increasingly saw counterinsurgents as providing security was increasingly likely to 
support them and provide them with vital intelligence (Lynn, 2005, p. 27). 
 
 
Setting the right tone ethically is another hugely important task [for military leaders]. If leaders fail to get this right, 
winking at the mistreatment of detainees or at manhandling of citizens, for example, the result can be a sense in the 
unit that ‘anything goes.’ Nothing can be more destructive in an element than such a sense (Petraeus, 2006, p. 10). 
 
Your actions at the tactical level resonate throughout the communities you protect and are amplified beyond - 
shaping how audiences across the world perceive the state of progress in Iraq. What you do, how you do it, and 
how people view it—everyday—matters (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1). 
 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…  
2. Give the people justice and honor. Iraqis value justice and honor. In the counterinsurgency fight, we want the 
hands that bring security to be the hands that help bring justice and honor as well… As a rule, treat Iraqis with 
genuine dignity and respect so as to earn their trust. Deal with complaints and abuses quickly and publicly (MNC-I 
Guidance, no date, p. 1-2). 
As an illustration of the contrasts, one senior Iraqi official who worked closely with the Coalition had his house 
twice subjected to routine search by U.S. Army personnel. On one occasion the troops displayed exemplary 
awareness of cultural sensitivities, such as appropriate treatment of women in the household. On the other, the 
aggressive behavior of troops from a battalion newly arrived in theatre led to his formal complaint, with 
consequent apology from a U.S. General Officer (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5). 
The other widely held view, amongst non-U.S. participants in theatre, was that the U.S. Army was too often 
insensitive to the cultural nuances of the situation. In practical terms this amounts to a variation of the ‘too kinetic’ 
theme [too much emphasis on violent action], since the effect was potentially the same—to undermine popular 
support for the Coalition campaign (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5). 
The most short-sighted statements I hear are: ‘They only understand force.’ Or, ‘If only we could take the gloves 
off, we could win.’ The truth is that everyone understands force, and everyone can be battered or intimidated by 
violence, but such use of violence generates the three ’Rs’: resentment, resistance, and revenge (Lynn, 2005, p. 
27). 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
The increased incidence of foreign intervention into internal conflicts of various types requires a high 
standard of professionalism to counteract the phenomena that Mills (2007) described as “national 
chauvinism.” 
 
Local national soldiers must behave professionally to convince people that the government offers security 
and justice. 
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Table 4-21. Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Hence, it may be impossible for counterinsurgent forces to perceive the true meaning of insurgent actions, or 
influence populations and their perceptions, without access to local culture. Many links in the jihad – and virtually 
all the grievances and energies that circulate within it – are culturally determined. Culture is intimately connected 
with language, since humans use language to make sense of reality and communicate meaning. Therefore, in 
counterinsurgency, linguistic and cultural competence is a critical combat capability (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 613). 
 
Linguistic and cultural competence must exist at several levels within a counterinsurgent force. At the most basic 
level, everyone in the force – regardless of role – must have a basic degree of cultural awareness…At the 
intermediate level, planners, intelligence personnel, civil-military operations teams and advisers need higher levels 
of cultural understanding… At the highest level of cultural capability, key personnel need an ability to use culture 
to generate leverage within an insurgent system… At this level, individuals are bilingual and bi-cultural, and can 
exploit cultural norms and expectations to generate operational effects (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 613). 
This clear understanding of cultural norms directly applied to our actions when planning, preparing, and executing 
all operations (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Cultural awareness and understanding how insurgents gain support from the center of gravity became the important 
campaign consideration (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 9-10). 
 
Moreover, in Iraq (a community-based insurgency), or Afghanistan (a tribally-based insurgency), the blood feuds 
and community alienation arising from this would be more severe than in Vietnam, where professional party cadres 
(often from other districts) were often key targets (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7). 
Moreover, whilst they were almost unfailingly courteous and considerate, at times their cultural insensitivity, 
almost certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 3). 
The other widely held view, amongst non-U.S. participants in theatre, was that the U.S. Army was too often 
insensitive to the cultural nuances of the situation (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5). 
 
Observation Number 9, cultural awareness is a force multiplier, reflects our recognition that knowledge of the 
cultural ‘terrain’ can be as important as and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographic 
terrain (Petraeus, 2006, p. 8). 
 
Working in another culture is enormously difficult if one doesn’t understand the ethnic groups, tribes, religious 
elements, political parties, and other social groupings—and their respective viewpoints; the relationships among 
the various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course, local and 
national leaders. Understanding of such cultural aspects is essential if one is to help the people build stable 
political, social, and economic institutions (Petraeus, 2006, p. 8). 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…  
7. Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level. When it comes to language capacity, cultural 
awareness, and a having a ‘feel’ for what is normal in the local environment, Coalition forces are at a natural 
disadvantage (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2). 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
Most modern authors think cultural awareness is critical to the success of an international intervention.  
Foreign soldiers are already at a disadvantage, and the inability of those soldiers to interpret cultural 
nuances and behave in a culturally sensitive manner undermines their effort.  This modern consensus is 
much stronger than the classical consensus. 
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Table 4-22. Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple 
audiences 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Lessons learned...  
Popular support within the United States is our most vulnerable center of gravity (Lynn, 2005, p. 27). 
 
Public Diplomacy and Development. Getting the right message across with cultural nuances, and linking security 
and development, is as important—and difficult—to do today as it was in Vietnam (Mills, 2007, Contemporary 
constraints section, para 6). 
 
As a result, there are two fronts in a counterinsurgency: the insurgent’s population base, and the counterinsurgent’s 
electorate (Claessen, 2007, p. 98). 
 
Computers and the Internet, cell phones, and fax machines have enabled small, well-organized groups to gain 
media traction and set parts of the political agenda (Claessen, 2007, p. 99-100). 
 
Right or wrong, the fence-sitters (and the population as a whole) believe that because America put a man on the 
moon, it can do anything—and do it quickly. When we fail to produce…they believe it is because we, as a 
coalition, do not want to fix it (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 7). 
 
Informational campaigns explain to the population what they can do to help their government make them secure 
from terrorist insurgents; encourage participation in the political process by voting in local and national elections; 
and convince insurgents they can best meet their personal interests and avoid the risk of imprisonment or death by 
reintegrating themselves into the population through amnesty, rehabilitation, or by simply not fighting (Sepp, 2005, 
p. 10). 
 
Information operations are vital, as locals who perceive that the deployed force is providing them a tangible benefit 
are much more likely to inform of possible dangers and plots (Mooney, 2007, p. 31). 
 
COIN ops are fundamentally perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the 
population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 46). 
 
More generally, given pervasive media presence, the demeanor of a single soldier or official instantaneously 
communicates more about the state of a campaign than any public information operation (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 6) 
 
Transparency, itself flowing from information technology, globalization, and the international flow of people, has 
changed the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit information and build linkages, but 
harder to sustain (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles… 
9. Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what PAOs say, we must be mindful of the 
impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media… we should remember to 
communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first. U.S. global audiences can follow (MNC-I Guidance, no date, 
p. 3) 
 
Caveats and Commentary: 
 
Propaganda is even more important than before.  Communication technology ensures the insurgents’ story 
will get out. 
 
 “This article holds that to maintain resolve, the counterinsurgent should seek to minimize publicity about the 
conflict rather than try to drum up public support for it” (Claessen, 2007, p. 97). 
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Table 4-23. Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the 
insurgent 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Control arises from a combination of coercion and consent. The more any government has of one, the less it needs 
of the other. Counterinsurgents almost always lack the coercive power to control the environment – thus building 
consent is key (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 45). 
 
Insurgents rely on members of the population for concealment, sustenance, and recruits, so they must be isolated 
from the people by all means possible. Among the most effective means are such population-control measures as 
vehicle and personnel checkpoints and national identity cards (Sepp, 2005, p. 10). 
 
The isolation achieved in Malaya was literal and physical, but in a more figurative sense, counterinsurgents must 
be able to isolate insurgents from their support base to achieve victory (Lynn, 2005, p. 26). 
 
As chaotic and unsafe conditions continue, it becomes increasingly likely that the governing authority’s inability to 
control the situation will attract some citizens to the insurgents’ cause (Bensahel, 2006, p. 285). 
  
The acceptance of this tripartite ethnic – religious division [Sunni, Shia, Kurds] underpinned the way in which the 
Interim Iraqi Council was organized. It also increasingly grounded the way in which the US occupation force, like 
Saddam before it, sought to establish and maintain control via the use of what were perceived as traditional tribal 
leaders and structures (Berger & Borer, 2007, p. 210). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
Control of information is much more difficult than before.  Control of movement can be enhanced by 
networked computer databases, there is so much movement, both locally and about the globe, that control is 
still very difficult and resource intensive.  Nevertheless, control of people and of resources is necessary for 
effective counterinsurgency. 
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Table 4-24. Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need for sanctuary 
or bases to build strength 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
… because of the phenomenon of failed and failing states, and under-administered areas between states (such as 
the tribal areas on the Pakistan/Afghan border). This allows geographical sanctuary for insurgents, while 
international flows of information and finances provide ‘cyber-sanctuaries’ (like the Al Qaeda Internet presence 
described above) for insurgents (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 608). 
 
Border crossings must be restricted to deny terrorist insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty 
(Sepp, 2005, p. 11.) 
 
The task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent emplacing an improvised explosive 
device, and it could win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the 
campaign if the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary (Chiarelli 
& Michaelis, 2005, p. 9). 
 
We also chose an indirect approach, through co-option of the populace using information operations, to deny the 
terrorist physical and psychological sanctuary in an effort to thwart their objectives (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, 
p. 6). 
 
The global reach of the United States is likely to preclude any nation, even Iran or Syria, from providing overt 
sanctuary to Iraqi insurgents, causing the movement to remain more inchoate than the Palestinian insurgency, with 
Iraqi leadership shadowy and its form a loose amalgamation of diverse groups unified only by a shared dislike of 
U.S. occupation. For the United States, this news is both good and bad as this form will limit the strength of the 
insurgency but will also make it headless, without a clear center of gravity, and thus difficult to kill (Metz, 2004, p. 
31). 
 
Would-be insurgents and terrorists go where the people and money are; they seek security by hiding among the 
population and within the complexity of a modern-day metropolis. Sanctuary and safe bases were gained in the 
past through distance and complex terrain, far from a government’s power center (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76).  
 
The classic guerrilla setting was the mountainous hideout, the dense forest, or wild jungle. These settings offered 
sanctuary for insurgent forces to train and rest. They also afforded the insurgent the cover, protection, and 
sustenance required. This type of cover and support is even greater in cities with heterogeneous populations, 
locations in which guerrillas may freely exist (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76). 
 
Yet if even a small percentage of the local population is sympathetic to the militants’ cause, they can provide the 
sanctuary and local intelligence necessary to conduct insurgent operations (Bensahel, 2006, p. 279). 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
Sanctuary is still necessary, but it is not the same as in the 1950s and 1960s.  Today, insurgents seek 
sanctuary by hiding among urban populations.  Additionally, insurgents can seek material, moral and 
financial support; advice and recruits online as well as publish propaganda.  The internet creates as cyber-
sanctuary that has many of the same benefits as a physical sanctuary. 
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Table 4-25. Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require 
external support 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Because outside aid for insurgents is primarily material support, the best way to stop it is by interdicting the flow 
of equipment, not undermining popular support within the outside power. This fight is more physical than political 
(Lynn, 2005, p. 25). 
 
Whereas major outside states intervened on the part of insurgents during the Cold War, in today’s era of globalized 
economies and globalized insurgency, assistance comes from non-state actors—individuals and radical Islamic 
groups eager to attack what they see as the anti-Islamic United States (Lynn, 2005, p. 27). 
 
Border crossings must be restricted to deny terrorist insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty 
(Sepp, 2005, p. 11.) 
 
A method of obtaining resources In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) 
funding; 3) equipment/supplies; 4) sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence. These can be provided, seized, or created. 
Provided resources can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of the 
counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents) 
(Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 3). 
 
Insurgent movements can no longer depend on external sponsors for all or most of their resources and therefore 
must devote an extensive amount of effort to fundraising or income generation (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Clearly, the insurgents require access to resources, particularly arms and money (Metz, 2004, p. 28). 
Population control and border security can shut off physical support (Crane, 2007, p. 59). 
In today’s interconnected world, financial support for an insurgency can come from a variety of sources (Crane, 
2007, p. 59). 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
External support is still critical.  It is more likely to come from non-state actors or from diaspora 
populations than during he Cold War. 
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Table 4-26. Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to 
insurgent survival 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
By contrast, today’s insurgents often employ diffuse, cell-based structures and ‘leaderless resistance’ (Kilcullen, 
2006a, p. 7). 
 
No equivalent [to highly developed Viet Cong political infrastructure] exists in Iraq or Afghanistan, where 
independent cells and micro-movements cooperate in constantly shifting alliances of convenience (Kilcullen, 
2006a, p. 7). 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…  
4. Get out and walk - move mounted, work dismounted… Patrol on foot to gain and maintain contact with the 
population and the enemy. That's the only way to dominate urban terrain (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2). 
Additionally, the globalized, media-savvy nature of today’s insurgents contrasts with their bottom-up, cellular 
organizational structure. The former allows them unparalleled access to sources of support, recruits and marketing, 
while their operational structure both provides security and assists it in replicating itself and its actions without 
active leadership oversight. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and in many 
dimensions with unprecedented demands for intelligence gathering and analysis, interoperability and flexibility, 
and cultural sensitivity and understanding (Mills, 2007, Introductory section, para 3). 
Unless you [the tactical counterinsurgent] ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, 
the insurgents will consistently out-run and outmaneuver you (Kilcullen, 2006b, p. 104). 
Mobility is imperative (Cassidy, 2004, p. 42). 
As evidenced by the insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Columbia, rural  insurgencies have not 
vanished, but the complex terrain of the world’s amorphous urban centers is fast becoming the insurgent and 
terrorist’s jungle of the twenty-first century (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76). 
 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
Mobility and dispersal are still essential.  Today, insurgents are more likely to be dispersed among urban 
populations than in the past, and mobility now might include the ability to travel internationally. 
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Table 4-27. Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
As a result, the government became even more blind and dependent on the wrong kind of counterinsurgent 
operations and resorted to illegal actions contrary to its laws and its own people’s concept of justice. Arrest without 
clear cause, imprisonment without trial, torture, and summary executions could produce short-term results, but 
undermine the government’s legitimacy and eventually lead to defeat (Lynn, 2005, p. 25). 
 
Although brutally repressive dictatorships use terror and torture against their own people and survive by doing so, 
the United States cannot afford to use such tactics. It is given that whatever U.S. forces do will be subjected to 
intense media scrutiny: secrets are nearly impossible to keep. Morality should guide us, but even if the cynical 
might cast it aside, realists would still have to admit that if the United States were to support horribly oppressive 
regimes, doing so would undercut public support of U.S. foreign policy (Lynn, 2005, p. 25). 
 
Each of our case studies and the contemporary SMT [social movement theory] works discussed above indicate that 
omitting or insufficiently employing the ‘Governance’ LLO [logical line of operation- an interagency coordination 
model] is severely damaging to COIN campaigns (Mattox & Rodgers, p. 112). 
 
Based on the evidence detailed above, leaders planning COIN [counterinsurgency] campaigns must focus on 
emphasizing the rule of law and ensure political inclusion is an integral part of their strategic planning in COIN 
(Mattox & Rodgers, p. 112). 
 
In turn, an incorrupt, functioning judiciary must support the police (Sepp, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Emergency conditions dictate that a government needs a single, fully empowered executive to direct and 
coordinate counter-insurgency effort (Sepp, 2005, p. 11). 
 
One of the most widely recognized of these [accepted counterinsurgency] principles is the fact that 
counterinsurgency operations should focus on developing effective governance and enhancing the government’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Mooney, 2007, p. 33). 
 
If good governance and enhancing governmental legitimacy are key to defeating an insurgency, then the long-term 
solution to the cycle of violence in Lebanon requires more than military action; such as economic development, 
social reconciliation, and the enhancement of government capacity (Mooney, 2007, p. 34) 
 
Clearly, Western liberal democracies cannot resort to repression of the population, (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary 
 
Effective governance is still critical.  The government must still obey the law, or the world will know of it.  
Emergency legal measures may still be required to cope with the demands of insurgency. 
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Table 4-28. Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; 
Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required) 
 
Contemporary Quotations: 
 
Likewise, successful classic counterinsurgency in the Americas, Africa and Asia has been closely tied to improvements 
in governance, integrated administrative systems and joint inter-agency action (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 607). 
 
Unity of Effort. Having a single actor with the authority to direct effort down all the lines of operation remains key to 
success today, as it was when the British used a committee system to achieve unity of effort in Malaya (Mills, 2007, 
Contemporary constraints section, para 5) 
 
Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace.  Penetration did not 
occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; 
training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that 
would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO ) campaign that 
supported the cultural realities of the area of operations (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 4). 
 
UNIFIL deployed [to southern Lebanon] without any organic civil affairs or information operations units, leaving it 
without a structured means to interface with local leaders, to craft and disseminate messages, or to leverage information 
and influence the population (Mooney, 2007, p. 31). 
 
Separation of the insurgents from the supporting population requires provisioning economic, social, and police security 
to the civilian population; establishing trust, especially through long-term relationships; and removing incentives for 
joining or supporting the insurgency (McFate, 2005, p. 40). 
 
Observation Number 7… is that everyone must do nation-building (Petraeus, 2006, p. 6). 
 
Observation Number 10 is… that success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations (Petraeus, 
2006, p. 8). 
 
Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…  
3. Integrate civilian and military efforts - this is an interagency, combined arms fight… we must purposely synchronize 
efforts to improve local security with initiatives aimed at making progress in governance and economic development. 
This requires fully integrating our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2). 
 
 
 
Caveats and Commentary: 
 
The importance of interagency functioning cannot be overstated.  The complexity of an essentially political 
problem requires the complexity of a multi-disciplinary response.  There is one change: 
 
“No longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations by believing that if 
you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially toward establishing critical infrastructure and 
governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence” (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 15).  
 
Furthermore: 
“The proponents for heavy military assistance point to the need to stabilize the security situation first, but the 
requirement for jobs and services has proven to be an equally essential part of the security equation in post-conflict 
interventions” (Mooney, 2007, p. 36). 
 
The classical theorists usually taught that security had to be established before nation-building can begin.  These 
two articles conclude that nation-building initiatives must be part of establishing security.   
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Summary and Recommendations for Further Research 
Summary 
  Preliminary research isolated a set of thirteen candidate principles that military officers 
need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency.  A metasynthesis of 
eight classical theorists of counterinsurgency seeking support for and consensus on these 
principles discovered considerable consensus on all of them.  This led me to conclude that all 
principles were valid, and that the set could be considered a “classical” model of 
counterinsurgency for use in counterinsurgency campaign planning. The classical principles are 
found in Table 5-1 on the following page. 
 The contemporary global political environment is very different from that the classical 
theorists faced. Therefore, additional research attempted to understand the changes in the 
environment and in the nature of insurgency to determine the changes necessary to update the 
classical model.  The most important changes in the environment included the end of the Cold 
War and of superpower rivalry, the increase in the number and influence of important non-state 
actors, urbanization, and globalization of media and communications technologies.   
 Corresponding changes in the nature of insurgency included the changed objectives of 
insurgent groups; the globalization of local national struggles; the formation of global terrorist 
groups that can be perceived as insurgencies; the advent of networked, rather than hierarchical, 
insurgent organizations; and increased emphasis on the use of media to generate support for 
insurgent causes and to spread fear. 
Nevertheless, analysis found the classical principles to be remarkably durable.  While the 
tactics and techniques needed to put each principle into action might be very different from those 
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of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles remain valid, and are still useful for campaign planning in 
an insurgency localized to a single national state. 
 Table 5-1: Principles of Effective and Humane Counterinsurgency  
 
1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the 
political struggle is always primary 
 
2: The population is the center of gravity 
 
 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the 
government 
 
 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government 
 
  2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support 
 
  2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents 
 
  2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences 
 
2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent  
 
3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength 
 
3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support 
 
3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival 
 
4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law 
 
4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to 
win (capacity-building will be required) 
 
 
 The analysis also determined that the globalized nature of insurgency, where local 
national insurgencies can spill over a state’s borders and achieve global effects, and where 
transnational insurgencies can achieve effects both globally and locally, suggested the refinement 
of two or more counterinsurgency models that, while sharing common ancestry, permit the 
development and utilization of different techniques to combat them.  The models should focus 
not on the definition of the insurgent group as a local national or transnational insurgency, but 
upon the arena—global or local—where each type achieves its effects.  Furthermore, it was 
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posited that the list of principles emerging from the metasynthesis and examined in the light of 
the contemporary environment might serve as a common starting point for multiple more 
specialized models.  Research indicates the principles are very useful for opposing local national 
insurgencies, or more precisely, for combating the local national effects of any insurgency.  The 
hypothesis that the principles might be useful for combating transnational insurgent effects is a 
topic for further research. 
Finally, the model was tested against recent scholarship reflecting recent experience in 
countering both localized and global insurgency.  This additional level of synthesis confirmed 
the validity of the list of principles for localized counterinsurgency and again suggested it may 
be valid for combating globalized insurgency as well. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 I found several additional topics to be interesting as I conducted this research: 
1) This study suggested that the list of classical principles may form the basis of a model 
for addressing the effects of globalized insurgency.  Additional research on this topic may 
support or reject this hypothesis. 
2) Other research efforts have led to various lists of principles that might be useful for 
conducting counterinsurgency (Please see the last section of Chapter 1 for some examples).  A 
metasynthesis performed on these lists would be informative.  A researcher would need to divide 
the lists into categories, i.e. descriptions of insurgency, recommended counterinsurgent 
strategies, “imperatives” (FM 3-24, 2006), “enduring principles” (Kilcullen, 2007), and so on, 
and then compare across each category to illuminate useful theory. 
3) Kilcullen (2006b) asserted that some people were good at counterinsurgency while 
others were not.  If this is true, it may be possible to identify traits that make one good at 
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counterinsurgency or separate those likely to be good from those who just are not suited to it.  
Several good temperament sorters and personality tests exist.  Results from one or more of these 
tests compared to the performance of individuals with counterinsurgency experience may 
produce some correlations.  The problem will be to define a “good” counterinsurgent. Currently, 
I know of no good way to do that. 
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Appendix 
 
Coding Sheet 
 
1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); 
the political struggle is always primary 
 
2: The population is the center of gravity 
 
 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support 
to the government 
 
 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government 
 
  2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support 
 
  2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents 
 
 
  2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences 
 
 
2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent  
 
 
3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength 
 
3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support 
 
3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival 
 
4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law 
 
4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not 
sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required) 
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